State of Minnesota v. Jairo Missael Fernandez Sorto

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-1564

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Jairo Missael Fernandez Sorto,
Appellant.

Filed September 9, 2024
Affirmed
Frisch, Judge

Stearns County District Court
File No. 73-CR-22-8482

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Lisa Lodin, Keaon Dousti, Assistant Attorneys General,
St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Janelle P. Kendall, Stearns County Attorney, St. Cloud, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jennifer Workman Jesness,
Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Cochran, Judge; and

Frisch, Judge.

SYLLABUS

1. A district court’s decision whether to allow a support animal to accompany

a testifying witness at trial is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.

2. In evaluating whether to allow a support animal to accompany a witness

during their trial testimony, a district court may consider (1) the effect and helpfulness of

the support animal to aid the testimony of the witness, (2) the risk of prejudice associated
with the use of the support animal during the witness’s trial testimony, and (3) the ability

of the district court to mitigate possible prejudice.

OPINION

FRISCH, Judge

Following convictions for two counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct,

appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion to

introduce evidence regarding the victim’s previous sexual conduct, by allowing

relationship evidence, and by permitting the victim to testify at trial accompanied by the

county’s support dog. Because we discern no abuse of discretion in the district court’s

evidentiary or trial-management rulings, we affirm.

FACTS

In October 2022, S.F.-P. reported to a teacher at school, who then reported to police,

that her father, appellant Jairo Missael Fernandez Sorto, had been sexually assaulting her

since she was eight years old. Based on S.F.-P.’s allegations, respondent State of

Minnesota charged Fernandez Sorto with three counts of first-degree criminal sexual

conduct.

Before trial, the state moved in limine to offer relationship evidence and to exclude

evidence of S.F.-P.’s previous sexual conduct. Fernandez Sorto moved to exclude

relationship evidence and to offer evidence of S.F.-P.’s previous sexual conduct to prove

that semen and a sexually transmitted infection detected in S.F.-P.’s examination originated

from a source other than Fernandez Sorto. The state also moved to allow S.F.-P. to testify

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at trial accompanied by a support dog belonging to the county. 1 In its motion, the state

included details of the dog’s certification, training, and handler; articles about trauma for

child witnesses; and articles about the use of support dogs in courtrooms, mediation, the

workplace, and hospitals. And the state included an email from a social worker, who

expressed that S.F.-P. was experiencing anxiety and fear about testifying in Fernandez

Sorto’s presence. Fernandez Sorto opposed allowing the dog to accompany S.F.-P. during

her trial testimony because it would elicit improper sympathy from the jury and prejudice

him.

The district court granted the state’s motions in limine in part. The district court

found that an October 2021 incident where Fernandez Sorto hit S.F.-P. was admissible

relationship evidence. With regard to evidence of S.F.-P.’s previous sexual conduct, the

district court found there was insufficient evidence that another individual was the source

of the semen but ordered a hearing to consider the issue of the source of the sexually

transmitted infection. At that hearing, the district court ruled that Fernandez Sorto could

offer evidence of an allegation of previous sexual conduct that S.F.-P. later recanted and

could present evidence indicating that S.F.-P. tested positive for a sexually transmitted

infection and that Fernandez Sorto did not. Fernandez Sorto did not offer further evidence

at the hearing about the source of the sexually transmitted infection. The district court

1
We refer to the dog as the county’s support dog, as opposed to a facility dog, which is the
term used by the parties. The record reflects that the dog is owned and handled by the
county, and the county initiated the use of the dog in the proceedings below. We also note
that we use the term “support dog” without deciding what term is most appropriately used
when a dog accompanies a witness during their testimony.

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granted the state’s motion to allow S.F.-P. to testify at trial accompanied by the county’s

support dog.

At trial, the state offered testimony from 17 witnesses, including S.F.-P., medical

and social work providers, Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension (BCA) scientists,

S.F.-P.’s mother and friend, S.F.-P.’s teacher, and law-enforcement officers. Fernandez

Sorto testified and denied the allegations of sexual contact. He also offered testimony from

his wife and from an examiner at a child advocacy center.

At trial, S.F.-P.—who was then 15 years old—testified that Fernandez Sorto began

sexually assaulting her when she was eight years old, shortly after S.F.-P. moved in with

Fernandez Sorto. S.F.-P. detailed sexual abuse taking place at home, including that

Fernandez Sorto digitally penetrated and touched her vagina, penetrated her vagina with

his penis, touched her vagina with his mouth, and put his penis in her mouth and anus.

S.F.-P. testified about how Fernandez Sorto used cameras around the home to ensure

that no one saw the abuse. Videos from these cameras were admitted at trial and depict

Fernandez Sorto touching S.F.-P.’s butt, S.F.-P. touching Fernandez Sorto and laying on

him, and S.F.-P. and Fernandez Sorto going into S.F.-P.’s closet, all of which were shown

to the jury. S.F.-P. testified specifically about two instances of sexual abuse occurring on

October 9 and 11, 2022. S.F.-P. testified that she told Fernandez Sorto she did not want to

have sexual intercourse with him and that he told her not to tell anyone about the abuse.

S.F.-P. also testified that Fernandez Sorto bought and directed her to take emergency

contraceptives several times to prevent her from getting pregnant.

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 S.F.-P. testified that Fernandez Sorto had yelled at and hit her in October 2021. She

testified that Fernandez Sorto had been upset with her because someone told him that

S.F.-P. was communicating online with a man in his twenties. S.F.-P. originally told

Fernandez Sorto that she was just talking to the man but eventually told Fernandez Sorto

that she had performed oral sex on the man. Fernandez Sorto struck S.F.-P. and contacted

police. S.F.-P. told police that she had performed oral sex on the man. S.F.-P. testified at

trial that she had not done so and that she told police the story “[b]ecause of [her] dad.”

The jury also heard testimony from a police officer who investigated a mandated report

that Fernandez Sorto hit S.F.-P. S.F.-P. told the officer that Fernandez Sorto hit her twice

in the arm and once with a closed fist under her eye. Fernandez Sorto acknowledged to the

officer that he hit S.F.-P.

The jury found Fernandez Sorto guilty of each charged offense. The district court

entered convictions for two of the offenses and sentenced Fernandez Sorto to 216 months’

imprisonment.

Fernandez Sorto appeals.

ISSUES

I. Did the district court abuse its discretion by excluding evidence of S.F.-P.’s previous
sexual conduct?

II. Did the district court abuse its discretion by admitting relationship evidence?

III. Did the district court abuse its discretion by allowing the county’s support dog to
accompany S.F.-P. during her trial testimony?

IV. Do the issues raised in Fernandez Sorto’s pro se supplemental brief merit relief?

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 ANALYSIS

I. The district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding evidence of S.F.-P.’s
previous sexual conduct.

Fernandez Sorto argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying in

part his motion to present evidence about S.F.-P.’s alleged previous sexual conduct. We

disagree.

“In a prosecution for acts of criminal sexual conduct . . . , evidence of the victim’s

previous sexual conduct shall not be admitted nor shall any reference to such conduct be

made in the presence of the jury, except by court order . . . . ” Minn. R. Evid. 412(1); see

also Minn. Stat. § 609.347, subd. 3 (2022) (generally barring the admission of a victim’s

previous sexual conduct). Evidence of a victim’s previous sexual conduct is “highly

prejudicial,” State v. Olsen, 824 N.W.2d 334, 340 (Minn. App. 2012), rev. denied (Minn.

Feb. 27, 2013), and the prohibitions against the admission of such evidence “emphasize

the general irrelevance of a victim’s sexual history,” State v. Crims, 540 N.W.2d 860, 867

(Minn. App. 1995), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 23, 1996). Given these concerns, evidence of

a victim’s previous sexual conduct is admissible only if an exception to rule 412 applies

and “if the probative value of the evidence is not substantially outweighed by its

inflammatory or prejudicial nature.” Olsen, 824 N.W.2d at 340 (quotation omitted); see

also Minn. R. Evid. 412(1).

We will not overturn a district court’s evidentiary ruling “absent a clear abuse of

discretion.” State v. Pendleton, 706 N.W.2d 500, 510 (Minn. 2005). “A district court

abuses its discretion when its decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against

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logic and the facts in the record.” State v. Hallmark, 927 N.W.2d 281, 291 (Minn. 2019)

(quotation omitted). And even if we conclude that a district court abused its discretion in

its evidentiary ruling, we will “reverse only if the exclusion of evidence was not harmless

beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Zumberge, 888 N.W.2d 688, 694 (Minn. 2017). “An

error in excluding [defense] evidence is harmless only if the reviewing court is satisfied

beyond a reasonable doubt that if the evidence had been admitted and the damaging

potential of the evidence fully realized, a reasonable jury would have reached the same

verdict.” Olsen, 824 N.W.2d at 340 (quotation omitted).

Fernandez Sorto moved the district court to present evidence about alleged sexual

contact between S.F.-P. and other men. Fernandez Sorto contends that the evidence was

admissible under an exception to rule 412 because it was offered to show that the source

of the semen and sexually transmitted infection discovered during S.F.-P.’s medical

examination in October 2022 originated with someone other than Fernandez Sorto.

Rule 412 permits the admission of evidence of a victim’s previous sexual conduct

when “the prosecution’s case includes evidence of semen, pregnancy or disease at the time

of the incident” and the evidence sought to be admitted “show[s] the source of the semen,

pregnancy or disease.” Minn. R. Evid. 412(1)(B). The district court concluded that

Fernandez Sorto’s offer of proof was insufficient to support his assertion that S.F.-P.’s

previous sexual conduct showed that another person was the source of semen. And

regarding the evidence of the sexually transmitted infection, the district court concluded

that “there’s been nothing that’s been brought before the court” that would “show that

[S.F.-P.] engaged in any conduct with [another individual] that would result in a positive

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urine [sexually-transmitted-infection] test.” But the district court ruled that “in balancing

the right of [Fernandez Sorto] to put on a defense,” Fernandez Sorto could present evidence

that S.F.-P. testified positive for the infection and Fernandez Sorto twice tested negative

for the same infection.

The record supports the district court’s conclusions that Fernandez Sorto offered

insufficient proof of the alleged previous sexual conduct and that the evidence that

Fernandez Sorto did offer did not show that the exception in rule 412(1)(B) applied. The

record reflects that Fernandez Sorto’s offer of proof about S.F.-P.’s previous sexual

conduct consisted of his own assertions. And to the extent that Fernandez Sorto indicated

that he would rely on a criminal complaint containing allegations of sexual conduct

between S.F.-P. and another individual, that complaint related to criminal sexual conduct

occurring between September and October 2021, a year before S.F.-P.’s positive test for a

sexually transmitted infection and results indicating the presence of semen. The probative

value of the evidence that Fernandez Sorto sought to present beyond the evidence permitted

by the district court was not substantially outweighed by its prejudicial nature. See Olsen,

824 N.W.2d at 340 (stating that evidence of a witness’s prior sexual conduct is assumed to

be “highly prejudicial”); Crims, 540 N.W.2d at 868 (reasoning that, absent exceptional

circumstances, the prejudicial impact of evidence of sexual activity with third persons

outweighs its probative value under Minn. R. Evid. 403). Thus, the district court did not

abuse its discretion by excluding evidence of S.F.-P.’s previous sexual conduct. See Crims,

540 N.W.2d at 868 (placing the burden on defendants to establish the relevance of

statements regarding a victim’s sexual history).

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 Even if we concluded that the district court abused its discretion in excluding this

evidence, any such error was harmless. The evidence presented at trial showed that S.F.-P.

tested positive for a sexually transmitted infection, Fernandez Sorto had tested negative for

that infection, and Fernandez Sorto’s wife had no reason to believe that she had that

infection. This evidence undercut the state’s theory of the case. We also observe that the

record contains significant evidence of Fernandez Sorto’s guilt, and we are not convinced

that evidence regarding S.F.-P.’s previous sexual conduct would have led a reasonable jury

to reach a different result. See Olsen, 824 N.W.2d at 340 (“An error in excluding [defense]

evidence is harmless only if the reviewing court is satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that

if the evidence had been admitted and the damaging potential of the evidence fully realized,

a reasonable jury would have reached the same verdict.” (quotation omitted)).

II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting relationship
evidence.

Fernandez Sorto next contends that the district court abused its discretion by

admitting evidence that Fernandez Sorto hit S.F.-P. as relationship evidence under Minn.

Stat. § 634.20 (2022), which provides that “[e]vidence of domestic conduct by the accused

against the victim of domestic conduct, or against other family or household members, is

admissible unless the probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair

prejudice.” Relationship evidence can be relevant because it “illuminates the history of the

relationship between the victim and defendant,” “help[s] prove motive,” and “assist[s] the

jury in assessing witness credibility.” State v. Matthews, 779 N.W.2d 543, 549 (Minn.

2010) (quotation omitted).

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 We review the district court’s admission of relationship evidence for an abuse of

discretion. See State v. McCoy, 682 N.W.2d 153, 161 (Minn. 2004). “A district court

abuses its discretion when its decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against

logic and the facts in the record.” Hallmark, 927 N.W.2d at 291 (quotation omitted).

In its pretrial ruling, the district court determined that evidence that Fernandez Sorto

hit S.F.-P. was admissible as relationship evidence under Minn. Stat. § 634.20. See Minn.

Stat. § 518B.01, subds. 2(a) (defining “domestic abuse” to include committing “physical

harm, bodily injury, or assault” against a “family or household member”), 2(b)(2) (defining

“family or household member” to include “parents and children”) (2022). It found that the

incident was supported by a preponderance of the evidence and “is a specific instance of

domestic abuse that illuminates the relationship between [S.F.-P.] and [Fernandez Sorto]

and the risk of unfair prejudice does not substantially outweigh the evidence’s probative

value.” Fernandez Sorto argues that the district court abused its discretion because this

evidence “did not provide context for the sexual abuse crimes,” and the danger of unfair

prejudice associated with the admission of this evidence substantially outweighed its

probative value. We disagree for two reasons.

First, Fernandez Sorto’s interpretation of Minn. Stat. § 634.20 is unreasonably

narrow and inconsistent with our authorities stating that the probative value of relationship

evidence is “bolstered” when it “helps to establish the relationship between the victim and

the defendant or which places the event in context.” State v. Lindsey, 755 N.W.2d 752, 756

(Minn. App. 2008) (quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 29, 2008); see also State v.

Valentine, 787 N.W.2d 630, 637 (Minn. App. 2010) (reasoning that a defendant’s treatment

10
of his family is probative of how a defendant interacts with those close to him, including

the victim), rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 16, 2010). We are not aware of a requirement, as

Fernandez Sorto suggests, that the relationship evidence at issue must involve similar

conduct as the charged offense to be probative. Evidence of domestic conduct, including

evidence of domestic abuse, is admissible under section 634.20 provided the probative

value of that evidence is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.

The relationship evidence here is probative to illuminate the context of Fernandez Sorto

and S.F.-P.’s relationship, which is permitted under Minnesota law. See Lindsey, 755

N.W.2d at 756. The evidence is also probative of S.F.-P.’s credibility, which was at issue

because Fernandez Sorto’s theory of the case centered on an assertion that S.F.-P.

fabricated her allegations.

Second, the district court provided the jury with a cautionary instruction related to

the proper use of relationship evidence before the jury heard about the incident. The

instruction specified that the evidence was “being offered for the limited purpose of

demonstrating the nature and the extent of the relationship between [Fernandez Sorto] and

[S.F.-P.]” to assist the jury “in determining whether [Fernandez Sorto] committed those

acts with which [he] is charged in the complaint.” The district court instructed the jury that

Fernandez Sorto was “not being tried for and may not be convicted of any behavior other

than the charged offenses” and that the jury was “not to convict [Fernandez Sorto] on the

basis of conduct described.” This instruction mitigated the risk of the jury using the

relationship evidence for an improper purpose. See State v. Andersen, 900 N.W.2d 438,

441-42 (Minn. App. 2017) (observing that “the district court’s cautionary instructions

11
lessened any probability that the jury would rely improperly on relationship evidence”);

State v. Ware, 856 N.W.2d 719, 729 (Minn. App. 2014) (stating that a district court’s

limiting instruction mitigates the risk that a jury may give undue weight to relationship

evidence); Pendleton, 706 N.W.2d at 509 (stating that we presume that the jury followed

the district court’s instructions). We therefore conclude that the district court did not abuse

its discretion in admitting the relationship evidence. See McCoy, 682 N.W.2d at 161.

III. The district court did not abuse its discretion by allowing a support animal to
accompany S.F.-P. during her trial testimony.

Fernandez Sorto next challenges the district court’s decision to allow S.F.-P. to

testify at trial accompanied by the county’s support dog. He argues that the district court

abused its discretion by allowing the dog to accompany S.F.-P. at trial because “the dog’s

helpfulness [to the testifying witness] is weighed against the potential prejudice to the

defendant,” the record did not support a determination that the support dog would be

helpful, and the use of the support dog was otherwise prejudicial to him. We disagree.

The use of a support animal to accompany a witness during trial testimony is an

issue of first impression in Minnesota. We first consider the standard of review. A district

court has discretion to “exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of

interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence.” Minn. R. Evid. 611(a). Pursuant to

Minn. R. Evid. 611(a), a district court is authorized to exercise that discretion “so as to

(1) make the interrogation and presentation effective for the ascertainment of the truth,

(2) avoid needless consumption of time, and (3) protect witnesses from harassment or

undue embarrassment.” Other jurisdictions have analyzed these factors in determining

12
whether to allow a support dog to accompany a testifying witness at trial. See, e.g., State

v. Devon D., 138 A.3d 849, 867 (Conn. 2016) (holding that the determination of whether a

support dog may accompany a testifying witness requires the trial court to “balance the

extent to which the accommodation will help the witness to testify reliably and completely

against any possible prejudice to the defendant’s right to a fair trial” and consideration of

“the availability of measures to mitigate any prejudice”); State v. Dye, 283 P.3d 1130, 1134

(Wash. Ct. App. 2012) (concluding that a trial court properly allowed a service dog to

accompany a testifying witness where the trial court appropriately balanced the witness’s

disabilities and emotional trauma against potential prejudice), aff’d, 309 P.3d 1192 (Wash.

2013); People v. Tohom, 969 N.Y.S.2d 123, 136 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013) (concluding that a

trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing a therapy dog to accompany a testifying

witness where it properly “balanced [the witness’s] demonstrated need for [the dog] during

her testimony against the potential prejudice to the defendant”).

Consistent with these authorities, a district court’s decision to allow a support

animal to accompany a witness while testifying at trial falls within the district court’s

“broad discretion in controlling the manner in which testimony is received.” State v. Ross,

451 N.W.2d. 231, 235-36 (Minn. App. 1990) (first citing Minn. R. Evid. 611(a); then citing

Manion v. Tweedy, 100 N.W.2d 124, 130 (Minn. 1959)) (reviewing a district court’s

courtroom-management decisions for an abuse of discretion), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 13,

1990). We therefore hold that a district court’s decision whether to allow a support animal

to accompany a testifying witness at trial is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.

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 The record reflects that the district court exercised reasonable control consistent

with rule 611 when it permitted the county’s support dog to accompany S.F.-P. during her

trial testimony. The district court considered the impact and helpfulness of the support

dog’s presence to aid the veracity of S.F.-P.’s testimony. See People v. Johnson, 889

N.W.2d 513, 529 (Mich. Ct. App. 2016) (noting that a trial court employing its discretion

to control the proceedings “should consider the facts and circumstances of each individual

witness to determine whether the use of the support animal will be useful to the expeditious

and effective ascertainment of the truth”). The district court reasoned that the county’s

support dog would help S.F.-P., noting her fear and anxiety about testifying, the ability of

support dogs to reduce stress and enable truthful and complete testimony, and the

circumstances of the case. And the district court’s determination is supported by the

record, which reflects that S.F.-P. was experiencing anxiety and fear about testifying in

Fernandez Sorto’s presence and includes articles discussing trauma experienced by child

witnesses and the use of support animals in various settings including courtrooms. 2

2
We disagree with Fernandez Sorto’s contention that a district court must make
particularized findings about a testifying witness’s trauma, or the specific helpfulness of or
need for the support dog, to the extent Sorto makes such an argument. No such requirement
exists in Minnesota, and this requirement has been rejected in other jurisdictions. See
People v. Chenault, 175 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1, 14 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (reviewing a trial
court’s decision to allow a support dog during witness testimony and recognizing that
express findings on that decision are preferred but concluding that implicit findings are
adequate if the record is sufficient); Devon D., 138 A.3d at 865, 867-68 (rejecting the
conclusion that the trial court “was required to make an express finding that there was a
need for this special procedure” (emphasis omitted) (quotation omitted)). We see no need
for such a requirement, especially when, as here, we are satisfied that the district court
considered the helpfulness of the county’s support dog.

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 The district court next considered the risk of prejudice to Fernandez Sorto. The

district court reasoned that the presence of the county’s support dog in the courtroom was

not unduly prejudicial and that the risk that the presence of the support dog might evoke

additional sympathy was low given that S.F.-P. was likely already a sympathetic witness

due to her age and the nature of her testimony. The district court observed that “the jurors

would understand that testifying at a trial by its very nature is stressful, particularly for a

child.” See Devon D., 138 A.3d at 864-65 (affirming the trial court’s decision to allow a

dog to accompany a testifying witness and stating that a trial court must balance “the extent

that the special accommodation will aid the reliability of the witness’ testimony against

any possible prejudice to the defendant’s right to a fair trial”). These conclusions are

supported by the record as well. And Fernandez Sorto’s argument on appeal that the

presence of the county’s support dog unfairly bolstered S.F.-P.’s credibility is unavailing

because it is speculative and not supported by authority or the record.

Finally, the district court took careful measures to reduce possible prejudice to

Fernandez Sorto associated with the presence of the support dog at trial. The district court

ruled pretrial that Fernandez Sorto could question prospective jurors about the use of

support dogs. The district court took additional measures to ensure that the support dog

was not a distraction or visible to the jury during S.F.-P.’s testimony. For example, the

district court issued a pretrial order requiring S.F.-P. and the county’s support dog enter

and exit the witness stand outside the presence of the jury and instructing the support dog’s

handler to take reasonable action to ensure the jury was not alerted to the support dog’s

presence. The district court also instructed the jury that the county’s support dog

15
accompanied S.F.-P. during her testimony and that no inferences should be drawn based

on the presence of the dog, stating:

The decision to allow the use of the courthouse facility dog was
one that I made, and that you may not speculate in any way as
to why I made that decision.

You must not draw any inference, favorably or
negatively, from either side because of the dog’s presence. You
must not permit sympathy for any party to enter your
considerations as you listen to the testimony. Each witness’s
testimony must be evaluated upon the instructions I give you
and nothing else.

The record also reflects that the jury was not distracted by the support dog at trial. The

record includes several comments from the parties and the district court outside the

presence of the jury reflecting that the support dog was not visible to the jury during

S.F.-P.’s testimony, that the support dog made no noise during trial, and that the support

dog entered and exited the witness stand outside the presence of the jury.

We therefore hold that in evaluating whether to allow a support animal to

accompany a witness during their trial testimony, a district court may consider (1) the

effect and helpfulness of the support animal to aid the testimony of the witness, (2) the risk

of prejudice associated with the use of the support animal during the witness’s trial

testimony, and (3) the ability of the district court to mitigate possible prejudice. Mitigation

measures may include, for example, arrangements to make the presence of the animal

unobtrusive and undisruptive during the proceedings and instructions to the jury to

minimize prejudice. See Chenault, 175 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 12. We emphasize that

16
consideration of additional factors or mitigation measures may be appropriate given the

circumstances of each case.

The record here reflects the district court’s careful consideration of these factors. In

deciding to allow S.F.-P. to testify accompanied by the county’s support dog, the district

court thoughtfully weighed the helpfulness of the support dog to S.F.-P.’s testimony against

the potential prejudice to Fernandez Sorto. The district court undertook significant steps

to guard against the risk of prejudice to Fernandez Sorto. And the district court’s decision

is supported by the record. Thus, we conclude that the district court acted within its

discretion by allowing the county’s support dog to accompany S.F.-P. during her trial

testimony.

IV. Fernandez Sorto is not entitled to relief for the issues raised in his pro se
supplemental brief.

Fernandez Sorto argues in his pro se supplemental brief that there was insufficient

evidence for his two convictions and that there was insufficient evidence to support an

aggravated sentence on one of the counts.

The assertions set forth by a pro se appellant are forfeited if they are unsupported

by argument or citation to legal authority. State v. Krosch, 642 N.W.2d 713, 719 (Minn.

2002). Factual assertions must also be supported by citations to the record. See State v.

Manley, 664 N.W.2d 275, 286 (Minn. 2003) (granting a motion to strike and refusing to

consider portions of a pro se brief that contained only argument and were not supported by

the facts in the record). Fernandez Sorto’s pro se brief contains no citations to the record

17
or to legal authority, and his assertions are therefore forfeited. And the issues raised do not

demonstrate obvious prejudicial error on mere inspection.

DECISION

We discern no abuse of discretion by the district court in its evidentiary rulings and

conclude that the issues raised in Fernandez Sorto’s pro se supplemental brief are forfeited.

We hold that we review a district court’s decision whether to allow a support animal to

accompany a witness during trial testimony for an abuse of discretion. In evaluating

whether to allow a support animal to accompany a witness during their trial testimony, a

district court may consider (1) the effect and helpfulness of the support animal to aid the

testimony of the witness, (2) the risk of prejudice associated with the use of the support

animal during the witness’s trial testimony, and (3) the ability of the district court to

mitigate possible prejudice. Because the district court considered the effect and helpfulness

of the county’s support dog, the risk of prejudice to Fernandez Sorto, and mitigated

possible prejudice through courtroom management and in its instructions to the jury, we

discern no abuse of discretion by the district court by allowing the county’s support dog to

accompany S.F.-P. during her trial testimony.

Affirmed.

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