State of Minnesota v. Anthony Paris Wilson

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-0763

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Anthony Paris Wilson,
Appellant.

Filed April 29, 2024
Affirmed
Connolly, Judge

Blue Earth County District Court
File No. 07-CR-21-2017

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Patrick R. McDermott, Blue Earth County Attorney, Megan E. Gaudette Coryell, Assistant
County Attorney, Mankato, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Amy Lawler, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Smith, Tracy M., Judge; and

Reilly, Judge.


Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
 NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

CONNOLLY, Judge

In this appeal from the final judgment, appellant argues that he must be allowed to

withdraw his guilty plea to third-degree criminal sexual conduct because his guilty plea

was constitutionally invalid. Alternatively, he argues that he must be allowed to withdraw

his guilty plea under the presentence fair-and-just standard. We affirm.

FACTS

In June 2021, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Anthony Wilson

with one count of third-degree criminal sexual conduct under Minn. Stat. § 609.344, subd.

1(b) (2020), and one count of fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct under Minn. Stat.

§ 609.345, subd. 1(b) (2020). The complaint alleged that on June 20, 2021, Wilson, who

was 25 years old at the time, sexually assaulted a 13-year-old girl. According to the

complaint, the victim reported that, while at Wilson’s residence, she gave Wilson oral sex,

and that Wilson touched her breasts and penetrated her vagina with his fingers.

Wilson entered a Norgaard plea1 to the third-degree criminal-sexual-conduct

charge. In exchange for Wilson’s guilty plea, the state agreed to dismiss the fourth-degree

criminal-sexual-conduct charge, and Wilson would be free to argue for a stayed sentence.

In October 2022, Wilson failed to appear for sentencing and a bench warrant was

issued. Wilson later moved to withdraw his guilty plea prior to sentencing under the fair-

and-just standard set forth in Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 2, claiming that he did not

1
State ex rel. Norgaard v. Tahash, 110 N.W.2d 867, 871 (Minn. 1961).

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fully understand the collateral consequences of his plea, including its impacts on his

employment and housing. The district court denied Wilson’s motion, concluding that

collateral consequences are not grounds for plea withdrawal and that the withdrawal of

Wilson’s plea would prejudice the state. The district court then stayed imposition of

sentence, placed Wilson on probation for seven years, and ordered him to serve 365 days

in jail. This appeal follows.

DECISION

Wilson challenges the district court’s denial of his request to withdraw his guilty

plea. He argues for the first time on appeal that his guilty plea is constitutionally invalid.

Wilson also contends that the district court abused its discretion in denying his request to

withdraw his guilty plea under the fair-and-just standard. These arguments are addressed

in turn.

A. Wilson’s guilty plea was constitutionally valid.

“A defendant has no absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea after entering it.” State

v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 93 (Minn. 2010). But a defendant may challenge the

constitutional validity of his guilty plea for the first time on direct appeal. Brown v. State,

449 N.W.2d 180, 182 (Minn. 1989). “To be constitutionally valid, a guilty plea must be

accurate, voluntary, and intelligent. A defendant bears the burden of showing his plea was

invalid. Assessing the validity of a plea presents a question of law that [appellate courts]

review de novo.” Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 94 (citations omitted).

Wilson challenges only the accuracy of his guilty plea. An accurate guilty plea

requires a factual basis “showing that the defendant’s conduct meets all elements of the

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offense to which he is pleading guilty.” State v. Jones, 921 N.W.2d 774, 779 (Minn. App.

2018), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 27, 2019). This requirement “is satisfied if the record

contains a showing that there is credible evidence available which would support a jury

verdict that [a] defendant is guilty of at least as great a crime as that to which he [pleaded]

guilty.” Nelson v. State, 880 N.W.2d 852, 859 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted).

Wilson entered a Norgaard plea to the alleged third-degree criminal-sexual-conduct

offense. “A plea constitutes a Norgaard plea if the defendant asserts an absence of memory

on the essential elements of the offense but pleads guilty because the record establishes,

and the defendant reasonably believes, that the state has sufficient evidence to obtain a

conviction.” Williams v. State, 760 N.W.2d 8, 12 (Minn. App. 2009), rev. denied (Minn.

Apr. 21, 2009). But a Norgaard plea must still be accurate, voluntary, and intelligent. Id.

at 11-12.

Here, the following colloquy between Wilson and his attorney was held on the

record at Wilson’s plea hearing:

Q: Do you[] recall having contact with [the victim and her
friend] in Blue Earth County [on June 20, 2021]?
A: Yes.
Q: Now on that date, when you did have contact with them[,]
[y]ou were drinking alcohol is that correct?
A: I didn’t start drinking until they brought the bottle.
Q: Okay, irrespective of who brought the alcohol, were you
drinking alcohol on that day?
A: Yes.
Q: [You were] also taking other medications or pills. Is that
correct?
A: Yes.
Q: And your memory of that night was impaired because you
. . . were impaired by alcohol and drugs. Is that correct?
A: Yes.

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 Wilson argues that his plea was invalid because, although he “agreed that his

memory was ‘impaired,’” he never claimed that he “lost memory of the alleged offense

due to amnesia or intoxication.” But Wilson’s signed plea petition states, “I intend to enter

a Norgaard plea” because “I was so drunk or so under the influence of drugs or medicine

that I did not know what I was doing at the time of the crime.” In addition, the signed

addendum to the plea petition states, “I do not recall the circumstances of the offenses.”

And the district court confirmed with Wilson on the record at his plea hearing that it was

his signature on the plea petition.

Moreover, the following colloquy occurred on the record at the plea hearing

between Wilson and his attorney related to his Norgaard plea:

Q: Finally, Mr. Wilson, we discussed what a[] Norgaard plea
is. Is that correct?
A: Yes.
Q: Is it your understanding that a Norgaard plea is where at
the time of the offense you were under the influence of alcohol
or a combination of alcohol and drugs? Let’s say you don’t
remember what happened is that correct?
A: Yes.
Q: In a Norgaard plea you understand that you do not assert a
claim of innocence. You basically agree with the State’s
evidence. You just don’t recall it and you wish to enter a plea
of guilty to take the benefit of a plea deal that the State has
extended to you. Is that why you’re entering a plea of guilty
today?
A: Yes.

Wilson further acknowledged on the record that his memory of the alleged offense was

“impaired by alcohol and drugs.” As such, the record does not support Wilson’s position

that “he never claimed that drug or alcohol use caused him to lose his memories.”

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 Wilson also contends that his guilty plea was invalid because “the factual basis for

the purported Norgaard plea was created solely through leading questions, and [he] never

explained in his own words the circumstances of the alleged offense or why he had decided

to enter the Norgaard plea.” We are not persuaded. Ordinarily, the parties establish a

proper factual basis “by questioning the defendant and asking the defendant to explain in

his or her own words the circumstances surrounding the crime.” State v. Ecker, 524

N.W.2d 712, 716 (Minn. 1994). But for Norgaard pleas, the parties must establish the

factual basis using other means. A Norgaard plea establishes an adequate factual basis by

requiring (1) a record that “clearly shows that in all likelihood the defendant committed the

offense” and (2) the defendant’s acknowledgment that the evidence is sufficient for a jury

to convict the defendant. Williams, 760 N.W.2d at 12-13. These two components “provide

the court with a basis to independently conclude that there is a strong probability that the

defendant would be found guilty of the charge to which he pleaded guilty.” Id. at 13.

The record here reflects that Wilson’s counsel summarized the evidence expected

to be presented at trial, which included evidence that (1) the victim was 13 years old on the

date of the alleged offense; (2) the victim would testify that “she gave [Wilson] sex and

that [Wilson’s] penis went inside of her mouth” and that Wilson was 25 years old at the

time; and (3) these events occurred in Blue Earth County. Wilson agreed that if all of this

evidence was presented at trial that a jury would find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

And Wilson agreed that he was not asserting a claim of innocence. These facts, in the

context of a Norgaard plea, provide an adequate factual basis to establish that Wilson was

guilty of violating Minn. Stat. § 609.344, subd. 1(b).

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 Moreover, although the Minnesota Supreme Court has “repeatedly discouraged the

use of leading questions to establish a factual basis,” the supreme court has “never held

that the use of leading questions automatically invalidates a guilty plea.” Nelson, 880

N.W.2d at 860. And Wilson cites to no authority that requires us to allow plea withdrawal

after the factual basis of a Norgaard plea was established using primarily leading questions,

despite the practice being disfavored. On this record, Wilson’s Norgaard plea was

supported by an adequate factual basis. Therefore, Wilson is unable to establish that his

guilty plea is constitutionally invalid.

B. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Wilson’s request to
withdraw his guilty plea under the fair-and-just standard.

Wilson also argues that, in the alternative, he must be allowed to withdraw his guilty

plea under the fair-and-just standard. Under this standard, district courts are required to

give “due consideration” to two separate factors: (1) the “reasons advanced . . . in support

of the motion” and (2) “any prejudice the granting of the motion would cause the

prosecution.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 2; accord Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 97. The

defendant bears the burden of advancing reasons to support plea withdrawal, and the state

bears the burden of showing prejudice. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 97. We review a district

court’s decision to deny a withdrawal motion under the fair-and-just standard for an abuse

of discretion, “reversing only in the ‘rare case.’” Id. (quoting Kim v. State, 434 N.W.2d

263, 266 (Minn. 1989)).

Wilson argues that it would be fair and just to allow him to withdraw his guilty plea

because “he was not aware that his guilty plea would prevent him from maintaining

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housing and employment.” But in Kim, the supreme court affirmed the district court’s

denial of the defendant’s motion to withdraw his plea because the defendant did not

establish that there was a fair-and-just reason to withdraw. 434 N.W.2d at 266-67. There,

the defendant sought to withdraw his plea because he did not think that he would lose his

job as a collateral consequence of the plea agreement, and the supreme court determined

that this was a unilateral mistake resulting from the defendant’s own failure to heed advice

to consult with his employer about the impact of his plea before accepting the plea

agreement. Id.

Here, in denying Wilson’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea, the district court

noted that Wilson acknowledged at the plea hearing that his attorney went over the plea

petition with him and that he understood the consequences of his plea, including the fact

that “by pleading guilty to criminal sexual conduct in the third degree it will trigger

registration for [ten] years.” Wilson’s acknowledgments at the plea hearing indicate that

he understood the collateral consequences of his guilty plea. As such, in light of Wilson’s

acknowledgments at the plea hearing, and the discretion afforded the district court, Wilson

is unable to demonstrate that the district court abused its discretion in concluding that there

was not a fair and just reason to permit him to withdraw his plea. And because the district

court acted within its discretion in concluding that Wilson failed to establish a fair and just

reason to withdraw his guilty plea, we need not address whether the state would be

prejudiced by allowing Wilson to withdraw his guilty plea. See Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at

98 (holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying a plea-withdrawal

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motion under the fair-and-just standard when the defendant failed to provide any

substantiated reason why the withdrawal would be fair and just).

Nevertheless, even if Wilson could establish a fair and just reason to withdraw his

plea, the state has met its burden of demonstrating that prejudice would result if Wilson

were permitted to withdraw his plea. The district court found that “at least one” of the girls

involved in this case “was in contact with probation regarding this matter and they shared

their thoughts on this matter and what they would like to see happen and have discussed

how this case has affected them.” The district court then found that “it would be prejudicial

to the State to allow [Wilson] to withdraw [his] plea because the [s]tate is entitled to some

finality and so [is] the victim[] to this offense.” And the district court referenced the

prejudice to the state related to the staleness of the case if Wilson were permitted to

withdraw his plea, which was exacerbated by Wilson’s failure to appear for sentencing in

October 2022. The district court properly balanced the considerations required under the

fair-and-just standard and concluded that there was no fair and just reason to allow Wilson

to withdraw his plea. Wilson cannot show that the district court abused its discretion in

making this decision. Accordingly, Wilson has not shown that he is entitled to withdraw

his guilty plea.

Affirmed.

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