Mary Nesgoda, Relator, vs. County of Le Sueur, et al., Respondents

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0112

Mary Nesgoda,
Relator,

vs.

County of Le Sueur, et al.,
Respondents.

Filed October 13, 2025
Reversed and remanded
Worke, Judge

Le Sueur County Board of Commissioners

Elizabeth Lambrecht, Lambrecht Law, St. Paul, Minnesota (for relator)

Kristin C. Nierengarten, Shelby M. Borthwick, Squires, Waldspurger & Mace, P.A.,
Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondents)

Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and Reyes,

Judge.

NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

WORKE, Judge

In this certiorari appeal, relator challenges respondent county-board’s denial of

relator’s plat application for a private cemetery. The board’s sole basis for denying the

application was its understanding that the establishment of private cemeteries is statutorily
prohibited. Because we conclude that the plain language of Minn. Stat. § 307.01 (2024)

permits relator to establish a private cemetery, we reverse and remand.

FACTS

Relator Mary Nesgoda desires to establish a private cemetery on her land. The

property is in an Agriculture (A) zoning district. Nesgoda submitted an application for

approval of a final plat for the cemetery to respondent County of Le Sueur (the county) in

October 2024. Nesgoda has not submitted an application for a conditional-use permit

(CUP), which will also be necessary to establish the cemetery.

The Le Sueur County Planning Commission (the commission) considered the plat

application on November 14, 2024. The commission determined by a majority vote that

Nesgoda’s application met the plat requirements for approval. But the commission also

considered, among other things, a letter from the Le Sueur County Attorney, stating his

opinion that private cemeteries are not authorized by current Minnesota law. The

commission also considered Nesgoda’s attorney’s statements that private cemeteries are

allowed under Minnesota law. The commission elected to forward the application to

respondent Le Sueur County Board of Commissioners (the board) with “no

recommendation.”

The board considered Nesgoda’s application on November 26, 2024. The board did

not make any findings, reference relevant ordinances, or state for the record any

determinations concerning the merits of Nesgoda’s plat application. A board member

moved to deny the application, based on the “discussion and . . . hearing some thoughts by

legal counsel.” The motion carried. The county provided Nesgoda written notice of the

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denial on November 26, 2024. The denial letter stated that, “[b]ased on information

gathered during the November 14, 2024, Planning Commission public hearing, the

[board’s] decision to deny the request was supported by the following: The legal opinion

of [Le Sueur] County Attorney . . . as stated in the letter included in the Planning

Commission packet.”

This appeal followed.

DECISION

“The denial or approval of a preliminary or final plat application is a quasi-judicial

administrative decision.” Watab Twp. Citizen All. v. Benton Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 728

N.W.2d 82, 93 (Minn. App. 2007), rev. denied (Minn. May 15, 2007). We review a quasi-

judicial decision subject to certiorari review to determine whether it was “arbitrary,

oppressive, unreasonable, fraudulent, under an erroneous theory of law, or without any

evidence to support it.” In re Stoick Creek, LLC, 999 N.W.2d 915, 919 (Minn. App. 2023)

(quotation omitted); RDNT, LLC v. City of Bloomington, 861 N.W.2d 71, 75-76 (Minn.

2015) (reviewing quasi-judicial decision concerning CUP to determine whether city acted

“unreasonably, arbitrarily, or capriciously,” including whether “the reasons given by the

city were legally sufficient” and, if so, “if the reasons had a factual basis in the record”).

The primary focus of the parties’ dispute is whether the board acted under an

erroneous theory of the law when it denied Nesgoda’s plat application. We must decide

whether the establishment of a private cemetery is prohibited under Minnesota law. To do

so, we must interpret provisions within chapters 306 and 307 of the Minnesota Statutes.

Minn. Stat. §§ 306.01-.99, 307.01-.12 (2024). “The goal of statutory interpretation is to

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effectuate legislative intent by reading the statute as a whole.” Energy Transfer LP v.

Greenpeace Int’l, 23 N.W.3d 554, 564 (Minn. 2025). “We look first to the plain meaning

of the statute to decide whether the text is ambiguous,” and “[i]f the statute is unambiguous,

our analysis will end there.” Id. (citation omitted).

Section 307.01 provides, in part:

Any private person and any religious corporation may
establish a cemetery on the person’s or corporation’s own land
in the following manner: The land shall be surveyed and a plat
thereof made. A stone or other monument shall be established
to mark one corner of such cemetery, and its location shall be
designated on the plat. The plat and the correctness thereof
shall be certified by the surveyor, whose certificate shall be
endorsed thereon, and with such endorsement shall be filed for
record with the county recorder in the county where the
cemetery is located, showing the area and location of the
cemetery.

Under the plain language of section 307.01, “[a]ny private person,” such as Nesgoda, “may

establish a cemetery on the person’s . . . own land,” such as Nesgoda’s land. And it

provides a particular way to do so, including by making a plat and filing it “for record with

the county recorder in the county where the cemetery is located.” The plain meaning of

the statute is unambiguous—it allows Nesgoda to establish a cemetery on her land and

directs that she do so through the platting process.

Respondents’ arguments do not directly address the plain language of

section 307.01, but instead focus on the two other statutes which, they contend, supersede

section 307.01. First, Minn. Stat. § 306.01 provides, “[p]ublic cemetery associations

existing on March 1, 1906, shall continue under the forms of organization adopted by them

and retain the rights and powers then possessed. Cemetery associations and private

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cemeteries established after that date shall be organized and governed by this chapter.”

And, second, Minn. Stat. § 306.87, subd. 3, provides, “[a]ll cemeteries started or

established as public cemeteries and all cemeteries hereafter started or established, except

cemeteries established by religious corporations, are public cemeteries within the

provisions of this chapter.” We are not convinced.

Respondents argue that section 306.01 controls the establishment of new private

cemeteries. But section 306.01 does not address whether, or under what circumstances, a

private cemetery may be established. By its plain terms, the statute addresses only how a

private cemetery is to be organized and governed. In doing so, it explicitly acknowledges

that private cemeteries may still be established after March 1, 1906. 1 We see no basis in

the plain language of section 306.01 to conclude that the establishment of private

cemeteries is categorically prohibited, as respondents suggest. To the contrary, it

recognizes that private cemeteries may be established today.

Respondents next argue that, under Minn. Stat. § 306.87, subd. 3, all cemeteries

created after its enactment “must be public cemeteries unless the cemetery is established

by a religious corporation.” We disagree. Section 306.87, subdivision 3, provides that “all

cemeteries hereafter started or established . . . are public cemeteries within the provisions

of this chapter.” But Minn. Stat. § 306.87, subd. 1, also provides that “the following

1
Respondents argue that Minn. Stat. § 307.01 is not irreconcilable with their interpretation
because it “governs private cemeteries established” before March 1, 1906, and Minn. Stat.
§ 306.01 governs “those established after March 1, 1906.” But that would require us to
read Minn. Stat. § 306.01 as simultaneously acknowledging that private cemeteries may be
established after March 1, 1906, but also prohibiting the establishment of private
cemeteries after that date. That is not a reasonable interpretation of the statute.

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definitions”—including the definition of “[p]ublic cemeteries” in subdivision 3—“apply to

this chapter.” (Emphasis added.) Therefore, at most, Minn. Stat. § 306.87, subd. 3, makes

provisions of chapter 306 applicable to private cemeteries which are established. But the

definition is, by its own terms, limited to chapter 306, and we cannot apply this language

to prohibit what section 307.01 otherwise plainly allows.

In sum, we conclude that Minn. Stat. § 307.01 unambiguously allows a person to

establish a private cemetery on their land and directs that they do so through the platting

process. Minnesota Statutes sections 306.01 and 306.87, subdivision 3, are not to the

contrary. While those statutes make chapter 306 applicable to private cemeteries, at least

in certain respects, they do not apply to the establishment of private cemeteries or the

platting process. Notably, respondents have advanced no argument that Nesgoda violates

any other specific provisions of chapter 306, but, even if they did, such questions are

separate from the question before the board: whether to approve Nesgoda’s plat

application. Minnesota Statutes section 307.01 makes clear that when the board denied

Nesgoda’s application, it was acting under an erroneous theory of the law.

Nesgoda contends that, because her “application met all of the requirements of

Minn. Stat. § 307.01 and the standards of the Le Sueur Planning and Zoning Commission,”

we should reverse and remand with directions to the board “to approv[e] the plat

application and issue a [CUP], if necessary.” Based on the issues presented and facts of

this case, we remand to the board solely for renewed consideration of Nesgoda’s plat

application.

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 If an “ordinance specifies standards to which a proposed plat must conform, it is

arbitrary as a matter of law to deny approval of a plat which complies in all respects” with

the ordinance. Nat’l Capital Corp. v. Vill. of Inver Grove Heights, 222 N.W.2d 550, 552

(Minn. 1974). And if the board’s decision is arbitrary, “the standard remedy is that the

court orders” approval. In re Stadsvold, 754 N.W.2d 323, 332 (Minn. 2008). But there is

an exception to the “standard remedy” when a board’s decision was “premature and not

necessarily arbitrary.” Id. at 333 (quotation omitted). This may include when an appellate

court clarifies the law on appeal. See Krummenacher v. City of Minnetonka, 783 N.W.2d

721, 733 (Minn. 2010) (clarifying applicable legal standard). Here, the board’s decision

concerning Nesgoda’s plat application was based on its erroneous understanding that

establishment of a private cemetery is prohibited under Minnesota law and, as a

consequence, the board did not decide whether the application complied with the correct

legal standard, Minn. Stat. § 307.01, and any applicable ordinances. 2 Therefore, it is

appropriate to remand to the board for consideration of Nesgoda’s plat application pursuant

to the correct legal standard.

2
We understand that Nesgoda, by arguing that she satisfied the standards required by the
commission, agrees that her plat application must comply with the relevant ordinances in
addition to Minn. Stat. § 307.01. To the extent that she argues to the contrary, we agree
with respondents that Nesgoda has not provided any law to support the argument, and any
prejudicial error is not obvious. Therefore, that argument is forfeited. See Schoepke v.
Alexander Smith & Sons Carpet Co., 187 N.W.2d 133, 135 (Minn. 1971) (“An assignment
of error based on mere assertion and not supported by any argument or authorities in
appellant’s brief is [forfeited] and will not be considered on appeal unless prejudicial error
is obvious on mere inspection.”).

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 Regarding a CUP, the record does not reflect that Nesgoda has applied for a CUP

from the county or that the county considered such an application in its decision. Because

Nesgoda seeks to use the land as a cemetery, and the land is in an Agriculture (A) zoning

district, Nesgoda is required to apply for a CUP. See Le Sueur County, Minn., Zoning

Ordinance § 21 (2022) (providing CUP requirements); Le Sueur County, Minn., Zoning

Ordinance § 8, subd. 5 (2024) (including cemeteries as a conditional use in an Agriculture

(A) zoning district). While Nesgoda may apply to the county for a CUP, we do not consider

any issues related to that application in this appeal. See Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580,

582 (Minn. 1988) (stating that reviewing court generally will consider only issues raised

and considered below); In re Expulsion of A.D., 883 N.W.2d 251, 261 (Minn. 2016)

(applying Thiele in certiorari appeal). 3

Reversed and remanded.

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Nesgoda also requests that we award her costs. This request is both procedurally and
substantively flawed. While a prevailing party in an appeal may generally seek taxation of
costs and disbursements, it may do so only after the filing of our decision. See Minn. R.
Civ. App. P. 139.03, subd. 1. Regardless, in certiorari appeals, costs and disbursements
may not be taxed “for or against the body to whom the writ is directed.” Minn. R. Civ.
App. P. 115.05; Lund v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 783 N.W.2d 142, 143 (Minn. 2010)
(holding, based on sovereign immunity, that taxation of costs against state is not permitted
when state acts in its sovereign capacity). Therefore, Nesgoda is not entitled to costs.

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