State of Minnesota v. Kenneth Jagger Crawford

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-1711

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Kenneth Jagger Crawford,
Appellant.

Filed October 14, 2024
Reversed and remanded
Larkin, Judge

Washington County District Court
File No. 82-CR-21-4008

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Kevin M. Magnuson, Washington County Attorney, Andrew T. Jackola, Assistant County
Attorney, Stillwater, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Leah C. Graf, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for Crawford)

Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and

Harris, Judge.

SYLLABUS

The district court is without authority to disregard the mandatory-minimum

sentence in Minn. Stat. § 152.021, subd. 3(b) (2020), which applies to certain repeat

offenders who are convicted of a first-degree controlled-substance crime.
 OPINION

LARKIN, Judge

Appellant challenges the validity of his guilty plea to first-degree

controlled-substance possession, arguing that his plea was invalid. Specifically, he argues

that his plea was unintelligent because he was not aware that imposition of a

mandatory-minimum term of imprisonment was a direct consequence of his plea or that

the district court was not authorized to disregard that mandatory-minimum sentence.

Instead, he was led to believe that the district court had authority to grant his request for a

downward-dispositional sentencing departure, based on the state’s assertion that, because

it had not invoked the mandatory-minimum sentencing provision in the charging

document, that provision did not restrict the district court’s sentencing discretion. Because

the district court was not authorized to disregard the relevant mandatory-minimum

sentence, appellant’s guilty plea was unintelligent and invalid. We therefore remand to

allow appellant to withdraw his guilty plea.

FACTS

Appellant Kenneth Jagger Crawford appeared before the district court on charges of

first-degree controlled-substance possession and fleeing a police officer in a motor vehicle.

Crawford’s attorney informed the district court and respondent State of Minnesota that

Crawford intended to plead guilty as charged and to seek a downward-dispositional

sentencing departure. The guilty pleas would be proffered as a “straight plea,” that is, there

2
was no plea agreement or sentencing agreement with the state.1 Neither the district court

nor the state objected to Crawford’s intent to seek a downward-dispositional departure.

At previous hearings, the parties and the district court discussed that if Crawford

were convicted of the underlying charge of first-degree controlled-substance possession, a

mandatory-minimum sentence of 48 months would be required if the offense had been

charged with reference to a prior first-degree controlled-substance conviction. However,

the state asserted that even though Crawford had a prior controlled-substance conviction,

which triggered application of the mandatory-minimum sentence, the district court was not

required to impose the mandatory-minimum sentence if the state did not charge Crawford’s

first-degree controlled-substance offense as a subsequent controlled-substance offense, that

is, with reference to Crawford’s prior controlled-substance conviction. The district court

and defense counsel accepted that assertion.

Consistent with its position, the state made several statements in district court

indicating that the mandatory-minimum sentence could have applied if the state had

charged the underlying controlled-substance offense with reference to the prior

controlled-substance conviction. But at the plea hearing, no one mentioned the

mandatory-minimum sentence during discussions regarding Crawford’s intent to plead

guilty as charged and to request a downward sentencing departure. Moreover, the

mandatory-minimum sentence was not mentioned during Crawford’s waiver of trial rights

1
Crawford had other first-degree controlled-substance offenses pending in a separate file,
with a different date of offense. The state voluntarily dismissed those charges after
Crawford was sentenced on the underlying offenses in this case.

3
in support of his guilty plea. Finally, the district court told Crawford that it would consider

his lawyer’s request for “something less than the guidelines.”

Crawford tendered, and the district court accepted, his guilty pleas to first-degree

controlled-substance crime and fleeing a police officer in a motor vehicle. The guilty pleas

were tendered remotely, and Crawford and his attorney were in different locations. Thus,

Crawford offered an oral waiver of his trial rights in support of his guilty pleas, and defense

counsel requested permission from Crawford to sign the petition on Crawford’s behalf.

The district court indicated that it would receive the petition, but the record does not contain

a petition to plead guilty.

As planned, Crawford requested a downward-dispositional or durational sentencing

departure. As to a dispositional departure, that is, probation instead of imprisonment,

Crawford’s motion papers identified his acceptance into the Minnesota Adult and Teen

Challenge Program as one supporting ground. The state argued against Crawford’s request

on the merits and did not mention the mandatory-minimum sentence. Defense counsel

argued in favor of a downward sentencing departure, and Crawford addressed the district

court, “beg[ging]” the court to put him on probation instead of sending him to prison.

The district court rejected Crawford’s request for a downward sentencing departure

on the merits after determining that substantial and compelling circumstances did not

justify a departure. The district court entered judgments of conviction on the admitted

offenses and imposed presumptive, concurrent prison sentences as follows: 125 months

for the first-degree controlled-substance offense and 19 months for the fleeing offense.

This appeal follows.

4
 ISSUE

Was Crawford’s guilty plea unintelligent and therefore invalid because he was

misinformed that the district court could disregard the mandatory-minimum sentence

applicable to his first-degree controlled-substance conviction?

ANALYSIS

Crawford challenges the validity of his guilty plea to first-degree

controlled-substance possession.2 A defendant may challenge the constitutional validity of

a guilty plea for the first time on direct appeal. Brown v. State, 449 N.W.2d 180, 182 (Minn.

1989). “To be constitutionally valid, a guilty plea must be accurate, voluntary, and

intelligent. A defendant bears the burden of showing his plea was invalid. Assessing the

validity of a plea presents a question of law that [appellate courts] review de novo.” State

v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 94 (Minn. 2010) (citations omitted).

“The purpose of the requirement that the plea be intelligent is to [ensure] that the

defendant understands the charges, understands the rights he is waiving by pleading guilty,

and understands the consequences of his plea.” State v. Trott, 338 N.W.2d 248, 251 (Minn.

1983). The intelligence requirement concerns the direct consequences of a plea and

conviction. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 96. “[A] direct consequence is one that has a definite,

immediate and automatic effect on the range of a defendant’s punishment.” Kaiser v. State,

2
Crawford’s argument that his guilty plea was invalid focuses on his plea to first-degree
controlled-substance possession and the district court’s authority to grant a downward-
dispositional departure. We therefore limit our analysis to that issue. Although Crawford
argues that his guilty plea was also involuntary, we do not address that issue because we
ultimately conclude that his guilty plea to first-degree controlled-substance possession was
unintelligent and therefore invalid.

5
641 N.W.2d 900, 904 n.6 (Minn. 2002). Consistent with those principles, the district court

must ensure that defense counsel has told the defendant, and the defendant understands,

that “[i]f a minimum sentence is required by statute, the judge may impose a sentence of

imprisonment” not less than the amount specified in the statute. See Minn. R. Crim. P.

15.01, subd. 1(6)(j).

Crawford contends that he was misinformed regarding the direct consequences of

his guilty plea and that his plea was therefore unintelligent and invalid. Specifically, he

argues that a mandatory-minimum prison sentence of at least 48 months was a direct

consequence of his guilty plea, that the district court had no authority to disregard that

mandatory-minimum sentence, and that the district court therefore had no authority to grant

a downward-dispositional departure and place him on probation instead of imposing an

executed prison sentence.

Crawford pleaded guilty to first-degree controlled-substance possession under

Minn. Stat. § 152.021, subd. 2(a)(1) (2020), which provides that “[a] person is guilty of a

controlled substance crime in the first degree if: (1) the person unlawfully possesses one

or more mixtures of a total weight of 50 grams or more containing cocaine or

methamphetamine.” The relevant penalty provisions for that offense provide:

(a) A person convicted under subdivisions 1 to 2a,
paragraph (a), may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more
than 30 years or to payment of a fine of not more than
$1,000,000, or both.
(b) If the conviction is a subsequent controlled
substance conviction, a person convicted under subdivisions 1
to 2a, paragraph (a), shall be committed to the commissioner of
corrections for not less than four years nor more than 40 years

6
 and, in addition, may be sentenced to payment of a fine of not
more than $1,000,000.

Minn. Stat. § 152.021, subd. 3(a)-(b) (2020) (emphasis added).

A “subsequent controlled substance conviction” means that

before commission of the offense for which the person is
convicted under this chapter, the person was convicted of a
violation of section 152.021 or 152.022, including an attempt
or conspiracy, or was convicted of a similar offense by the
United States or another state, provided that ten years have not
elapsed since discharge from sentence.

Minn. Stat. § 152.01, subd. 16a (2020).

The parties do not dispute that the conviction resulting from Crawford’s guilty plea

to first-degree controlled-substance possession in this case constitutes a subsequent

controlled-substance conviction.3 Instead, the parties’ dispute centers on whether the

district court had authority to disregard the applicable mandatory-minimum sentence and

to grant a downward-dispositional departure.

Crawford’s Position

Crawford argues that the district court was without authority to disregard the

mandatory-minimum sentence in section 152.021, subdivision 3(b). Caselaw supports

3
Crawford committed the underlying first-degree controlled-substance offense on
November 23, 2021. In sentencing Crawford for that offense, the district court received
and considered a pre-sentence investigation report. That report indicates that Crawford
was convicted of a first-degree controlled-substance offense in 2006 and was not
discharged from the sentence for that offense until November 2, 2021. Because Crawford
was convicted of a violation of section 152.021 in 2006, before commission of the
underlying offense, and ten years have not elapsed since his sentence was discharged for
the 2006 offense, the underlying offense constitutes a “subsequent controlled substance
conviction.” See Minn. Stat. § 152.01, subd. 16a.

7
Crawford’s position that the district court lacked such authority.

Mandatory-minimum sentencing statutes “prohibit a stay of execution of sentence

and probation.” See State v. Adams, 791 N.W.2d 757, 759 (Minn. App. 2010) (discussing

Minn. Stat. §§ 152.022, subd. 3(b), .026 (2006)), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 15, 2011). Thus,

mandatory-minimum sentencing provisions restrict judicial discretion in sentencing. See

State v. Olson, 325 N.W.2d 13, 18 (Minn. 1982) (“[T]he legislature may restrict the exercise

of judicial discretion in sentencing, such as by providing for mandatory sentences . . . .”).

The supreme court has rejected “the argument that the legislature must append language

prohibiting waiver to every mandatory statute to ensure that the statute is given effect,”

reasoning that “[t]he canons of statutory construction provide that ‘shall’ is mandatory.”

State v. Humes, 581 N.W.2d 317, 319 (Minn. 1998); see State v. Sheppard, 587 N.W.2d 53,

56 (Minn. App. 1998) (applying Humes to consideration of a mandatory-minimum

sentencing provision in Minn. Stat. § 609.11, subd 8(b) (1996), and stating that “[t]he

legislature should not be expected to enumerate a prohibition against stayed executions in

every mandatory sentencing statute, particularly when the mandatory language and

removal of discretion is clear”), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 27, 1999).

As to the application of mandatory-minimum sentencing provisions in the context

of controlled-substance crimes, in State v. Bluhm, the supreme court held that “Minnesota

Statutes [section] 152.025, subdivision 3(b) (2002), requires that a mandatory minimum

six-month jail term be imposed and served when an offender has a previous qualifying

controlled substance conviction.” 676 N.W.2d 649, 650 (Minn. 2004). That penalty

provision stated, “If the conviction is a subsequent controlled substance conviction, a

8
person convicted under subdivision 1 or 2 shall be committed to the commissioner of

corrections or to a local correctional authority for not less than six months nor more than

ten years.” Minn. Stat. § 152.025, subd. 3(b) (2002) (emphasis added). The supreme court

considered that statutory provision in conjunction with Minn. Stat. § 152.026 (2002), which

stated that “[a] defendant convicted and sentenced to a mandatory sentence under sections

152.021 to 152.025 is not eligible for probation, parole, discharge, or supervised release

until that person has served the full term of imprisonment as provided by law.” Bluhm, 676

N.W.2d at 652 (quotation omitted).

The Bluhm court found that “[t]he language of sections 152.025 and 152.026 is clear

and unambiguous,” and it read that plain language “as mandating that an individual subject

to the penalty provision in section 152.025, subdivision 3(b), be committed to a local

correctional authority for a minimum of six months and that the sentence actually be

served.” Id. at 653. Thus, the supreme court rejected “Bluhm’s argument that the

sentencing court has the discretion to place a defendant being sentenced under section

152.025, subdivision 3(b), for a subsequent controlled substance crime on probation

instead of committing her to the minimum term called for in that section.” Id.

Like the supreme court, we have held that “In the absence of express authorization

by the legislature, a district court is without authority to disregard a statutory mandatory-

minimum sentence.” State v. Rausch, 799 N.W.2d 19, 20 (Minn. App. 2011). In Rausch,

we reversed the district court’s grant of a downward departure, reasoning that the district

court erred by failing to impose an applicable mandatory-minimum sentence. Id. at 21.

The relevant statute in Rausch provided that “[a] person convicted of committing burglary

9
of an occupied dwelling, as defined in subdivision 1, clause (a), must be committed to the

commissioner of corrections or county workhouse for not less than six months.” Minn.

Stat. § 609.582, subd. 1a (2010). We said that if “a statute is not ambiguous, it must be

given its plain meaning” and that there was no ambiguity in section 609.582, subdivision

1a. Rausch, 799 N.W.2d at 22. In reversing Rausch’s sentence because the district court

failed to impose the mandatory-minimum sentence, we recognized that our reversal might

“give rise to a motion to withdraw [the] plea as not voluntary or intelligent.” Id. at 23.

Although the mandatory-minimum sentence in Rausch applied to the offense of

burglary, we have also held that mandatory-minimum sentences applicable to

controlled-substance offenses must be imposed. For example, in State v. Turck, we held

that “[t]he mandatory-minimum sentencing provision for a repeat offender who commits a

third-degree controlled-substance crime under Minn. Stat. §§ 152.023, subd. 3(b) (2004),

and .026 (Supp. 2005), prohibits a district court from staying execution of the sentence.”

728 N.W.2d 544, 545 (Minn. App. 2007), rev. denied (Minn. May 30, 2007).

The relevant statute in Turck provided that “[i]f the conviction is a subsequent

controlled substance conviction, a person convicted under subdivision 1 or 2 shall be

committed to the commissioner of corrections for not less than two years nor more than 30

years.” Minn. Stat. § 152.023, subd. 3(b) (2004) (emphasis added). Like the supreme court

in Bluhm, we considered the mandatory-minimum statutory provision in conjunction with

the relevant version of section 152.026, which provided that “[a] defendant convicted and

sentenced to a mandatory sentence under sections 152.021 to 152.025 and 152.0262 is not

eligible for probation, parole, discharge, or supervised release until that person has served

10
the full term of imprisonment as provided by law.” Minn. Stat. § 152.026 (Supp. 2005);

Turck, 728 N.W.2d at 545. We stated that “[s]ections 152.023 and 152.026 require repeat

offenders to serve a minimum prison sentence” and that “because respondent’s sentence

[was] for a subsequent controlled-substance offense, he must serve a term of

imprisonment” that is not less than the statutory minimum. Turck, 728 N.W.2d at 548.

And in Adams, we held that “[t]he mandatory minimum sentencing provision for a

repeat offender who commits a second-degree controlled-substance crime under Minn.

Stat. §§ 152.022, subd. 3(b), .026 (2006), prohibits a district court from staying execution

of the sentence.” 791 N.W.2d at 757. The relevant statute in Adams provided that “[i]f the

conviction is a subsequent controlled substance conviction, a person convicted under

subdivision 1 . . . shall be committed to the commissioner of corrections for not less than

three years.” Minn. Stat. § 152.022, subd. 3(b) (2006) (emphasis added); Adams, 791

N.W.2d at 758. We once again considered the relevant sentencing statute in conjunction

with section 152.026, which provided that “[a] defendant convicted and sentenced to a

mandatory sentence under sections 152.021 to 152.025 . . . is not eligible for

probation . . . until that person has served the full term of imprisonment as provided by

law.” Minn. Stat. § 152.026 (2006); Adams, 791 N.W.2d at 758-59. We determined that

“[t]he language of the statutes is clear and unambiguous” and “mandate[s] that a repeat

offender serve a minimum sentence of three years and is not eligible for probation until

that time is served.” Adams, 791 N.W.2d at 759.

We stated that “[b]ecause Adams’s conviction in this case is a subsequent controlled-

substance conviction, . . . sections 152.022, subdivision 3(b), and 152.026 mandate an

11
executed prison sentence of three years; they prohibit a stay of execution of sentence and

probation.” Id. We were quite clear: “The district court lacked discretion to place Adams

on probation instead of committing her to the minimum term called for in section 152.022,

subdivision 3(b).” Id.

Like the mandatory-minimum sentencing provisions in Bluhm, Turck, and Adams,

the relevant statute in this case uses the mandatory term “shall” to require imposition of

the mandatory-minimum sentence. See Minn. Stat. § 152.021, subd. 3(b) (stating that “a

person convicted under subdivisions 1 to 2a, paragraph (a), shall be committed to the

commissioner of corrections for not less than four years” (emphasis added)). And like the

circumstances in those cases, Minn. Stat. § 152.026 (2020) provides that “[a] defendant

convicted and sentenced to a mandatory sentence under section 152.021 . . . is not eligible

for probation, parole, discharge, or supervised release until that person has served the full

term of imprisonment as provided by law.” We therefore do not discern a reason to treat

the mandatory-minimum sentencing provision in section 152.021, subdivision 3(b),

differently than the appellate courts of this state have treated similar mandatory-minimum

sentencing provisions in the controlled-substance context.

The State’s Position

The state argues that because it did not charge the underlying controlled-substance

offense with reference to the mandatory-minimum sentence in section 152.021, subdivision

3(b), that mandatory-minimum penalty does not apply. The state does not cite, and we are

not aware of, any authority supporting that proposition. In fact, it is inconsistent with the

12
caselaw set forth above. And as set forth below, there are several flaws in the state’s

argument.

First, the state conflates the elements of the first-degree controlled-substance offense

in this case with the factor necessary to trigger the mandatory-minimum sentence in section

152.021, subdivision 3(b). For example, the state argues that it “had ample opportunity to

amend the complaint in this case to charge [Crawford] with a more severe offense . . . based

on [his] prior first-degree possession conviction. The fact remains that the [s]tate chose

not to do so.” (Emphasis added.) The state notes that “a prosecutor has broad discretion

in the exercise of the charging function and ordinarily, under the separation-of-powers

doctrine, a court should not interfere with the prosecutor’s exercise of that discretion.”

State v. Foss, 556 N.W.2d 540, 540 (Minn. 1996).

The state’s reliance on charging discretion is unavailing because there is no attempt

to interfere with that discretion here. The state charged Crawford with first-degree

controlled-substance possession under Minn. Stat. § 152.021, subd. 2(a)(1). The elements

of that crime are as follows: (1) a person unlawfully possesses (2) one or more mixtures

of a total weight of 50 grams or more (3) containing cocaine or methamphetamine. See

Minn. Stat. § 152.021, subd. 2(a)(1). The plain language of section 152.021, subdivision

2(a)(1), shows that the existence of a prior controlled-substance conviction is not an

element of that offense. Instead, it is a sentencing factor that, if established, requires

imposition of the mandatory-minimum sentence in section 152.021, subdivision 3(b).

Compare Minn. Stat. § 152.021, subd. 2(a)(1) (defining the crime of first-degree possession

of a controlled substance without mention of a prior controlled-substance conviction) with

13
Minn. Stat. § 152.021, subd. 3(b) (stating the penalty for a person convicted under section

152.021, subdivision 2(a)(1), is a mandatory commitment “for not less than four years” if

the conviction is a “subsequent controlled substance conviction”).

Second, the state fails to recognize that, although the state must generally prove

aggravating sentencing factors beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury, there is an exception

for prior convictions: “other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the

penalty for a crime beyond the statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved

beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Barker, 705 N.W.2d 768, 771 (Minn. 2005) (emphasis

added) (quotation omitted).

For example, the state argues that it “did not allege in the charging document (much

less prove beyond a reasonable doubt) that a conviction on the charged offense would

constitute a ‘subsequent controlled substance conviction.’” But the state was not required

to prove that Crawford had a prior controlled-substance offense to trigger the mandatory-

minimum sentence under subdivision 3(b). The district court could make that finding based

on judicial records. See State v. Her, 862 N.W.2d 692, 698 (Minn. 2015) (noting that “[t]he

prior-conviction exception to the Sixth Amendment’s jury-trial right . . . permits a court to

find the existence of a prior conviction when sentencing a defendant so long as the prior

conviction is not itself an element of the current offense” and that “[t]he exception is

justified in part by the certainty of procedural safeguards attached to any fact of prior

conviction” (quotations omitted)). Thus, we reject the state’s argument that because it did

not invoke the mandatory-minimum penalty provision in section 152.021, subdivision 3(b),

“there was no basis in law or fact for the sentencing court to impose [that] penalty” and

14
Crawford therefore “was not subject to a mandatory minimum sentence for the instant

offense.”

Third, the state’s assertion that it could usurp the district court’s obligation to impose

the mandatory-minimum sentence required under section 152.021, subdivision 3(b), is

further weakened by the fact that subdivision 3(b) does not contain language authorizing

the state to request sentencing without regard to the mandatory-minimum sentence. This

absence is notable because a mandatory-minimum sentencing provision in another

paragraph of section 152.021 allows the state to pursue sentencing without regard to that

mandatory-minimum sentence. See Minn. Stat. § 152.021, subd. 3(c) (2020) (requiring a

mandatory-minimum term of incarceration of 65 months and providing that “the prosecutor

may, prior to the time of sentencing, file a motion to have the person sentenced without

regard to the mandatory minimum sentence established by this paragraph”). The lack of a

similar provision in subdivision 3(b) indicates that the legislature did not intend the state

to avoid application of the mandatory-minimum sentence in subdivision 3(b).

Fourth, the legal authorities governing the content of a charging document do not

require the state to cite or describe any applicable mandatory-minimum sentencing

provisions. Although the criminal rules require the state to include the maximum penalty

in a complaint, the rules do not require inclusion of any potential mandatory-minimum

sentence. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 2.01, subd. 1 (“The complaint must specify the offense

charged, the statute allegedly violated, and the maximum penalty. The complaint must also

conform to the requirements in Rule 17.02.”); 17.02 (requiring that “[a] complaint must be

substantially in the form required by Rule 2” and that “[f]or each count, the indictment or

15
complaint must cite the statute, rule, regulation, or other provision of law the defendant

allegedly violated”).

Similarly, Minn. Stat. §§ 628.01-.69 (2022), which govern the contents of

indictments and complaints, do not require the state to include information regarding any

applicable mandatory-minimum sentence in the charging document. See Minn. Stat.

§§ 628.10 (“The first pleading on the part of the state is the indictment, which shall contain:

(1) the title of the action, specifying the name of the court to which the indictment is

presented, and the names of the parties; (2) a statement of the acts constituting the offense,

in ordinary and concise language, without repetition.”); .12 (“The indictment shall be direct

and certain as it regards: (1) the party charged; (2) the offense charged; [and] (3) the

particular circumstances of the offense charged, when they are necessary to constitute a

complete offense.”).

Finally, as to the content requirements of a charging document, the due-process

“nature and cause requirement is satisfied if an indictment contains such descriptions of

the offense charged as will enable a defendant to make his defense and to plead the

judgment in bar of any further prosecution of the same crime.” State v. Dunson, 770

N.W.2d 546, 551 (Minn. App. 2009) (quotations omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 20,

2009). The lack of any authority requiring the state to explicitly refer to a potential

mandatory-minimum sentence in a charging document undercuts the state’s assertion that

its failure to do so renders the mandatory-minimum sentence inapplicable.

Fifth—and most importantly—the state’s assertion that the state alone is entrusted

to determine whether or not to impose the mandatory-minimum sentence in section

16
152.021, subdivision 3(b), fails to recognize the relative powers of the legislature, the

judiciary, and a prosecutor in sentencing.

The power to define the conduct which constitutes a
criminal offense and to fix the punishment for such conduct is
vested in the legislature. However, the imposition of the
sentence within the limits prescribed by the legislature is
purely a judicial function. . . . But once the legislature has
prescribed the punishment for a particular offense it cannot,
within constitutional parameters, condition the imposition of
the sentence by the court upon the prior approval of the
prosecutor.

Olson, 325 N.W.2d at 17-18 (citations omitted).

The Olson court stated that “[t]he separation of powers doctrine mandates that

power given to [a] prosecutor . . . to initiate sentencing without regard to [a] statutory

mandatory minimum sentence must also be given to the courts.” Id. at 14. The supreme

court explained that the law “must be interpreted to give courts and prosecutors alike the

power to initiate sentencing without regard to statutory minimums. If the legislature gives

such power to the prosecutors, it must also give it to the courts. It cannot constitutionally

do otherwise.” Id. at 19. The state’s assertion that it can unilaterally prevent the district

court from imposing the mandatory-minimum sentence under section 152.021, subdivision

3(b), is untenable given that a prosecutor cannot unilaterally interfere with the prescribed

punishment for a particular offense. See id. at 18.

For these reasons, we reject the state’s argument that, because it did not “invoke”

section 152.021, subdivision 3(b), in its charging document, the mandatory-minimum

sentence in section 152.021, subdivision 3(b), does not apply in this case. Because the

17
first-degree controlled-substance conviction resulting from Crawford’s guilty plea was a

subsequent controlled-substance conviction, the district court was required to impose a

mandatory-minimum sentence of at least four years in prison under section 152.021,

subdivision 3(b). The district court had no authority to ignore that mandatory-minimum

sentence, to stay execution of a prison sentence and place Crawford on probation, or to

impose an executed sentence of less than 48 months. See Rausch, 799 N.W.2d at 21

(reversing downward-dispositional departure because the district court had no authority to

disregard the applicable mandatory-minimum sentence); Turck, 728 N.W.2d at 548

(reversing downward-dispositional departure because the applicable mandatory-minimum

sentence required imprisonment); Adams, 791 N.W.2d at 759 (reversing downward-

dispositional departure because the applicable mandatory-minimum sentence required

imprisonment).

Having concluded that the district court could not disregard the

mandatory-minimum sentence in Minn. Stat. § 152.021, subd. 3(b), we next consider

whether Crawford’s guilty plea was unintelligent and therefore invalid.

Validity of Crawford’s Guilty Plea

Several circumstances inform our decision regarding whether Crawford has shown

that his guilty plea to first-degree controlled-substance possession was unintelligent and

therefore invalid.

First, although the lawyers and the district court discussed the mandatory-minimum

sentence in section 152.021, subdivision 3(b), at several hearings, those discussions

regarded the state’s assertion that it could have sought application of that sentence in the

18
underlying case. Indeed, Crawford may have acknowledged that possibility. But the state

never did so, and it asserted—incorrectly—that the district court was therefore not required

to impose the mandatory-minimum sentence under subdivision 3(b).

Second, as a result of the state’s incorrect assertion that the district court was not

required to impose the required sentence under subdivision 3(b), when Crawford tendered

his guilty plea, the district court misinformed him that the maximum statutory sentence for

his offense was 30 years. Because the district court had no authority to disregard the

mandatory-sentencing requirement, the statutory maximum sentence was 40 years. See

Minn. Stat. § 152.021, subd. 3(b).

Third, as a result of the state’s incorrect assertion that the district court was not

required to impose the mandatory-minimum sentence under subdivision 3(b), when

Crawford tendered his guilty plea, he was not informed that he was subject to that

mandatory-minimum sentence, which required his commitment to prison for at least 48

months. Id. Nor was he informed that the district court could not disregard the mandatory

term of imprisonment, either by placing him on probation or by imposing a prison term

less than 48 months. Instead, the district court informed Crawford that it would consider

his request for “something less than the guidelines,” implying that the district court could

in fact grant a downward sentencing departure despite the mandatory-minimum sentence.

The district court had no authority to do so.

Fourth, the record does not contain a petition to plead guilty clarifying or correcting

the misinformation that Crawford received prior to tendering his guilty plea. See Perkins

v. State, 559 N.W.2d 678, 690 (Minn. 1997) (concluding, despite defendant’s contrary

19
assertions, that the record established that when defendant pleaded guilty, he understood

the maximum sentence that could be imposed, based in part on his signature on a petition

to plead guilty, which correctly stated the maximum penalty).

On this record, Crawford has established that he was not informed that the direct

consequences of his guilty plea to first-degree controlled-substance possession included a

mandatory term of imprisonment of at least 48 months. Instead, he was incorrectly led to

believe that the district court could ignore that mandatory-minimum sentence, grant a

downward-dispositional departure, and place him on probation simply because the state

did not request application of the mandatory-minimum term of imprisonment. Again, the

district court could not do so. Thus, Crawford has shown that his guilty plea was

unintelligent and therefore invalid, and he is entitled to withdraw his guilty plea to first-

degree controlled-substance possession.

DECISION

Because Crawford’s guilty plea to first-degree controlled-substance possession was

unintelligent and therefore invalid, we remand to allow Crawford to withdraw that guilty

plea if he chooses to do so. If Crawford withdraws his guilty plea to first-degree

controlled-substance possession on remand, the district court shall vacate his conviction

for that offense. Although Crawford does not specifically address the validity of his guilty

plea to felony fleeing, his brief suggests that he should be allowed to withdraw that guilty

plea on remand as well. Because it is not clear that the district court would have accepted

Crawford’s guilty plea to felony fleeing in the absence of his guilty plea to first-degree

controlled-substance possession, if the district court vacates Crawford’s judgment of

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conviction of first-degree controlled-substance possession on remand, it may also vacate

his judgment of conviction of felony fleeing. See State v. Goulette, 258 N.W.2d 758, 762

(Minn. 1977) (“Neither the constitution nor our Rules of Criminal Procedure give to a

criminal defendant an absolute right to have his plea of guilty accepted.”).

Reversed and remanded.

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