Lana Waldron, as successor Trustee of the Pick Family Trust dated December 11, 2013 v. Marilyn A Stenzel, ...

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1281

Lana Waldron, as successor Trustee of the Pick Family Trust dated December 11, 2013,
Appellant,

vs.

Marilyn A Stenzel, Individually and former Trustee of the Pick Family Trust dated
December 11, 2013,
Respondent.

Filed May 19, 2025
Affirmed
Schmidt, Judge

Waseca County District Court
File No. 81-CV-22-243

Sarah R. Jewell, River Valley Law, P.A., Waite Park, Minnesota (for appellant)

Christopher L. Paul, Trautmann Martin Law, PLLC, Mankato, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Cochran, Judge; and Schmidt,

Judge.

NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

SCHMIDT, Judge

Appellant Lana Waldron, as successor trustee of the Pick Family Trust, argues for

the reversal of the denial of her posttrial motion due to the jury’s failure to award damages

and the district court’s order lacking written findings of fact or conclusions of law. Because

the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the posttrial motion, we affirm.
 FACTS 1

Respondent Marilyn Stenzel and Marie Pick 2 had been friends for over fifty years.

Marie frequently asked Stenzel for help as Marie aged.

In 2013, Marie came into an inheritance and created the Pick Family Trust. Stenzel

served as the grantor and the initial trustee, with Marie’s four adult children as the

beneficiaries. Marie’s adult children were unaware of the existence of the trust until 2018.

Marie had a Wells Fargo account that was unconnected to the trust, besides the trust

having a contingent remainder interest in the account after Marie’s death. Between 2013

and 2018, the Wells Fargo account reached a zero-dollar balance. Stenzel received two

$5,000 cashier’s checks from the Wells Fargo account. Marie spent other money from the

account on improvements to the farm ($80,000), gifts to her children ($10,000 each), gifts

to her nieces and nephews ($60,000), and charitable donations.

Marie met with two different financial advisors between 2013 and 2017, meeting

with one six or seven times and separately meeting with the other four or five times.

Stenzel was present at every meeting. The first financial advisor did not feel Marie “was

being coerced or forced to do something that she did not” want to do. The second financial

advisor never felt the need to ask Stenzel to leave the room when they met.

After learning of the trust, Marie’s children filed a lawsuit to have Stenzel removed

as trustee. Stenzel resigned as trustee and Waldron accepted appointment as the successor

1
We base the facts on the evidence presented at trial as viewed in the light most favorable
to the jury’s verdict. Ouellette by Ouellette v. Subak, 391 N.W.2d 810, 817 (Minn. 1986).
2
Given the trust’s name, we refer to Marie Pick as “Marie” throughout the opinion.
2
trustee. In that case, the district court ordered Stenzel to: provide an inventory of all

property belonging to the trust, create an accounting of the trust’s assets, and transfer all

trust records and property in Stenzel’s possession to Waldron.

Marie passed away in 2020. In 2022, Waldron—in her capacity as trustee—sued

Stenzel. The complaint alleged four counts, including breach of a fiduciary duty.

A jury trial was held over five days. A unanimous jury returned the special-verdict

form, rejecting all of Waldron’s claims. For the questions addressing the claim for breach

of a fiduciary duty, the jury answered the special verdict questions as follows:

3
 Waldron moved for a new trial and judgment as a matter of law. Waldron requested

a new trial on damages, asserting that the jury’s finding that Waldron suffered no damages

was contrary to the “mountains of available evidence” in the case. The district court denied

Waldron’s posttrial motions on the record during the hearing. In addressing Waldron’s

motion for a new trial alleging insufficient damages proven, the district court explained:

As to [the] motion for new trial alleging insufficient damages
proven, again, this is based on mere speculation. The jury
listened to days of evidence and piles of documents [were]
submitted in this matter, and ultimately all ten jurors
unanimously decided plaintiff didn’t prove damages. There’s
insufficient evidence for a damage award, and frankly, I can
see why the jury came to that conclusion. Plaintiff’s evidence
was based on mere speculation. They didn’t provide any hard
evidence that Ms. Stenzel misappropriated this $10,000 of
cashier[’]s checks or this Northwestern Mutual fund account.
Certainly plaintiff, I recall made a big deal about Northwestern
Mutual not responding to subpoenas and requests for
discovery. Why didn’t you ask for a court order? You could
have done more to prove there is evidence of this Northwestern
Mutual account. You argued speculation, that we believe there
is this account out there and Ms. Stenzel and Northwestern
Mutual are basically in cahoots and withholding evidence. I
don’t believe that’s true. I believe you failed to prove sufficient
evidence for damages and the jury rightfully found no damages
for the breach of fiduciary duty as well as the fraud counts.

That leads into 59.01(g), verdict not justified by the
evidence. Again, plaintiff, by your own admission, stated that
you didn’t know what evidence Northwestern Mutual really
had. Well, again, you presented a case based on speculation.
No hard evidence for this jury to award damages.

So new trial motion is denied on all the
grounds. . . . The judgment is going to stand because I believe
the jury did weigh all of the evidence, including witness
testimony and exhibits. And the question the Court must look
at is whether the verdict is so contrary to the preponderance of
the evidence as to imply the jury failed to consider all the
evidence or acted under some mistake or from some improper

4
 motive, bias, feeling, caprice, instead of honestly and
dispassionately exercising its judgment. Plaintiff has failed to
show anything in the court file that the verdict was contrary to
the evidence submitted in this case, therefore, the motion to
issue a judgment as a matter of law for plaintiff is denied.

The district court then filed a written order that summarily denied the posttrial

motions without including any findings of fact or conclusions of law. Waldron appeals.

DECISION

Waldron argues that the district court abused its discretion by (1) denying her

posttrial motion because the jury should have awarded damages after finding Stenzel

breached her fiduciary duty; and (2) not issuing written findings of fact or conclusions of

law in the order denying the motion. We address each issue in turn.

I. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Waldron’s motion for
a new trial based on the jury’s answers on the special-verdict form.

Waldron challenges the denial of her new-trial motion with respect to damages on

her breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim. 3 We review a district court’s denial of a motion for a

new trial for an abuse of discretion. Christie v. Est. of Christie, 911 N.W.2d 833, 838

(Minn. 2018). We “liberally construe[]” a jury’s answers on a special-verdict form “to

give effect to the intention of the jury” and we must “harmonize all findings if at all

possible.” Dunn v. Nat’l Beverage Corp., 745 N.W.2d 549, 555 (Minn. 2008). “If the

answers to special verdict questions can be reconciled on any theory, the verdict will not

be disturbed.” Id. (emphasis in original) (quotation omitted).

3
Waldron does not contest the jury’s verdicts for any of her other three claims.
5
 Waldron argues that the jury was required to award some damages after finding that

Stenzel breached her fiduciary duty. Waldron asserts that finding that there had been “a

breach of fiduciary duty but also no damages” is “legally inconsistent[.]”

But the special-verdict form simply listed each element for Waldron’s claim: duty,

breach, causation, and damages. See Lund v. Lund, 924 N.W.2d 274, 284 (Minn. App.

2019) (noting elements for breach-of-fidcuary-duty claim), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 27,

2019). The special-verdict form asked the jury to make a finding as to each element.

Contrary to Waldron’s argument, the jury did not find that she had proved her entire

claim. Instead, the jury found that Waldron had proved the first two elements of her claim;

namely, that Stenzel owed the Pick Family Trust a fiduciary duty, and that Stenzel breached

that duty. In analyzing the next element of the claim, the jury found that the trust did not

suffer any damages. Given that finding, the jury did not answer the question related to the

final element (causation). The jury’s answers did not create a legally inconsistent verdict.

In addition, our thorough review of the record demonstrates that the jury’s answer

to the special verdict damages question can be reconciled on multiple theories. For

example, Waldron argues that the cashier’s checks Stenzel received “definitively

establishes a bare minimum of at least $10,000.00 in damages under the court-instructed

‘profit the trustee made because of the breach’ method of calculating damages.” But, as

the district court determined, Waldron “didn’t provide any hard evidence that Stenzel

misappropriated this $10,000 of cashier[’]s checks.” Rather, the checks came from Marie’s

personal Wells Fargo account, in which the trust had only a contingent remainder interest

(payable to the Pick Family Trust on Marie’s death). The jury could have reasonably found

6
that Marie gave her longtime friend a gift of $10,000, which was also the amount that Marie

gifted to each of her adult children from the Wells Fargo account. The record supports that

the jury’s finding that Marie’s gift to her friend caused no damage to the Pick Family Trust.

Waldron also posits that the trust suffered damages given that “Trust assets went

unaccounted for, were transferred to various charitable causes and organizations that Marie

Pick was not otherwise known to support so generously, and were spent to benefit people

and entities other than Marie Pick and the beneficiaries of the Trust.” But these assertions

are based upon Waldron’s theory that the jury found Stenzel breached her fiduciary duty

by exerting undue influence over Marie. This theory is not supported by concrete evidence.

The jury’s finding of breach can be reconciled based upon evidence of Stenzel failing to

provide the initial accounting of the trust’s assets, which was later rectified. Such a breach

would not lead to damages to the trust. And, just as Waldron theorizes that Stenzel may

have exerted undue influence over Marie to inexplicably support charitable causes, the

evidence equally supports a theory that Marie spent her own money the way she chose. 4

Because the answers on the special verdict form can be reconciled based upon the

evidence presented at trial, we will not disturb the jury’s verdict. Dunn, 745 N.W.2d at

555. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the posttrial motion.

4
Waldron also points to damages in legal costs stemming from her need to investigate the
breach of fiduciary duty. But attorney fees are not a measure of damages for a claim
alleging breach of a fiduciary duty. See In re Trusteeship of Tr. of Williams, 631 N.W.2d
398, 409-10 (Minn. App. 2001) (“[I]t is a fundamental principle of law deeply ingrained in
our common law jurisprudence that each party bears his own attorney fees in the absence
of a statutory or contractual exception” and “there is no Minnesota case requiring a trustee
whose management of a trust has been challenged to pay attorney fees incurred by the
successful challenger.”) (quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 25, 2001).
7
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Waldron’s posttrial
motions without issuing written findings of fact or conclusions of law.

Waldron argues that the district court abused its discretion by failing to issue written

findings of fact or conclusions of law to explain its reasoning for denying her posttrial

motions. We review the district court’s denial of a posttrial motion for an abuse of

discretion. Christie, 911 N.W.2d at 838. “A district court abuses its discretion if its

decision is against the facts in the record or if its ruling is based on an erroneous view of

the law.” State ex rel. Swan Lake Area Wildlife Ass’n v. Nicollet Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs,

799 N.W.2d 619, 625 (Minn. App. 2011) (quotations omitted).

We discern neither an error of law, nor an abuse of discretion in the manner in which

the district court denied Waldron’s posttrial motions. The Minnesota Rules of Civil

Procedure do not require a district court to issue written findings of fact or conclusions of

law on posttrial motions in a case that was tried to a jury. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.01; see

also Poppler v. Wright Hennepin Coop. Elec. Ass’n, 845 N.W.2d 168, 172-73 (Minn. 2014)

(concluding that rule 52.01 is inapplicable to a case tried by jury); Myers v. Hearth Techs.,

Inc., 621 N.W.2d 787, 793 (Minn. App. 2001), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 13, 2001).

Similarly, the statute only requires written findings when an issue of fact has been

tried by a court. Minn. Stat. § 546.27, subd. 1(a) (2024) (“When an issue of fact has been

tried by the court, the decision shall be in writing, the facts found and the conclusion of

law shall be separately stated, and judgment shall be entered accordingly.”). The statute

did not require the district court to issue written findings of fact or conclusions of law

because the issues of fact were decided by a jury.

8
 Because the district court was not required to issue written findings of fact or

conclusions of law in denying Waldron’s posttrial motions, the district court did not abuse

its discretion in the manner in which it denied Waldron’s posttrial motions. 5

Affirmed.

5
Waldron’s argument also ignores the district court’s oral ruling at the close of the posttrial
motion hearing. Although not required by rule or statute to explain its reasoning in denying
the posttrial motion following the jury trial, the district court noted that Waldron’s
arguments for a new trial due to insufficient damages was based on “mere speculation.”
The court stated that it understood why the jury found that there was insufficient evidence
for a damage award. The district court also explained its denial of Waldron’s motion for
judgment as a matter of law, noting that Waldron “has failed to show anything in the court
file that the verdict was contrary to the evidence submitted in this case[.]” The oral ruling
provided sufficient reasoning for Waldron to understand the district court’s reasoning.
Although the order could have included additional written findings of fact and conclusions
of law, the district court was not required to do so. Cf. Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.01 (stating that
“[i]t will be sufficient if the findings of fact and conclusions of law are stated orally and
recorded in open court following the close of the evidence”).
9