Cited by

-78 (Minn. 2015); see also Caldwell, d at 382 (stating appellate courts do not add language to a statute that the legislature omitted).

d 368, 370 (Minn. 2024) (determining that the state could be sued for an alleged violation of a dog-bite statute); (determining that the state could not be sued for alleged statutory tort violations); Smallwood v. State, Dep’t of Hum.

The language in Chapter 504B shows that the legislature intended the implied 10 Lowry argues that MPHA does not receive sovereign immunity because the supreme court declared that sovereign immunity does not apply to “counties, cities, or other forms of government.” n.5 (Minn. 2015).

of Sec’y of State, (pre-Franson decision holding that, “[b]ecause the issue presented by appellants in this case was not before the court in Alexander [v. Eilers, ], the Alexander opinion provides no authority”), aff’d sub nom, d 773 (Minn. 2015).

This provision is not itself the source of immunity; it instead “provides a framework for interpreting whether a separate statutory provision waives sovereign immunity.” d 773, 776 (Minn. 2015) (emphasis omitted).

Sovereign immunity “precludes litigation against the state unless the state has consented to suit.” Nichols v. State

(holding that permitting suit against “broad categories of entities” like person, firm, association, corporation, and organization does not waive the state’s immunity).

We have recognized that, in adopting the statute, the legislature “expressly waived the state’s sovereign immunity with respect to common-law tort claims.” Nichols v. State, Office of Secretary of State, aff’d

(interpreting Minn. Stat. § 181.64 and quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1274 (10th ed. 2014)).

Nichols v. State, Office of Secretary of State, d 20, 28 (Minn. App. 2014), aff’d

“[An appellate court’s] primary objective in interpreting statutory language is to give effect to the legislature’s intent as expressed in the language of the statute.” (quotation omitted).