In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: Krista Jean Lynard

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-1067

In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: Krista Jean Lynard.

Filed December 26, 2023
Reversed and remanded
Slieter, Judge

Blue Earth County District Court
File No. 07-PR-23-1788

Kenneth R. White, Law Office of Kenneth R. White, P.C., Mankato, Minnesota (for
appellant Krista Jean Lynard)

Patrick R. McDermott, Blue Earth County Attorney, Susan B. DeVos, Assistant County
Attorney, Mankato, Minnesota (for respondent Blue Earth County Human Services)

Considered and decided by Cochran, Presiding Judge; Slieter, Judge; and Larson,

Judge.

NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

SLIETER, Judge

On appeal from the district court’s civil commitment as a person who has a mental

illness, appellant argues that the record does not support the district court’s findings that

she poses a substantial risk of physical harm to herself or others and that the district court

failed to provide reasons for rejecting a less-restrictive alternative.

The district court’s findings lack particularity and do not adequately demonstrate

the district court’s consideration of the relevant factors to determine whether appellant

meets the criteria as a person who poses a substantial risk of physical harm to herself or
others. And, the district court did not make any factual findings regarding a less-restrictive

alternative to commitment. Therefore, we reverse and remand.

FACTS

In May 2023, appellant Krista Jean Lynard was placed on an emergency hold

following an incident in which Lynard walked into a business with blood on her face and

told customers that the world was ending. Respondent Blue Earth County Human Services

petitioned the district court to civilly commit Lynard “as a person who poses a risk of harm

due to mental illness.” The district court found probable cause supporting Lynard’s

commitment and scheduled a commitment hearing. At the commitment hearing, the

district court heard testimony from the court-appointed examiner and Lynard, and it

received the examiner’s report into evidence.

In her report, the examiner diagnosed Lynard with a mental illness and opined that

Lynard meets the criteria for commitment as a person who poses a risk of harm to herself

or others due to mental illness. In the recommendation portion of her report, the examiner

suggested that “[i]f she agrees to an IRTS [(Intensive Residential Treatment Services)]

facility and follow[s] all recommendations for outpatient mental health she could receive

a stay of commitment.” The examiner reiterated this opinion in her testimony during the

commitment hearing. Lynard testified that she was willing to enter an IRTS facility.

The district court issued an order civilly committing Lynard as a person who poses

a risk of harm due to mental illness. Lynard appeals.

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 DECISION

I. The district court’s findings are inadequate to permit meaningful appellate
review.

In reviewing a civil commitment, an appellate court is limited to examining whether

the district court complied with the commitment statute and determining whether the

district court’s findings support its conclusions of law. In re Knops, 536 N.W.2d 616, 620

(Minn. 1995). The district court’s “[f]indings of fact, whether based on oral or

documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous.” Id. However,

“[t]he sheer volume of information contained in [a] district court’s order is not

determinative. Even a long order may be insufficient if it does not permit meaningful

appellate review.” In re Civ. Commitment of Spicer, 853 N.W.2d 803, 811 (Minn. App.

2014). Appellate review is not possible when the district court “does not identify the facts

that the district court has determined to be true and the facts on which the district court’s

decision is based.” Id.

Risk of Harm

Lynard claims that the district court erred by finding that she poses a risk of harm

to herself or others, arguing that the district court failed to find facts with particularity.

The applicable statute defines circumstances that demonstrate when a person poses

a “substantial likelihood of physical harm to self or others” due to mental illness, including:

(1) a failure to obtain necessary food, clothing, shelter,
or medical care as a result of the impairment;

(2) an inability for reasons other than indigence to
obtain necessary food, clothing, shelter, or medical care as a
result of the impairment and it is more probable than not that

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 the person will suffer substantial harm, significant psychiatric
deterioration or debilitation, or serious illness, unless
appropriate treatment and services are provided;

(3) a recent attempt or threat to physically harm self or
others; or

(4) recent and volitional conduct involving significant
damage to substantial property.

Minn. Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 17a(a) (2022).

The district court’s order, which was drafted by the county, includes eleven findings

of fact, three of which relate to whether Lynard poses a risk of harm to herself or others

(findings five, six, and nine). However, none of the three findings “identify the facts that

the district court has determined to be true and the facts on which the district court’s

decision is based.” Spicer, 853 N.W.2d at 811.

The fifth finding of fact, related to whether Lynard poses a risk of physical harm,

simply recites the examiner’s testimony. However, “it is insufficient for a district court to

‘merely recite[] or summarize[] excerpted portions of testimony of [the] witnesses without

commenting independently either upon their opinions or the foundation for their opinions

or the relative credibility of the various witnesses.’” Id. at 810 (quoting In re Welfare of

M.M., 452 N.W.2d 236, 239 (Minn. 1990)).

The sixth finding of fact incorporates by reference facts from the examiner’s report.

Again, simply repeating facts from the examiner’s report, which appear to have been

incorporated from the prehearing report, fails to indicate which facts the district court relied

on when making its decision. Id. (“A district court cannot satisfy its obligation to find facts

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with particularity by simply adopting in toto the opinions of a particular expert.” (citing In

re Civ. Commitment of Ince, 847 N.W.2d 13, 24 (Minn. 2014))).

Finally, the ninth finding of fact merely recites the statutory definition of a person

who poses a risk of harm due to a mental illness, as set forth in Minn. Stat. § 253B.02,

subd. 17a. But “[a]n order does not permit meaningful appellate review if it does not

identify the facts that the district court has determined to be true and the facts on which the

district court’s decision is based.” Spicer, 853 N.W.2d at 811. One of the remaining nine

findings relates to the uncontested issue of Lynard’s mental-health diagnosis, and the other

eight findings involve uncontested or procedural background facts.

In its oral statements explaining its decision, the district court referenced the

incident in which Lynard “cut herself and put blood on her face at the direction of God,”

and it stated that “[s]he is a danger to herself, maybe to others.” None of these statements,

however, demonstrate how the district court found that Lynard meets the criteria for

commitment as a person who poses a risk of harm due to a mental illness according to

Minn. Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 17a.

The county contends that, despite the lack of individualized findings of fact, clear

and convincing evidence supports Lynard’s civil commitment as a person who poses a risk

of harm because of mental illness. We disagree. The district court made no such factual

findings and “[i]t is not within the province of [appellate courts] to determine issues of fact

on appeal.” Kucera v. Kucera, 146 N.W.2d 181, 183 (Minn. 1966).

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 The district court’s findings are insufficient to permit meaningful appellate review

as to whether Lynard, due to mental illness, poses a substantial likelihood of physical harm.

Spicer, 853 N.W.2d at 810-11.

Less-Restrictive Alternative

Lynard claims that the district court erred by rejecting, without explaining its

reasoning, a less-restrictive alternative. We agree.

The district court “must consider alternatives to commitment and choose the least

restrictive available placement if commitment is ordered.” In re Danielson, 398 N.W.2d

32, 37 (Minn. App. 1986). And Minnesota law requires that the district court’s findings

“identify less restrictive alternatives considered and rejected by the court and the reasons

for rejecting each alternative.” Minn. Stat. § 253B.09, subd. 2(b) (2022).

In a conclusion of law, the district court found that “[t]he least restrictive alternative

which meets [Lynard’s] treatment needs is an involuntary commitment.” And in its oral

statements following the hearing, the district court stated it was familiar with “Ms.

Lynard’s history” before rejecting a stay of commitment and, instead, ordering full

commitment. There was no evidence related to “Lynard’s history” submitted during the

hearing.

Despite evidence in the record of an alternative to commitment—specifically, a stay

of commitment with admission into an IRTS facility which Lynard agreed to enter—the

district court provided no reasons for rejecting a less-restrictive alternative. See Danielson,

398 N.W.2d at 37 (determining that summarily stating that no less-restrictive alternative

exists is “wholly inadequate to support commitment” despite there being evidence of a

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mentally ill person needing treatment). Because the district court’s factual findings do not

articulate reasons for rejecting a less-restrictive alternative to commitment, they are

inadequate to permit meaningful appellate review. Spicer, 853 N.W.2d at 810-11.

In sum, the district court’s risk of harm and less-restrictive alternative findings do

not permit meaningful appellate review. Therefore, we reverse and remand to the district

court to make the necessary factual findings as required by statute. The district court may,

in its discretion, reopen the record on remand.

Reversed and remanded.

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