State of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. Mervel George Jones, III, Appellant

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1451

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Mervel George Jones, III,
Appellant.

Filed October 13, 2025
Affirmed
Cochran, Judge

Mille Lacs County District Court
File No. 48-CR-22-211

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Jacob Campion, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota; and

Corey Haller, Mille Lacs County Attorney, Milaca, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Rebecca Ireland, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Cochran, Presiding Judge; Smith, Tracy M., Judge; and

Ede, Judge.

NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

COCHRAN, Judge

Appellant challenges his convictions of first-degree assault and fleeing a peace

officer following a jury trial. Appellant argues that he is entitled to a new trial because the

district court judge violated his constitutional right to an impartial fact-finder when
conducting its inquiry as to whether appellant forfeited his right to be present at trial after

appellant failed to appear. Alternatively, appellant argues that he is entitled to a new trial

because the district court judge violated the code of judicial conduct by creating an

appearance of bias when discussing a hearsay objection with counsel. We affirm.

FACTS

This appeal stems from appellant Mervel George Jones III’s convictions for assault

of his significant other, A.M., and attempting to evade police during his arrest. The

following facts summarize the evidence received during the jury trial and the relevant

district court proceedings.

In January 2022, A.M.’s mother called the police to report that Jones had assaulted

A.M. Mille Lacs Tribal Police Officers J.H. and D.S. responded to the house of A.M.’s

mother, where they found A.M. According to the officers, A.M. had been “severely

beaten.” Her eyes were swollen, she was missing teeth, and she was bleeding profusely.

Paramedics took A.M. to the local hospital. Later, she was transferred via helicopter to a

level-one trauma center due to the severity of her injuries. A.M. had fractures involving

both her upper and lower jaw and her nasal bones, lacerations on her lips, and damage to

her gums and teeth.

In February 2022, respondent State of Minnesota charged Jones with first-degree

assault under Minnesota Statutes section 609.221, subdivision 1 (2020); domestic assault

under Minnesota Statutes section 609.2242, subdivision 4 (2020); and fleeing a peace

officer under Minnesota Statutes section 609.487, subdivision 6 (2020). Jones entered a

plea of not guilty and the matter proceeded to a five-day jury trial.

2
 Jones, who was on intensive supervised release, was present on the first two days of

trial for jury selection. The jury was sworn at the end of the second day. On the third day,

Jones failed to appear for trial.

The district court judge noted Jones’s absence for the record and asked defense

counsel to try to reach Jones to determine the reason for Jones’s absence. The judge

specifically noted that the district court had a duty to conduct “an adequate investigation

about the circumstances” surrounding Jones’s absence. Defense counsel called Jones and

also sent him a text message, but Jones did not respond. Defense counsel told the judge

that Jones usually answers his phone. Defense counsel further indicated that Jones did not

inform counsel that he would be absent.

The district court then decided to “conduct more of an investigation” to determine

whether Jones was voluntarily absent from trial. A sergeant with the local sheriff’s office

testified at the court’s request pursuant to rule 614(a) of the rules of evidence, which allows

a district court to call its own witnesses. The sergeant, who was working as “a transport

court security sergeant” at the time, testified that his job responsibilities included

determining if “[a]nyone [who] shows up for court, or might show up for court” has an

active warrant for their arrest. The sergeant further testified that, prior to the third morning

of trial, he learned that Jones had an active Minnesota Department of Corrections (DOC)

warrant because he violated the terms of his supervised release by cutting off his DOC

ankle monitoring bracelet around 10:30 p.m. on the second day of trial and leaving the

treatment facility where he resided. Following this testimony, the district court gave

counsel for the parties an opportunity to cross-examine the sergeant. Both declined to do

3
so. Additionally, both attorneys declined to make any argument or offer an opinion as to

whether Jones was voluntarily absent from trial.

The court then took a 25-minute break to give Jones some additional time to appear.

During the break, the judge reviewed court records from other matters, which showed that

Jones had an extensive history with the court system dating back to the year 2000, including

a number of warrants against him. Following the break, Jones still had not appeared. The

judge asked defense counsel if he had heard from Jones and counsel answered, “No.” The

judge then determined, in the presence of the parties’ counsel but outside of the presence

of the jury, that Jones had “intentionally abandoned a known right to be present at trial.”

In explaining the basis for the determination, the judge discussed some of Jones’s court

records and noted that Jones is “well aware of the system and how it works.” The district

court also told counsel, “[W]e’re going to proceed with trial with the hope that [defense

counsel] can reach [Jones] and that he can rejoin us.” Defense counsel continued to try to

reach Jones multiple times during trial but was unsuccessful.

The trial continued for three more days in Jones’s absence. The jury heard

testimony from A.M., the investigating police officers, medical personnel, and a domestic-

violence expert witness, among others. The jury found Jones guilty of all three charged

offenses. Prior to sentencing, Jones was arrested on a warrant and the district court gave

him an opportunity to explain his absence from trial. Jones declined to offer any statement

about his absence.

The district court convicted Jones of felony first-degree assault (count I) and

misdemeanor fleeing a police officer (count III). The district court sentenced Jones to the

4
presumptive sentence of 192 months’ imprisonment for first-degree assault. The district

court also sentenced Jones to 90 days in jail for fleeing a peace officer, but the warrant of

commitment reflects that Jones was given 90 days’ credit for time served.

Jones appeals.

DECISION

Jones seeks reversal of his convictions on the basis that the district court judge

deprived him of a fair trial. He first contends that the judge committed a structural error

by independently investigating facts outside the record to determine if Jones was

voluntarily absent from trial and sharing the results of that investigation in court, thereby

depriving Jones of his constitutional right to an impartial judge. Second, Jones maintains

that he is entitled to a new trial because the judge violated the code of judicial conduct by

not disqualifying himself after creating an appearance of bias during a discussion with

counsel on a hearsay objection. Each argument is addressed in turn.

I. The district court’s investigation into the circumstances of Jones’s absence
from trial did not violate Jones’s right to an impartial judge.

Jones argues that the district court judge violated Jones’s right to an impartial judge

by reviewing court records as part of the court’s inquiry into whether Jones’s absence from

trial was voluntary and relying in part on those records when determining that Jones waived

his right to be present at trial.

Jones’s argument implicates two constitutional rights of a criminal defendant: the

right to be present at trial and the right to an impartial judge. A criminal defendant has a

constitutional right to be present at every stage of trial. State v. Finnegan, 784 N.W.2d

5
243, 247 (Minn. 2010); U.S. Const. amends. VI, XIV; see also Ford v. State, 690 N.W.2d

706, 712 (Minn. 2005) (“A defendant’s constitutional right to be present [at trial] is

grounded in the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment and the Due Process Clause

of the Fourteenth Amendment.”). This right may be waived by the accused, either

expressly or impliedly. Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.03, subd. 1(2); State v. Cassidy, 567 N.W.2d

707, 709 (Minn. 1997). “A defendant’s voluntary absence without compelling

justification . . . constitutes a waiver of the right to be present.” Cassidy, 567 N.W.2d at

709 (quotation omitted).

If a defendant fails to appear for trial, the district court “must make sufficient inquiry

into the circumstances of a defendant’s disappearance to justify a finding whether the

absence was voluntary.” Finnegan, 784 N.W.2d at 250 (quotation omitted). The inquiry

must be made “efficiently,” while also safeguarding the defendant’s constitutional right to

be present at trial. Id. Following the inquiry, the district court makes “a preliminary

finding of voluntariness.” Id. If the defendant is returned to custody before the sentence

is imposed, the district court must afford the defendant the opportunity to explain his

absence. Id. The supreme court has concluded that this process provides “a workable

framework for district courts to utilize when confronting the question of [whether to

continue] with a trial in the defendant’s absence.” Id.

A criminal defendant also has a constitutional right to a fair trial and to a fair and

impartial judge. State v. Duol, ___ N.W.3d ___, ___, No. A22-0748, A24-1754, slip op.

at 11 (Minn. Sept. 3, 2025); see also U.S. Const. amend. VI; Minn. Const. art. I, § 6.

“[I]mpartiality is the very foundation of the American judicial system.” Greer v. State,

6
673 N.W.2d 151, 155 (Minn. 2004). “A judge must maintain the integrity of the adversary

system at all stages of the proceedings.” State v. Schlienz, 774 N.W.2d 361, 367 (Minn.

2009). The law makes no distinction between a judge presiding over a bench trial and a

judge presiding over a jury trial. See State v. Malone, 963 N.W.2d 453, 466-67 (Minn.

2021). Yet “[t]he mere fact that a party declares a judge partial does not in itself generate

a reasonable question as to the judge’s impartiality.” State v. Reek, 942 N.W.2d 148, 156

(Minn. 2020) (quotation omitted). Rather, there is a presumption that the district court has

discharged its duties properly. McKenzie v. State, 583 N.W.2d 744, 747 (Minn. 1998).

Jones argues that the district court violated his right to an impartial judge during its

inquiry into Jones’s absence from trial. Jones focuses on the district court’s review of and

reliance on court records from other matters to assist it in deciding whether Jones was

voluntarily absent from trial. The state disagrees, arguing that the district court was

required to conduct an independent inquiry into Jones’s absence from trial before

continuing with the trial to ensure Jones’s constitutional right to be present at trial was not

violated and further argues that the district court judge remained impartial throughout its

inquiry.

We review de novo whether a judge’s conduct deprived a defendant of the

constitutional right to a fair trial and an impartial fact-finder. State v. Dorsey, 701 N.W.2d

238, 249 (Minn. 2005). Depriving a defendant of the constitutional right to an impartial

judge is a structural error that requires automatic reversal and remand without regard for

whether the defendant was prejudiced by the error. Id. at 253.

7
 After Jones did not appear for trial on the third day and his counsel was unable to

locate him, the district court conducted the required inquiry into the circumstances

surrounding Jones’s failure to appear to determine whether Jones was voluntarily absent.

The district court’s inquiry included calling the sergeant to testify and reviewing Jones’s

criminal records in the Minnesota Court Information System (MNCIS). As discussed

above, the sergeant testified that Jones had an outstanding warrant because Jones cut off

his ankle monitoring bracelet following the second day of trial and left the treatment facility

where he was residing. The district court also reviewed Jones’s MNCIS records, which

showed that Jones had records going back to 2000 and had at least 33 warrants issued

against him. Based on this information, the district court determined that Jones “absented

himself intentionally” and had “abandoned a known right to be present at trial.”

In seeking reversal of his convictions, Jones does not challenge the district court’s

decision to call the sergeant to testify as part of the inquiry into Jones’s absence from trial.

Rather, Jones argues that by reviewing MNCIS records from other cases, the judge

transformed from an impartial judge to biased trier of fact and thereby deprived Jones of

his right to an impartial judge.

Minnesota law identifies three types of judicial bias: actual bias, emergent bias, and

perceived bias. State v. Lopez, 988 N.W.2d 107, 117 (Minn. 2023). Emergent bias occurs

“when the trier of fact is not actually biased, but during the trial, something happens that

transforms [the fact-finder] into a partial trier of fact.” Id. Jones contends that the judge’s

investigation of Jones’s court records constitutes emergent bias.

8
 Jones relies on Dorsey to support his argument. In Dorsey, the state brought a

charge of felony possession of marijuana. 701 N.W.2d at 241. The state further alleged

that Dorsey was in possession of a firearm in conjunction with the marijuana and sought to

impose a mandatory three-year minimum prison sentence. Id. The district court judge,

sitting as the fact-finder in a bench trial, heard testimony from a defense witness about the

date that the witness’s boyfriend had died. Id. at 241, 243. That testimony was relevant to

whether Dorsey constructively possessed the firearm in question. Id. at 242-43. The judge,

who was familiar with the deceased boyfriend from drug court, directed her clerk to check

whether the witness’s testimony was accurate by looking into court records. Id. at 243-44.

The records showed a different date of death. Id. at 244. Relying in part on this

information, the district court found that the defense witness lacked credibility and

convicted Dorsey of felony possession of marijuana while in possession of a firearm. Id.

at 244-45.

On appeal, the supreme court concluded that the district court judge’s questioning

of the veracity of the defense witness’s testimony, independent investigation of a fact

testified to by a defense witness, and report of the results of the investigation to counsel

deprived Dorsey of his constitutional right to an impartial judge and trier of fact. Id. at

250, 252. The supreme court explained that, by independently investigating a fact not

introduced into evidence, the district court judge violated “her obligation as the finder of

fact to refrain from seeking or obtaining evidence outside that presented by the parties

during the trial.” Id. at 250. “[T]he act of seeking information outside the record

effectively transformed the court into an investigator for the prosecution, thereby

9
‘eliminating any vestige of impartiality.’” Lopez, 988 N.W.2d at 119 (describing conduct

at issue in Dorsey and quoting Dorsey, 701 N.W.2d at 250). In reaching its decision, the

supreme court noted that it was “preserving the bright-line rule that judges may not engage

in independent investigations of facts in evidence.” Dorsey, 701 N.W.2d at 251. The

supreme court further concluded that the violation of Dorsey’s right to an impartial judge

amounted to structural error requiring reversal and remand for a new trial. Id. at 253.

Recently, the supreme court issued an opinion in which it clarified that Dorsey’s

holding applies in the context of a postconviction proceeding. Duol, slip op. at 11-13.

Duol involved a petition for postconviction relief from convictions of first- and second-

degree murder based on newly discovered evidence. Id., slip op. at 2. The district court

denied the petition for a new trial following a postconviction evidentiary hearing at which

two witnesses testified. Id., slip op. at 6-7. In its order denying the petition, the district

court found that the testimony of one of the witnesses was not credible. Id., slip op. at 7.

In making this finding, the district court relied on details about the witness’s criminal

history that were not part of the postconviction record. Id. On appeal, Duol argued that

the district court’s independent investigation into the witness’s criminal history deprived

Duol of his constitutional right to an impartial judge. Id., slip op. at 9-10. The supreme

court agreed and concluded that the district court engaged in structural error. Id., slip op.

at 10. To remedy the district court’s error, the supreme court reversed in part and remanded

for a new evidentiary hearing. Id., slip op. at 17.

In reaching its decision in Duol, the supreme court applied the legal principles

outlined in Dorsey. Id., slip op. at 11. The supreme court emphasized that the

10
constitutional right to “an impartial trial process ‘requires that conclusions reached by the

trier of fact be based upon the facts in evidence’ and ‘prohibits the trier of fact from

reaching conclusions based on evidence sought or obtained beyond that adduced in court.’”

Id. (quoting Dorsey, 701 N.W.2d at 249-50). As a result, the supreme court concluded that

“the district court’s deliberate independent investigation and use of extra-record facts in

the [postconviction] order” violated Duol’s constitutional right to an impartial judge. Id.,

slip op. at 12-13. The supreme court noted that it has “never recognized an exception to

[the] guardrail” prohibiting judges from performing “independent investigations of facts in

evidence.” Id., slip op. at 11 (quotation omitted).

But the supreme court has not addressed a situation like that present in this case,

where the district court was required to conduct its own inquiry into the defendant’s

absence from trial in order to protect the defendant’s constitutional right to be present. See

id.; Finnegan, 784 N.W.2d at 250. Instead, Duol and Dorsey both addressed situations

where the parties presented evidence on the issues to be decided by the district court

consistent with the adversarial process, but the district court nonetheless conducted its own

independent investigation to evaluate witness credibility. Dorsey, 701 N.W.2d at 243-45;

Duol, slip op. at 7-8.

Given the specific, unique circumstances of this case, we conclude that Dorsey and

Duol are distinguishable and do not control the outcome here. As discussed above, a

criminal defendant has a constitutional right to be present at trial. U.S. Const. amends. VI,

XIV. To protect that right, the district court in this case was required to conduct an inquiry

into whether Jones was voluntarily absent after Jones failed to appear on the third day of

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trial. Finnegan, 784 N.W.2d at 243, 249-50. Additionally, the record reflects that the

parties’ attorneys were unable to provide any information regarding Jones’s absence.

Consequently, the district court could not rely on evidence presented by the parties to

determine whether Jones was voluntarily absent and was forced to gather information of

its own to determine whether Jones intentionally waived his constitutional right to be

present at trial. In that regard, this case is materially different from both Dorsey and Duol,

where the parties presented evidence on the issues before the court and the district court

then went outside the record to determine witness credibility. Dorsey, 701 N.W.2d at 243-

45; Duol, slip op. at 7-8. By contrast, in this case there was no evidence in the record from

the parties as to the reason for Jones’s absence.

Importantly and unlike in Dorsey and Duol, the district court’s review of court

records in this case did not transform the judge into a partial trier of fact or “eliminate[]

any vestige of impartiality.” Dorsey, 701 N.W.2d at 250 (quotation omitted); Duol, slip op.

at 14. The transcript reflects that the judge fulfilled his duty to determine whether Jones’s

absence from trial was voluntary. See Finnegan, 784 N.W.2d at 249-50. In doing so, the

district court gathered facts relevant to whether Jones’s absence was an implicit waiver of

a known right. See State v. Richards, 456 N.W.2d 260, 264 (Minn. 1990) (noting that the

validity of a defendant’s waiver of rights “‘depends, in each case, upon the particular facts

and circumstances surrounding the case, including the background, experience, and

conduct of the accused’” (quotation omitted)). The judge did so to safeguard Jones’s

constitutional right to be present at trial. And, as this court stated in Finnegan, “a district

court that makes a finding on the voluntariness of the defendant’s absence [from trial]

12
without an adequate investigation creates substantial risk of retrial” following a

postconviction petition if the defendant’s absence was involuntary. 784 N.W.2d at 251.

For these reasons, we conclude that this case is distinguishable from Dorsey and

Duol. 1 And we further conclude that, under the unique circumstances of this case, the

judge did not violate Jones’s right to an impartial judge by consulting court records from

other matters as part of its inquiry into whether Jones waived his constitutional right to be

present at trial by failing to appear. Contrary to Jones’s suggestion, the district court

judge’s conduct did not result in emergent bias. As discussed above, the judge had a duty

to conduct an “efficient” inquiry and counsel offered no information of assistance to the

district court on the issue. Id. at 250. The undisputed facts in the record fail to demonstrate

bias on the part of the judge. Our conclusion that the district court judge remained impartial

is reinforced by the presumption that a district court discharges its duties properly.

1
Jones also relies on nonprecedential caselaw to support his argument. See, e.g., State v.
Bowlby, No. A25-0086, 2025 WL 1792874, at *5 (Minn. App. June 30, 2025) (district
court judge conducted independent research and relied on facts outside the record in a
harassment restraining order (HRO) matter); State v. Oxendine, No. A24-1402, 2025 WL
1924657, at *4-6 (Minn. App. July 14, 2025) (district court judge relied on the judge’s
personal knowledge about the defendant that related to an essential element of the charged
offense when finding the defendant violated a no-contact order); State v. Scudder, No. A21-
1081, 2022 WL 1532553, *1-4 (Minn. App. May 16, 2022) (district court judge
investigated facts during a restitution hearing); State v. Weidenbach, No. A16-1166, 2017
WL 1548619, at *2 (Minn. App. May 1, 2017) (district court judge based sentencing
decision on information obtained through the judge’s independent investigation of facts
outside the record); State v. Blanshan, No. A14-1065, 2015 WL 4507811, at *2-3 (Minn.
App. July 27, 2015) (district court judge relied on court order from separate case file that
was not part of trial record to find defendant guilty of failing to register). Because these
cases do not involve a judge’s investigation into a defendant’s absence from trial to
safeguard the defendant’s constitutional right to be present, they are not persuasive.

13
McKenzie, 583 N.W.2d at 747. We therefore decline to reverse Jones’s convictions based

on his claim that his constitutional right to an impartial judge was violated.

II. Jones is not entitled to relief on his disqualification argument.

Jones next argues that he is entitled to a new trial because the district court judge

became disqualified during trial by creating the appearance of bias while discussing a

hearsay objection with counsel and thereby violated the code of judicial conduct. The state

counters that Jones forfeited this argument by failing to raise it in district court. The state

also contends that, if we do reach the argument, we should apply the plain-error standard

of review and conclude that Jones is not entitled to relief on the merits of his claim. We

begin with the state’s forfeiture argument before turning to the standard of review and the

merits of Jones’s bias argument.

A. Jones has not forfeited his appearance-of-bias argument.

The parties agree that Jones did not raise his judicial-disqualification argument

before the district court, but they disagree as to whether the argument is forfeited as a result.

The state contends that Jones’s judicial-disqualification argument is barred because only a

claim of actual bias, not a claim of an appearance of bias, can be raised for the first time

on appeal and Jones has not alleged actual bias. In response, Jones contends that a

reviewing court may address a judicial-disqualification argument based on the appearance

of bias for the first time on appeal. On this issue, we agree with Jones.

In Reek, the supreme court considered an argument involving a failure to disqualify

a judge even though the issue was not raised in district court. 942 N.W.2d at 154-55. In

that case, the appellant argued that he was denied a fair trial before an impartial tribunal in

14
violation of the code of judicial conduct and the due process clause “because the district

court judge failed to recuse himself after allegedly becoming partial to the [s]tate.” Id. at

155. In district court, the appellant did not seek to disqualify the judge and did not raise

the issue of impartiality. Id. Nevertheless, the supreme court reviewed the appellant’s

judicial-disqualification claim, which was based on an alleged appearance of bias. Id. at

155-56. The supreme court’s decision in Reek supports a conclusion that we may consider

Jones’s judicial-disqualification argument based on an appearance of bias (otherwise

known as “perceived bias”) even though it is made for the first time on appeal. See id.;

Lopez, 988 N.W.2d at 117 (stating that “perceived bias . . . arises when facts or

circumstances might cause the public to reasonably question the impartiality of an unbiased

court”).

The state nonetheless urges us to conclude that Jones’s argument is forfeited based

on an earlier supreme court decision, State v. Moss, 269 N.W.2d 732 (Minn. 1978). In that

1978 case, the defendant “submitted to an omnibus hearing, two trials, and sentencing”

without seeking recusal or otherwise raising an issue of bias. Moss, 269 N.W.2d at 735.

The supreme court held that in those circumstances, the judgment would not be reversed

“unless [the] defendant were able to show actual bias and not just the appearance of bias.”

Id. While Moss has not been expressly overruled, Reek demonstrates that an appellate

court is not barred from reviewing a defendant’s claim based on an appearance of bias even

though it is raised for the first time on appeal. See Reek, 942 N.W.2d at 155-56. And this

court applies the supreme court’s most recent precedent. See Prokop v. Indep. Sch. Dist.

No. 625, 754 N.W.2d 709, 715 (Minn. App. 2008) (noting that courts apply the “most

15
recent precedential case on point”). Like in Reek, we therefore consider Jones’s argument

for a new trial based on an appearance of bias.

B. We review Jones’s argument de novo.

We next consider the applicable standard of review. Jones contends that the de novo

standard of review applies, while the state argues that plain-error review applies. We again

agree with Jones.

In Reek, the supreme court applied the de novo standard of review to a claim of

judicial disqualification under the code of judicial conduct. The supreme court did so even

though the claim was raised for the first time on appeal. Id. at 156 (citations omitted).

Because Jones likewise raises a claim of judicial disqualification under the code of judicial

conduct, we follow Reek and apply de novo review to Jones’s argument.

We acknowledge that two other supreme court cases support the state’s position that

plain-error review applies to a claim of judicial disqualification raised for the first time on

appeal, but these cases predate Reek. See State v. Finch, 865 N.W.2d 696, 701 n.3 (Minn.

2015) (reviewing a judicial-disqualification claim for plain error); see also Schlienz,

774 N.W.2d at 366-67 (considering whether an ex parte communication between the

district court judge and the prosecutor constituted plain error). Because Reek is the

supreme court’s most recent decision addressing the standard of review in this context, this

precedent controls. See Prokop, 754 N.W.2d at 715. We therefore review Jones’s

argument de novo.

16
 C. Jones’s right to a fair trial was not violated.

We turn next to the merits of Jones’s argument. Jones argues that the district court

judge violated rule 2.11(a) of the code of judicial conduct “when he presented evidentiary

arguments helpful to the state,” thereby creating an appearance of bias requiring

disqualification.

Rule 2.11 of the code provides that “[a] judge shall disqualify himself or herself in

any proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” Minn.

Code Jud. Conduct Rule 2.11(A). “Impartiality” is the “absence of bias or prejudice in

favor of, or against, particular parties or classes of parties, as well as maintenance of an

open mind in considering issues that may come before a judge.” State v. Pratt,

813 N.W.2d 868, 876 (Minn. 2012) (quotation omitted). “A judge is disqualified due to

an appearance of partiality if a reasonable examiner, with full knowledge of the facts and

circumstances, would question the judge’s impartiality.” Finch, 865 N.W.2d at 703

(quotations omitted). We presume that district court judges properly discharge their duties.

Hannon v. State, 752 N.W.2d 518, 522 (Minn. 2008).

Jones contends that the district court judge violated rule 2.11(a) of the code by not

disqualifying himself after he created an appearance of bias. Jones’s argument is based on

the district court’s conversation with counsel, outside the presence of the jury, about the

admissibility of certain evidence and defense counsel’s hearsay objection. After A.M.

testified that she had no memory of the attack, the judge and counsel discussed the

admissibility of (1) A.M.’s statements to law enforcement at the hospital and (2) body-

camera footage from the officer who spoke with A.M. at her mother’s house after her

17
mother called police. Defense counsel objected to admission of the evidence on hearsay

grounds. The district court overruled the objection as to A.M.’s statements at the hospital.2

The district court and the parties then engaged in a lengthy discussion regarding the

admissibility of the body-camera footage from A.M.’s mother’s house. Defense counsel

reiterated his objection based on hearsay. The district court questioned whether the

evidence met the definition of hearsay, asking defense counsel “if it really asserts the truth

of anything.” The district court further noted, “I’m not sure there’s a whole lot that’s said

there.”

The conversation continued:

THE COURT: What would be the hearsay objection, because
I don’t know that it’s offered to prove the truth of any matter
asserted.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: . . . [W]hat would be the purpose of
introducing it at all?

THE PROSECUTOR: To show [A.M.’s] mental state [at her
mother’s house]. That when confronted with questions, she
didn’t give any sort of response.

THE COURT: I think that would probably fall under present
sense impression.

THE PROSECUTOR: Right.

THE COURT: It could . . . be an excited utterance
because . . . I watched the whole thing, and she’s awfully
upset . . . .

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Well, I think it should be excluded
also under [rule] 403.

2
Jones does not challenge the admission of this evidence.

18
 THE COURT: You mean too prejudicial?

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Too prejudicial and—

THE COURT: . . . I think it would be admitted for the purpose,
in part, of proving the injury element. It’s a start to it. It’s not
very scientific, obviously, but people can see that. . . . So I’ll
take a look at it under [rule] 403 . . . .

The following morning, the district court ruled on defense counsel’s objection to the

body-camera footage. It explained that:

The State [is] offering a video . . . and I talked yesterday
about hearsay exceptions and my opinion and ruling that it is a
then existing mental, emotional, or physical condition hearsay
exception under 803(3). And I made reference to present sense
impression . . . [which is] found in 801 under non-hearsay. So
present sense impression isn’t a hearsay exception, it’s just not
hearsay . . . .

....

[I]n any event, I think it also fits those
criteria . . . under . . . [801(d)], a statement describing or
explaining an event or condition made while the declarant was
perceiving the event or condition or immediately thereafter.
And [Officer J.H.] will be here [and] he can be cross-examined,
obviously, and [A.M.] was here, and she was cross-examined.
So however the declarant is identified, whether it’s [Officer
J.H. or A.M.], the confrontation issues, I think, are satisfied
there. And it would be a prior statement by a witness, one or
the other, either [Officer J.H. or A.M.] or both. So I think that’s
covered.

Jones asserts that the judge violated the code of judicial conduct during the

discussion set forth above by making statements favorable to the state and thereby creating

an appearance of bias that required disqualification. Jones relies on Schlienz to support his

position. Jones’s argument is unavailing.

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 In Schlienz, the district court judge had an ex parte conversation with the prosecutor

about the defendant’s sentencing hearing. 774 N.W.2d at 363-64. The judge “suggested

specific objections that the prosecutor could make” to the defense’s forthcoming motion to

withdraw his guilty plea. Id. at 367. These suggestions were based on the judge’s personal

legal research. Id. When the defendant later moved to withdraw his guilty plea, the

prosecutor raised the objection suggested by the judge and the judge denied the defendant’s

motion. Id. at 364-65. The supreme court determined that “the judge’s failure to recuse

denied [defendant] the right to a fair hearing before an impartial decision maker.” Id. at

369.

This case is factually distinguishable. Unlike Schlienz, this case does not involve

an ex parte conversation between the judge and the prosecutor where the judge identified

arguments that were helpful to the state, which the prosecutor had not yet made. Id. at 367.

Here, defense counsel raised a general hearsay objection but did not object on specific

grounds. Cf. State v. Rodriguez, 505 N.W.2d 373, 376 (Minn. App. 1993) (“An objection

must be specific as to the grounds for challenge.”), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 19, 1993). To

evaluate the objection, the judge engaged in a conversation with both attorneys on the

record as to whether evidence at issue—the body-camera footage—included any hearsay

statements, whether an exception to the general hearsay rule applied, or whether it should

be excluded. The judge’s discussion about the evidence did not suggest arguments to the

state but rather reflects the judge’s effort to “rule intelligently” on the hearsay objection.

Adelmann v. Elk River Lumber Co., 65 N.W.2d 661, 666 (Minn. 1954). In analyzing the

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objection, the judge did not act in a way such that his “impartiality might reasonably be

questioned.” Minn. Code Jud. Conduct Rule 2.11(A).

We therefore conclude, based on our de novo review, that Jones has failed to

demonstrate that the district court judge violated rule 2.11(a) or created an appearance of

bias in ruling on the admissibility of the body-camera footage.

Affirmed.

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