In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: Renee Jean Tapper

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1135

In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: Renee Jean Tapper.

Filed December 1, 2025
Remanded
Ross, Judge

Blue Earth County District Court
File No. 07-PR-25-1709

Steven D. Winkler, Brandt & Winkler, P.A., St. Peter, Minnesota (for appellant Renee Jean
Tapper)

Patrick R. McDermott, Blue Earth County Attorney, Susan B. DeVos, Assistant County
Attorney, Mankato, Minnesota (for respondent Blue Earth County Human Services)

Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Frisch, Chief Judge; and Ede,

Judge.

NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

ROSS, Judge

The district court civilly committed Renee Tapper after finding that she poses a

substantial risk of harm to herself or others and that she needs medical treatment to stabilize

her declining psychiatric condition. Tapper appeals, arguing that the district court adopted

findings that lack sufficient detail for appellate review, concluded without sufficient factual

support that she poses a substantial risk of harm to herself or others, and failed to provide

reasons for rejecting a less-restrictive alternative to civil commitment. We hold that the

district court’s commitment order, which is a verbatim replica of the county’s proposed
order, fails to include fact findings that are sufficient for our review of whether the evidence

meets the civil-commitment statutory criteria. We therefore remand for the district court to

make the necessary findings, but in the meantime, we leave in place Tapper’s civil

commitment to inpatient care.

FACTS

This appeal arises from the involuntary hospitalization and civil commitment of

appellant Renee Tapper. Police encountered Tapper in April 2025 after responding to a

report that she was experiencing paranoid delusions and threatened suicide in text

messaging and a social-media post. The encounter led to Tapper’s psychological evaluation

at Mayo Clinic in Mankato during a 72-hour hold. Tapper there denied being suicidal but

exhibited paranoia about being sexually harassed and assaulted by staff. The evaluating

physician diagnosed Tapper with bipolar disorder and prescribed neuroleptic medication.

Respondent Blue Earth County Human Services petitioned the district court to civilly

commit Tapper for treatment, and the district court appointed two examiners to assess her

eligibility for inpatient care. Tapper remained hospitalized and refused to take neuroleptic

medications.

The district court held an evidentiary hearing in May 2025 to address the county’s

petition. At the hearing’s conclusion, the district court orally granted the county’s petition

and later presented its decision as a written order, civilly committing Tapper to inpatient

care by signing the 22-paragraph proposed order supplied by the county.

Tapper appeals.

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 DECISION

Tapper challenges the district court’s decision civilly committing her to inpatient,

hospitalized care. She contends, among other things, that the district court’s fact findings

are insufficient for appellate review. The district court must make civil-commitment

findings “specifically,” and it must “separately state its conclusions of law.” Minn. Stat.

§ 253B.09, subd. 2(a) (2024). In ordering commitment, it must also “specifically state the

proposed patient’s conduct [that] is a basis for determining that each of the requisites for

commitment is met.” Id. We see two fundamental problems in the district court’s findings

and conclusion of law, hindering our ability to meaningfully review its civil-commitment

decision.

The first problem is that the district court did not heed the supreme court’s repeated

cautioning against adopting any party’s factual findings and legal conclusions verbatim,

because wholesale adoption of a party’s proposed order calls into question whether the

district court has exercised the “skill and judgment” that it is expected to exercise. Pederson

v. State, 649 N.W.2d 161, 163–64 (Minn. 2002) (quotation omitted). The supreme court

has emphasized that “the practice of the verbatim adoption of a party’s proposed findings

and conclusions is hardly commendable.” Id. at 163. It has recognized that this practice

“can make it more difficult to determine whether a court exercised its own careful

consideration of the evidence, of the witnesses, and of the entire case.” Dukes v. State, 621

N.W.2d 246, 258 (Minn. 2001) (quotation omitted). It has stressed, “We discourage district

courts from adopting proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law verbatim because it

does not allow the parties or a reviewing court to determine the extent to which the court’s

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decision was independently made.” Lundell v. Coop. Power Ass’n, 707 N.W.2d 376, 380

n.1 (Minn. 2006). Consistent with these concerns, more than thirty years ago we too began

to “strongly caution that wholesale adoption of one party’s findings and conclusions raises

the question of whether the trial court independently evaluated each party’s testimony and

evidence.” Bliss v. Bliss, 493 N.W.2d 583, 590 (Minn. App. 1992), rev. denied (Minn. Feb.

12, 1993); see also County of Dakota v. Blackwell, 809 N.W.2d 226, 230 (Minn. App.

2011). The record here reveals that the day after the hearing, the county provided the

district court with its proposed findings, conclusions, and order, and the district court

printed and signed that draft order with no changes. While it is true that verbatim adoption

of a party’s proposed order is not, standing alone, a basis to reverse, Bliss, 493 N.W.2d at

590, in this case we extend our deference to the district court’s factual findings and its

exercise of discretion reservedly.

The county does not allay our concerns by its emphasizing that the district court

adopted the county’s proposed order verbatim only after it ruled in the county’s favor from

the bench the day before. The district court’s oral ruling is similarly inadequate for our

review of whether the evidence meets the statutory criteria for civil commitment. And

Tapper has relatedly identified a circumstance from which she urges us to conclude that

the district court’s decision to comprehensively adopt the proposed order did not result

from its deliberate analysis and review. Although we recognize that a district court might

sign a proposed order after determining that its wording matches the court’s independent

judgment, we agree with Tapper’s suggestion that this might not have occurred here. The

order’s seventh numbered paragraph is the following unpunctuated sentence-fragment

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finding: “7. The Interested Party statement indicated that Respondent had made statements

about suicide and copies of the text message communications and posts supported[.]” The

district court’s failure to correct this error at least implies that it did not carefully consider

the proposed order before adopting it as its own.

Tapper accurately highlights a second problem with the district court’s order. Its

adopted “fact findings” are mostly not actually fact findings. We view the record in the

light most favorable to the district court’s fact findings and rely on those findings unless

they reflect clear error. In re Civ. Commitment of Spicer, 853 N.W.2d 803, 807 (Minn.

App. 2014). Weighing evidence to determine and find facts is a different exercise from

merely reciting testimony to report on what evidence was presented. A commitment order

is factually deficient when the district court merely recites testimony rather than stating

independently how it has weighed the testimony to determine the facts. See id. at 810–11.

We evaluate the language of an order to distinguish fact findings from mere testimony

recital. Id. Phrases that report party testimony, witness opinions, and witness assertions are

telltale signs of merely recited testimony, not fact findings. Id. Most of the district court’s

eleven short paragraphs of its “Findings of Fact” here are comprised of only its reciting

what testimony and other evidence existed, such as, “The Court’s file contains” specified

documents; “Dr. Scharlepp testified that . . . .”; “The Interested Party statement indicated

that . . . .”; “Both examiners noted that . . . .”; “According to Dr. Scharlepp . . . .”;

“According to Dr. Marshall . . . .”; and so forth. And the order includes no express

credibility findings. The district court does make the ultimate finding “that Respondent

meets the criteria as a person who poses a risk of harm due to a mental illness,” but this

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sort of conclusory finding does little to facilitate our review of whether the evidence

supports the fact findings and whether the findings support the legal conclusions. Its other

findings recite statutory language, recount the procedural background of the case, or

speculate about harm that Tapper faces without drawing from specific evidence in the

record to bolster the concern.

We are therefore persuaded by Tapper’s contention that the district court’s fact

findings are insufficient for our appellate review and by her related arguments that the

findings are insufficient to establish that her mental illness impairs her ability to obtain

necessary medical care and that alternatives to commitment are unavailable. See Minn.

Stat. §§ 253B.09, subd. 1(a), 253B.02, subd. 17a(a)(1) (2024) (providing that civil

commitment is appropriate when a person poses a risk of harm to herself or others due to

her mental illness and when there are no suitable alternatives to commitment). In sum, we

have no choice but to return the case to the district court to undertake the appropriate

analysis, make necessary fact findings, and provide supported conclusions of law bearing

on the county’s civil-commitment petition. Out of concern for possible risk to Tapper as

discussed by witnesses at the commitment hearing, however, we do not require the district

court to discharge her from hospitalized commitment during the remand proceedings,

which we direct the district court to undertake expeditiously in the interest of her civil

rights.

Remanded.

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