State of Minnesota v. Jaisden Harold-Dru Hanners

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0144

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Jaisden Harold-Dru Hanners,
Appellant.

Filed February 23, 2026
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Halbrooks, Judge *

Redwood County District Court
File No. 64-CR-23-416

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Shannon M. Ness, Redwood County Attorney, Redwood Falls, Minnesota; and

Travis J. Smith, Special Assistant County Attorney, Slayton, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jessica Merz Godes, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Ede, Presiding Judge; Larson, Judge; and Halbrooks,

Judge.

*
Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
 NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

HALBROOKS, Judge

A Redwood County jury found appellant guilty of five counts of second-degree

criminal sexual conduct based on evidence that he had sexual contact with his stepdaughter

numerous times while she was between 10 and 12 years of age. Appellant challenges his

conviction, arguing (1) for reversal on the ground that the district court plainly erred by

allowing expert testimony about grooming behavior and (2) for remand to correct the

sentencing order and warrant of commitment. We affirm appellant’s conviction but reverse

and remand the sentencing order and warrant of commitment for correction by the district

court.

FACTS

Between April 2016 and April 2017, appellant Jaisden Harold-Dru Hanners sexually

abused his stepdaughter R.G. numerous times while she was between 10 and 12 years old.

Due to challenges related to substance use, R.G.’s mother was often absent—either

imprisoned or undergoing residential treatment. Hanners perpetrated much of his abuse

during these prolonged absences. On one occasion, R.G. woke up to find Hanners in bed

with her with his hand on her breast area and his erect penis pressed against her clothed

buttocks. On another occasion, R.G. woke up to find Hanners in bed with her touching her

buttocks and vagina underneath her clothing with his hand. Hanners told R.G. not to tell

her mother about the incident. On several occasions, Hanners placed R.G. on his lap while

he had an erection, pushed her against his groin, and swayed back and forth. On another

occasion, Hanners sucked on R.G.’s ear.

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 Hanners also made numerous sexually explicit comments to R.G., including

describing how to masturbate, often referring to R.G. as “sexy,” and telling her sexually

explicit jokes. Hanners also gave R.G. drugs and alcohol on various occasions, including

wine, cannabis, and gabapentin. R.G. testified that the drugs and alcohol caused her to

black out and have lapses in memory. Hanner’s abuse caused R.G. to engage in self-harm,

attempt suicide, and require hospitalization.

In the fall of 2019, R.G. disclosed Hanners’s abuse to her mother, her grandmother,

and a school counselor. In November 2020, R.G. was interviewed by a social worker about

the abuse and, in December, she participated in a forensic interview at a child advocacy

center. The child advocacy center contacted law enforcement, which opened an

investigation into Hanners.

In June 2023, respondent State of Minnesota charged Hanners with seven counts of

criminal sexual conduct: three counts of second-degree criminal sexual contact of a person

under 13 years old by an actor more than 36 months older than that person, in violation of

Minn. Stat. § 609.343, subd. 1(a) (2014), 1(a) (2016); three counts of second-degree

criminal sexual contact of a person under 16 years old by an actor in a significant

relationship with that person, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.343, subd. 1(g) (2014); one

count of second-degree criminal sexual contact of a person under 16 years old involving

multiple acts over an extended period of time by an actor in a significant relationship with

that person, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.343, subd. 1(h)(iii) (2014).

In October 2023, the state provided notice of intent to introduce expert testimony to

explain victim behaviors in domestic-violence situations. In July 2024, the state moved

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the district court in limine to allow the Redwood County Sheriff to provide expert

testimony concerning counter-intuitive victim behaviors. The state also moved for

admission of evidence related to domestic abuse by Hanners against R.G. and her mother

under Minn. Stat. § 634.20 (2022). 1 Hanners moved in limine to exclude the expert

testimony arguing that disclosure was untimely and insufficient under Minn. R. Crim.

P. 9.01. The district court held a hearing on the pretrial motions. At the hearing, the state

substituted a new expert witness, added that she would address grooming behavior, and

argued for her certification. Hanners objected to admission of the expert witness’s

testimony, arguing that disclosure was untimely and insufficient. The district court took

the issue under advisement.

A week after the hearing, the district court issued a pretrial order granting the state’s

request to admit expert testimony on victim behavior, but deferred ruling on whether to

admit testimony about grooming behavior until the court ruled on admission of the

1
Minn. Stat. § 634.20 provides:

Evidence of domestic conduct by the accused against the
victim of domestic conduct, or against other family or
household members, is admissible unless the probative value
is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issue, or misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence. “Domestic conduct”
includes, but is not limited to, evidence of domestic abuse,
violation of an order for protection under section 518B.01;
violation of a harassment restraining order under
section 609.748; or violation of section 609.749 or 609.79,
subdivision 1. “Domestic abuse” and “family or household
members” have the meanings given under section 518B.01,
subdivision 2.

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Minn. Stat. § 634.20 evidence. The district court reserved ruling on the

Minn. Stat. § 634.20 evidence until the state identified with specificity the instances of

domestic abuse it intended to introduce.

Before jury selection, the district court heard arguments on admission of the

Minn. Stat. § 634.20 evidence and whether to allow expert testimony about grooming

behavior. The state argued that the court should allow evidence of instances when Hanners

sexually groomed R.G., arguing that such evidence was admissible under

Minn. Stat. § 634.20 and relevant for establishing intent. The state argued that expert

testimony about grooming behaviors would help the jury understand Hanners’s intent and

behavior over time. The district court deferred ruling on whether to admit expert testimony

related to grooming behavior until after hearing R.G.’s testimony, reasoning that hearing

R.G.’s testimony would enable it to determine whether expert testimony on grooming

behavior would be helpful to the jury.

Hanners’s case was tried to a jury over three days. Prior to opening statements, the

district court granted the state’s motion to admit evidence under Minn. Stat. § 634.20.

However, the district court limited the evidence to “sexually manipulative or grooming-

type activity,” which the district court reasoned “most clearly puts the alleged crime in the

context of a relationship.”

The state called 11 witnesses, including R.G.; R.G.’s mother, grandmother, and

grandfather; a social worker; two forensic interviewers; a police officer; the probation

officer assigned to R.G.’s mother; the investigating officer; and the expert witness.

Hanners exercised his right to remain silent and called no witnesses.

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 Following R.G.’s testimony, the state renewed its motion to admit expert testimony

about grooming behavior. Hanners again objected on relevance grounds. The district court

admitted the expert witness’s testimony related to grooming behaviors.

On the last day of trial, the state’s expert witness testified about grooming behaviors.

During closing argument, the prosecutor went through the elements of each charge and

argued that the state had proven each element beyond a reasonable doubt, summarizing

R.G.’s testimony and corroborating testimony in detail. The prosecutor discussed the

expert witness’s testimony about grooming behavior in the context of explaining why R.G.

maintained a relationship with Hanners during and after the abuse and did not disclose the

abuse for several years.

The jury found Hanners guilty of five counts of second-degree criminal sexual

conduct, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.343, subd. 1(a), (g), (h)(iii), but found him not

guilty of two counts of second-degree criminal sexual conduct, in violation of

Minn. Stat. § 609.343, subd. 1(a), (g).

Hanners moved the district court for a downward dispositional departure. At

sentencing, the district court denied the dispositional-departure motion, adjudicated

Hanners guilty of count 7—second-degree criminal sexual conduct, in violation of

Minn. Stat. § 609.343, subd. 1(h)(iii)—and sentenced Hanners to 90 months of

imprisonment. The district court declined to “pronounce any sentence on the remaining

counts” but did “preserve the jury’s finding of guilt on those offenses.”

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 In November 2024, the district court issued a sentencing order and warrant of

commitment. The order and warrant of commitment indicated that Hanners had been

acquitted of charges 1-2 and convicted of charges 3-7.

This appeal follows.

DECISION

Hanners raises two issues on appeal. First, Hanners argues that he is entitled to a

new trial because the district court plainly erred by allowing the state to elicit expert

testimony about how offenders groom victims. Second, Hanners argues that the sentencing

order and warrant of commitment must be corrected because they erroneously indicate that

he was convicted of five counts when the district court only entered judgment on one count.

I.

Hanners argues that the district court plainly erred by allowing the state to elicit

expert testimony about how offenders groom victims, that this error affected his substantial

rights, and that the fairness and integrity of judicial proceedings require a new trial.

Minnesota Rule of Evidence 702 governs the admissibility of expert testimony and

provides that an expert may give their opinion if their “scientific, technical, or other

specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine

a fact in issue.” “[E]xpert testimony is admissible under Minn. R. Evid. 702 when it is

helpful to the jury.” State v. Obeta, 796 N.W.2d 282, 289 (Minn. 2011). “[E]xpert

testimony is not helpful if the expert opinion is within the knowledge and experience of a

lay jury and the testimony of the expert will not add precision or depth to the jury’s ability

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to reach conclusions.” State v. Sontoya, 788 N.W.2d 868, 872 (Minn. 2010) (quotation

omitted).

This court reviews evidentiary rulings, “including those related to the admissibility

of expert testimony, for an abuse of discretion.” State v. Thao, 875 N.W.2d 834, 840

(Minn. 2016). The admission of expert testimony is an abuse of discretion when the district

court’s ruling is “based on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts in

the record.” State v. Heller, 12 N.W.3d 452, 466 (Minn. 2024) (quotation omitted).

However, appellate courts generally “will not consider a challenge to the admission of

evidence ‘unless . . . a timely objection or motion to strike appears of record, stating the

specific ground of objection, if the specific ground was not apparent from the context.’”

State v. Rossberg, 851 N.W.2d 609, 617-18 (Minn. 2014) (quoting Minn. R. Evid.

103(a)(1)). In cases where an appellant objected to admission of evidence on one ground,

and appeals admission of evidence on another ground that was not apparent from the

context, appellate courts apply the plain-error test. See id.

While Hanners did object to admission of the expert testimony on the grounds that

its disclosure was untimely, insufficient, not relevant, and confused the issues, Hanners

concedes that he did not object on the ground that the testimony constituted improper

profile evidence. Accordingly, we apply the plain-error test. Id.

Under the plain-error test, an appellant is entitled to relief on an issue to which no

objection was made at trial only if (1) there is an error, (2) the error is plain, and (3) the

error affects the appellant’s substantial rights. State v. Griller, 583 N.W.2d 736, 740

(Minn. 1998). If these three requirements are satisfied, the appellant also must satisfy a

8
fourth requirement: that the error “seriously affects the fairness and integrity of the judicial

proceedings.” State v. Little, 851 N.W.2d 878, 884 (Minn. 2014). If an appellate court

concludes that any requirement of the plain-error test is not satisfied, the appellate court

need not consider the other requirements. State v. Brown, 815 N.W.2d 609, 620 (Minn.

2012).

A.

The first step in the analysis is to determine whether the district court erred.

See Griller, 583 N.W.2d at 740. Hanners does not distinguish between the error and plain-

error prongs of the plain-error test. Instead, he combines the two prongs, contending that

the district court plainly erred by allowing the expert witness to testify about grooming

behavior because the testimony was related to how offenders, rather than victims, act.

According to Hanners, such testimony was improper because it contravenes caselaw

prohibiting testimony intended to cause a jury to infer that, because a defendant’s conduct

fits the profile of a typical offender, the defendant must be guilty.

In State v. Williams, the supreme court reversed Williams’s conviction for first-

degree controlled-substance crime for possessing more than ten grams of cocaine with

intent to sell and remanded for a new trial. 525 N.W.2d 538, 540 (Minn. 1994). The state

offered testimony about a “‘drug-courier profile’ used by drug investigators at airports,

train stations and bus terminals to help spot drug couriers” and “[t]estimony describing

how [Williams’s] conduct . . . fit the profile.” Id. at 541. The supreme court determined

that the testimony of officers about how “in their experience most drug couriers behave a

certain way” was “clearly and plainly inadmissible.” Id. at 548. The supreme court

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observed that “evidence that a defendant has traits shared by those who in the past have

acted as drug couriers seems akin to character evidence.” Id. at 547 (quotation omitted).

The supreme court concluded that the prosecuting attorney committed misconduct “in

eliciting the inadmissible evidence that [Williams] fit a drug courier profile used by the

officers” and that this error, combined with others, deprived Williams of a fair trial. Id. at

549.

Similarly, in State v. Loebach, the supreme court rejected expert evidence about

“battering parent” syndrome offered during Loebach’s trial for third-degree murder.

310 N.W.2d 58, 59, 64 (Minn. 1981). At trial, an expert “was asked to state the

characteristics of a ‘battering parent.’” Id. at 62. Although the expert “did not testify that

[Loebach] possessed any of these characteristics,” the “obvious purpose” of other state

witnesses’ testimony “was to demonstrate that [Loebach] fit within the ‘battering parent’

profile.” Id. at 63. The supreme court determined that “the ‘battering parent’ evidence

should not have been admitted.” Id. at 64.

But the supreme court determined that the error “was not prejudicial” because “there

was overwhelming evidence of [Loebach’s] guilt even without the ‘battering parent’

testimony,” which was “only a small percentage of the evidence.” Id. The supreme court

stated that “in future cases the prosecution will not be permitted to introduce evidence of

‘battering parent’ syndrome” until “further evidence of the scientific accuracy and

reliability of syndrome or profile diagnoses can be established.” Id.

Recently, in State v. Heller, the supreme court clarified its holdings in Williams and

Loebach, noting “evidence that a defendant fits a certain profile is a type of evidence where

10
the unfair prejudice to the defendant outweighs the probative value of the evidence.”

12 N.W.3d 452, 466 (Minn. 2024). In Heller, the supreme court held that expert testimony

about “lethality factors” is inadmissible because “as in Williams and Loebach, the jury was

impliedly urged to infer that since defendant’s conduct fit the profile, the defendant must

have been guilty.” Id. at 467 (quotation omitted). According to the supreme court, such

testimony creates a narrative that the defendant committed the crime against the victim

because people like the defendant tend to commit such crimes against people like the

victim. Id.

Here, as in Loebach, a good portion of the expert testimony about grooming had

much more to do with offender behavior than child-victim behavior. The expert witness

discussed five stages of grooming, including victim selection, establishing access, building

trust, desensitizing the victim, and maintaining secrecy. The only portion of this testimony

that related primarily to victim behavior was about maintaining secrecy. The rest of the

grooming testimony related primarily to offender behavior. Additionally, the prosecutor

asked the expert witness if specific conduct—including talking about sex with a child,

describing sexual acts to a child, and complimenting a child about their body—was

consistent with grooming behavior.

While the prosecutor did not tell the expert witness that Hanners committed these

acts, R.G. had earlier testified in the presence of the jury that Hanners did these things to

her. The expert witness’s testimony also made clear that grooming behavior leads to sexual

abuse. Thus, because the expert witness affirmed that acts that the jury heard Hanners

committed against R.G. constitute grooming behavior and because the expert witness

11
clearly suggested that people who engage in grooming behavior are seeking to sexually

abuse those they groom, “as in Williams and Loebach, the jury was impliedly urged to infer

that since defendant’s conduct fit the profile, the defendant must have been guilty.” Heller,

12 N.W.3d at 467 (quotation omitted). Therefore, we conclude that the district court erred

by allowing the expert witness to testify as to grooming behaviors.

B.

Having concluded that the district court erred, we next determine whether the

district court’s error was plain. See Griller, 583 N.W.2d at 740. “An error is plain if it is

clear or obvious, which is typically established if the error contravenes case law, a rule, or

a standard of conduct.” State v. Webster, 894 N.W.2d 782, 787 (Minn. 2017) (quotations

omitted). “An alleged error does not contravene caselaw unless the issue is conclusively

resolved.” State v. Hollins, 765 N.W.2d 125, 133 (Minn. 2009) (quotation omitted).

Here, while admission of the expert witness’s testimony was error under the

principles of Williams, Loebach, and Heller, the issue of whether expert testimony about

grooming behavior should be admissible has not been conclusively established. Indeed,

two nonprecedential decisions of this court come to opposite conclusions on the issue. 2 In

State v. Standifer, we concluded that expert testimony about grooming behavior, among

other things, “was helpful to the jury in considering the [victim]’s testimony.” No. A10-

1018, 2011 WL 2672025, at *3 (Minn. App. July 11, 2011), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 28,

2011). But in State v. Pike, we concluded that, while expert testimony describing typical

2
Nonprecedential opinions are not binding authority but may be cited as persuasive
authority. See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

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behaviors of child sexual-abuse victims was admissible, it was error to allow testimony

about the grooming behavior of “typical” abusers. No. A23-0680, 2024 WL 3249296, at

*6 (Minn. App. July 1, 2024), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 30, 2024). Absent binding

precedent, we cannot say that the issue has been conclusively resolved. See Hollins, 765

N.W.2d 125, 133.

Additionally, unlike Williams, Loebach, and Heller, the context of the expert

testimony about grooming in this case was directly related to helping the jury understand

the relevant Minn. Stat. § 634.20 evidence. Having determined—after hearing R.G.’s

testimony—that there were grooming behaviors contemporaneous with the alleged

incidents that were relevant to the relationship between Hanners and R.G., the district court

admitted the expert testimony. The court reasoned that such expert testimony would be

helpful to the jury in understanding the relevant relationship evidence pertaining to

Hanners and R.G. In other words, the district court determined that the expert testimony

would assist the trier of fact to understand other admitted evidence. This is consistent with

Minn. R. Evid. 702, and Obeta, 796 N.W.2d at 289. Because the district court admitted

evidence about grooming behavior under Minn. Stat. § 634.20, we cannot say that the

district court plainly erred by allowing an expert to explain grooming behavior to help the

jury understand the admitted Minn. Stat. § 634.20 evidence. Therefore, we conclude that

any error by the district court in allowing the expert witness’s testimony was not plain.

C.

Even if the district court’s error was plain, we would not reach a different result

because we conclude that the error did not affect Hanner’s substantial rights. At the third

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step of the plain-error test, an appellant bears a “heavy burden” in seeking to show that a

plain error affected his substantial rights. State v. Davis, 820 N.W.2d 525, 535

(Minn. 2012). “A plain error affects the substantial rights of the defendant when there is a

reasonable likelihood that the error substantially affected the verdict.” State v. Matthews,

800 N.W.2d 629, 634 (Minn. 2011) (quotation omitted). Hanners bears the burden “to

establish a reasonable possibility that the jury would have reached a different verdict had

the wrongfully admitted testimony not come in.” State v. Jaros, 932 N.W.2d 466, 472

(Minn. 2019). Hanners argues that the expert testimony about grooming behavior affected

his substantial rights because it improperly bolstered R.G.’s credibility while undermining

his credibility.

We weigh several “[n]on-exclusive factors . . . to determine whether a reasonable

possibility exists that the erroneously admitted evidence significantly affected the jury’s

verdict.” State v. Bigbear, 10 N.W.3d 48, 54 (Minn. 2024) (applying harmless-error

review); see also Matthews, 800 N.W.2d at 634 (“The court’s analysis under the third prong

of the plain error test is the equivalent of a harmless error analysis.”). These factors include

(1) the manner in which the party presented the evidence, (2) whether the evidence was

highly persuasive, (3) whether the party who offered the evidence used it in closing

argument, (4) whether the defense effectively countered the evidence, and (5) whether the

evidence of guilt was strong. Id. at 54.

We first consider the manner in which the party presented the evidence. Id. at 56.

In analyzing the manner of presentation, we seek to determine the prominence of the

admitted evidence. See id. In analyzing the prominence of erroneously admitted evidence,

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we consider, among other things, the relative number of transcript pages that the evidence

occupies and whether the evidence was used throughout the state’s case. Id.

Hanners argues the expert witness’s testimony played a prominent role because it

was the last testimony the jury heard, given that Hanners did not call any witnesses. Here,

the expert testimony regarding grooming behavior formed only a part of the expert

witness’s testimony, encompassing 5 of 40 transcript pages. Additionally, the challenged

testimony came from 1 of 11 witnesses and encompassed only 5 of more than 1,000 pages

of trial transcript. This is less than the length of other testimony the supreme court has

concluded to be insignificant. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 940 N.W.2d 497, 506 (Minn. 2020)

(concluding that inadmissible evidence was only a “small part of the State’s presentation”

because it spanned only 35 pages of 1,380-page trial transcript); Bigbear, 10 N.W.3d at 56

(concluding challenged evidence that spanned only 12 pages of the 300-page trial transcript

was insignificant relative to whole trial).

Additionally, the evidence was not used by the state throughout the whole trial. In

State v. Al-Naseer, the supreme court concluded that a video recording of the defendant’s

interview with police was prominent because the prosecutor mentioned it in the state’s

opening statement, closing argument, and on direct and cross-examination of witnesses to

point out inconsistencies in the defendant’s statements. 690 N.W.2d 744, 749-50 (Minn.

2005). In this case, unlike in Al-Naseer, the expert testimony was not mentioned in opening

or in the examination of other witnesses and was mentioned only briefly in closing. Thus,

even if the expert witness testimony about grooming behavior was plainly erroneous, this

15
factor weighs toward a determination that it did not affect Hanners’s substantial rights

because the evidence was not prominently presented.

Second, we consider whether the evidence was highly persuasive. See Bigbear, 10

N.W.3d at 57-59. Hanners argues that because the testimony about grooming behavior

came from an expert witness, it was highly persuasive. While it is true that expert

testimony is persuasive, the district court gave the jury instructions related to how it was

to consider the relationship evidence the expert testimony was elucidating. Specifically,

the district court stated that any testimony about grooming was

offered for the limited purpose of demonstrating the nature and
extent of the relationship between the defendant and [R.G.] in
order to assist you in determining whether the defendant
committed the acts with which the defendant is charged in this
matter. The defendant is not being tried for and may not be
convicted of any behavior other than the charged offenses.
You are not to convict the defendant on the basis of conduct on
other occasions. To do so might result in unjust double
punishment.

Because the jury is presumed to have followed that instruction, any improper

inference about the grooming behavior was mitigated. See State v. Fardan, 773 N.W.2d

303, 320 (Minn. 2009) (stating that juries are presumed to follow district court

instructions). Thus, even if the expert testimony about grooming behavior was plainly

erroneous, this factor weighs in favor of a determination that it did not affect Hanner’s

substantial rights.

Third, we consider whether, and to what extent, the disputed evidence was used in

closing argument. See Bigbear, 10 N.W.3d at 59. Mere mention of erroneously admitted

evidence in closing is not sufficient for an error to be reversible. See id. In Bigbear, the

16
court found improperly admitted evidence did not significantly affect the jury’s verdict,

even though the state mentioned the improper evidence nine times in closing argument. Id.

In this case, the expert witness’s testimony was discussed in closing argument, but

relatively briefly. It encompassed 3 out of 52 transcript pages of the prosecution’s closing

argument and rebuttal. Additionally, the use in closing argument—explaining the

relationship between Hanners and R.G.—was consistent with the purpose for which the

district court admitted the expert witness’s testimony. Thus, even if the expert testimony

about grooming behavior was plainly erroneous, this factor weighs toward a determination

that it did not affect Hanners’s substantial rights because the expert testimony was only

briefly used in closing argument and was used for its intended purpose.

Fourth, we consider whether Hanners was able to effectively counter the disputed

evidence. See id. In Bigbear, the challenged evidence was a recording admitted at trial.

10 N.W.3d at 53-54. In that case, the defendant argued that he was unable to effectively

counter the recording because the witness who was the subject of the recording did not

remember enough to be effectively cross-examined. Id. at 59. Additionally, the defendant

in Bigbear argued that, because the scope of the prosecution’s direct examination of the

witness did not include details from the recording, appellant was unable to question her

about it. Id. The supreme court concluded that, even though the defendant countered the

challenged evidence “to some extent” in cross-examination and in closing arguments, the

defendant did not effectively counter the inadmissible evidence. Id. at 59.

In this case, unlike Bigbear, the challenged testimony was presented during the

course of the prosecutor’s direct examination of the expert witness. And Hanners was able

17
to extensively cross-examine the expert witness about the content of the challenged

testimony. Accordingly, this factor weighs toward a determination that any inadmissible

testimony did not affect Hanners’s substantial rights.

Finally, we consider whether the evidence of guilt was strong. Id. at 59-60. Hanners

contends that this case hinged on credibility and that the expert witness’s testimony about

grooming behavior undoubtedly damaged his credibility in the eyes of the jury. In this

case, the evidence against Hanners was strong. R.G. testified that her mother was often

away from home in either jail, prison, or treatment, and that the abuse often occurred when

she was absent. R.G. testified very specifically about the abuse, including that on one

occasion, she woke up to find Hanners in bed with her with his hand on her breast area and

his erect penis pressed against her clothed buttocks. She stated that, on another occasion,

she woke up to find Hanners in bed with her touching her buttocks and vagina underneath

her clothing with his hand. R.G. testified that Hanners told her not to tell her mother about

the incident. And R.G. testified that on more than one occasion Hanners placed her on his

lap while he had an erection, pushed her against his groin, and swayed back and forth.

R.G.’s mother corroborated that she had been absent consistent with the times

testified to by R.G. In addition, R.G.’s mother testified about R.G.’s 2019 disclosure,

which matched R.G.’s testimony at trial. R.G.’s testimony was also consistent with the

information she shared in the forensic interview she gave in 2020.

Ultimately, the jury acquitted Hanners of two counts and found him guilty of five

counts. This suggests that the jury carefully weighed the evidence and was not unduly

prejudiced against Hanners. See State v. Washington, 521 N.W.2d 35, 40 (Minn. 1994)

18
(reasoning where jury acquitted appellant of some counts, but convicted appellant of

others, members of jury were not unduly prejudiced against the defendant).

After weighing the pertinent factors, we conclude that Hanners did not meet his

burden of showing that there is a reasonable likelihood that the wrongfully admitted

evidence significantly affected the verdict. Accordingly, even if the district court plainly

erred, any such error did not affect Hanners’s substantial rights.

D.

Even if the other prongs of the plain-error test are satisfied, this court will not

exercise its limited discretion to grant relief to correct the error unless the “failure to do so

will cause the public to seriously question the fairness and integrity of our judicial system.”

Pulczinski v. State, 972 N.W.2d 347, 359 (Minn. 2022). Here, Hanners was represented

by counsel at trial, and the record demonstrates that Hanners’s counsel was prepared and

presented a vigorous defense. The record further demonstrates that the district court

carefully considered disputed issues before it, including objections to evidence that were

made before and during trial.

The jury carefully listened to the evidence, and after hearing the evidence, the

parties’ arguments, and the district court’s instructions, the jury carefully deliberated and

delivered thoughtful verdicts on the strength of the evidence for each charge. When that

evidence was insufficient to meet the state’s burden, the jury had no problem returning not-

guilty verdicts. Given this record, it is not likely that any error would have wider

ramifications and cause the public to seriously question the fairness and integrity of our

19
judicial system. Thus, any error did not likely affect the fairness and integrity of the judicial

proceedings.

In sum, while it is likely that the district court erred by allowing the expert witness’s

testimony about grooming behavior, the error was not plain, did not affect Hanners’s

substantial rights, and did not seriously affect the fairness and integrity of the judicial

proceedings. We, therefore, affirm Hanners’s conviction.

II.

Hanners also argues that the sentencing order and warrant of commitment

erroneously indicates that he was convicted of five counts when the district court only

entered judgment for one count. Hanners contends that his case must be remanded for the

district court to correct this error. The state concedes that this case should be remanded to

the district court to correct the warrant of commitment to accurately reflect what occurred

at sentencing.

When a warrant of commitment conflicts with an orally pronounced sentence, the

oral sentence controls. State v. Staloch, 643 N.W.2d 329, 331 (Minn. App. 2002). A

district court may correct clerical errors in the warrant of commitment at any time. Minn.

R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 10.

In this case, the jury found Hanners guilty of five counts of second-degree criminal

sexual conduct in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.343, subd. 1(a), (g), (h)(iii), but found him

not guilty of two counts of second-degree criminal sexual conduct in violation of

Minn. Stat. § 609.343, subd. 1(a), (g). At sentencing, the district court adjudicated Hanners

guilty of one count of second-degree criminal sexual conduct in violation of

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Minn. Stat. § 609.343, subd. 1(h)(iii), and sentenced Hanners to 90 months of

imprisonment. The district court declined to “pronounce any sentence on the remaining

counts” but did “preserve the jury’s finding of guilt on those offenses.” But the order and

warrant of commitment indicate that Hanners was acquitted of two counts and convicted

of five counts. Because the warrant of commitment conflicts with the orally pronounced

sentence, the warrant of commitment is incorrect.

Accordingly, we reverse the sentencing order and remand it to the district court with

instructions to correct the order and warrant of commitment to reflect the fact that

convictions were not entered on counts 3 through 6, and that the jury’s guilty verdicts are

retained. See State v. LaTourelle, 343 N.W.2d 277, 284 (Minn. 1984) (holding that “the

proper procedure to be followed by the trial court when the defendant is convicted on more

than one charge for the same act is for the court to adjudicate formally and impose sentence

on one count only”).

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

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