State of Minnesota v. Sharmark Hussein Jama

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0191

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Sharmark Hussein Jama,
Appellant.

Filed December 29, 2025
Affirmed
Bentley, Judge

Blue Earth County District Court
File No. 07-CR-22-3027

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Patrick R. McDermott, Blue Earth County Attorney, Megan E. Gaudette Coryell, Assistant
County Attorney, Mankato, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sara J. Euteneuer, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bratvold, Presiding Judge; Schmidt, Judge; and Bentley,

Judge.

NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

BENTLEY, Judge

In this direct appeal from a conviction for third-degree possession of a controlled

substance, appellant Sharmark Hussein Jama maintains that the district court abused its

discretion when it denied his presentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea. In the
alternative, he argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion for

a dispositional departure at sentencing. We conclude that the district court acted within its

discretion in both respects and therefore affirm.

FACTS

Respondent State of Minnesota charged Jama with third-degree possession of

methamphetamine in a public-housing zone, 1 and fifth-degree possession of a schedule I,

II, III, or IV controlled substance. 2 The complaint alleged that Jama had been subject to an

outstanding warrant for probation violations in a separate criminal file. When officers saw

Jama drive away from his residence in a public-housing zone, they initiated a stop and

arrested Jama. That arrest led to the possession charges in this criminal case file. The

officers conducted a search incident to arrest and found a glass bowl pipe with residue that

field-tested positive for methamphetamine. A search of Jama’s car revealed a scale, several

prescription tablets in a nonprescription container, and three small bags of a white

substance that also field-tested positive for methamphetamine.

The district court placed Jama on conditional release during the pendency of the

proceedings in this case file. Soon after, Jama violated the release conditions when he failed

to report to jail to execute a sentence in the separate criminal file and also failed to appear

for the omnibus hearing in this case. The district court issued a warrant for his arrest, and

1
Minn. Stat. § 152.023, subd. 2(a)(6) (2022), with reference to Minn. Stat. § 152.023,
subd. 3(a) (2022).
2
Minn. Stat. § 152.025, subd. 2(1) (2022), with reference to Minn. Stat. § 152.025,
subd. 4(b) (2022).

2
he was apprehended several months later. The district court again placed Jama on

conditional release, and Jama again violated his release conditions. After he failed to appear

for a pretrial hearing, the district court issued another warrant for his arrest. Jama was

arrested over a year later and remained in custody as this case proceeded to trial.

The following facts derive from the transcript of a subsequent pretrial hearing.

About two weeks before the hearing, the state conveyed two plea offers to Jama without

expiration dates. Jama discussed the offers with his attorney, but he had not communicated

any decision to the state as to whether he would accept a plea. Then, on the afternoon before

the hearing, the state informed Jama’s attorney by email that the offers would expire at the

hearing. Jama’s attorney was unable to contact Jama about the imminent deadline until

they met just prior to the hearing.

At the start of the hearing, Jama’s attorney stated on the record that she was a “little

bit disturbed” about the pressure Jama was under to make his decision. She explained that

she spoke to Jama about her concerns and “talked about . . . asking the Court to set a plea

hearing for a few days.” But she clarified that, while Jama understood her concerns, he still

“indicat[ed] that he would like to put a plea on the record today” and to accept the offer to

plead guilty to third-degree controlled-substance possession with the understanding that he

would be permitted to argue for a dispositional departure at sentencing and that the state

would dismiss the fifth-degree charge. The district court asked Jama, “Are you in

agreement with this?” Jama affirmed that he would proceed with the plea. Then, shortly

after the court began the waiver of trial rights, Jama asked if he could “say a word with [his

attorney] for a second.” This was the first of several pauses throughout the hearing when

3
Jama stopped to consult with his attorney. After the last of those exchanges, Jama’s

attorney asked the district court if she could explain the plea agreement and possible trial

outcomes on the record. After doing so, she asked Jama if he was “comfortable moving

forward with the plea.” After an eight-second pause, he answered, “Yes.”

The court completed the waiver of trial rights and turned to the factual basis of the

plea. Jama stated that he possessed “a gram and a half of methamphetamine in [his] pocket”

and a “pipe that is used to smoke it” while leaving his home in a public-housing zone. He

acknowledged that the substance he possessed tested positive as methamphetamine in field

and confirmatory tests by police but that it had not yet been tested by the Bureau of

Criminal Apprehension. The district court determined there was a valid waiver of rights

and factual basis for the plea and accepted the plea.

Shortly after the hearing, Jama contacted his attorney about withdrawing the plea.

He filed a motion to withdraw the plea on the following business day, arguing that he had

“mere moments” to make his decision and that “[i]t is fair and just that he be permitted to

withdraw his hastily entered plea.”

At a hearing on the motion, Jama’s attorney argued that the plea was involuntary

because of the improper pressure leveraged on him by the state’s sudden deadline. As

evidence, she discussed Jama’s demeanor at the plea hearing, noting that he was “shaky in

his responses,” he “vacillated throughout the plea,” and he asked “many questions”

throughout. The district court agreed with the attorney’s characterization of Jama’s

demeanor at the hearing, stating, “[E]verything you said about . . . [his] reaction and such

is true. I mean I saw it myself.” But the district court explained that it had “a hard time

4
seeing . . . how the fair and just standard [was] met” to allow a plea withdrawal. The state

argued that it would be prejudiced by a withdrawal and that there is pressure in “every

single case” involving a plea.

The district court denied Jama’s motion to withdraw. In its order, the district court

reasoned, “It is not unreasonable for the prosecutor to set a deadline and nothing requires

an offer remain open for any particular length of time.” “It would not be fair and just,” the

court stated, “to continue to delay these cases which have been delayed for over two years,

particularly when much of the delay was the result of [Jama] not appearing for hearings

and being on arrest warrant status for over a year.”

At sentencing, Jama moved for a dispositional departure. The presumptive sentence

was 45 months’ imprisonment, but Jama argued that he was “particularly amenable” to

probation and that a sentence consisting of probation in a treatment setting would help him

address his struggles with chemical dependency. The district court denied the departure

motion and imposed the presumptive sentence after considering Jama’s criminal history,

his conditional release violations, and the availability of treatment and programming in

prison.

Jama appeals.

DECISION

Jama argues that the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion to

withdraw his guilty plea under the fair-and-just standard because the plea was involuntary.

He separately argues that the district court abused its discretion when it found that he is not

5
particularly amenable to probation and denied the departure motion on that basis. We

address each argument in turn.

I

Jama argues that his plea was involuntary because of the “extreme pressure” the

state placed on him in imposing a “sudden and unexpected” deadline. He maintains that

the district court abused its discretion in deciding it was not fair and just to allow him to

withdraw the plea.

At any time, a district court “must allow a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea” if

the defendant establishes “that withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice.”

Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1. If a motion to withdraw a plea is brought before

sentencing, a district court “may allow a defendant to withdraw a plea . . . if it is fair and

just to do so.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 2. The fair-and-just standard is “less

demanding” than the manifest-injustice standard. State v. Lopez, 794 N.W.2d 379, 382

(Minn. 2011).

Because Jama moved to withdraw his plea before sentencing, the district court

applied the fair-and-just standard. Under that framework, district courts must consider both

(1) the “reasons advanced by the defendant in support of the motion” and (2) “any

prejudice the granting of the motion would cause the prosecution” because of “actions

taken in reliance upon the defendant’s plea.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 2. The

defendant has the burden to show why withdrawal is fair and just. State v. Raleigh, 778

N.W.2d 90, 97 (Minn. 2010). We review the district court’s decision to deny a defendant’s

motion to withdraw for an abuse of discretion, reversing only in the “rare case.” Id.

6
(quotation omitted). A district court abuses its discretion when “its decision is based on an

erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts in the record.” State v. Hallmark,

927 N.W.2d 281, 291 (Minn. 2019) (quotation omitted).

Jama’s argument that there is a fair-and-just reason for withdrawal turns on the

voluntariness of his plea. Voluntariness “ensures a defendant is not pleading guilty due to

improper pressure or coercion.” Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 96. The state may not secure a

guilty plea “through actual or threatened physical harm or by mental coercion that

‘overbear[s] the will of the defendant.’” State v. Abdisalan, 661 N.W.2d 691, 694 (Minn.

App. 2003) (quoting State v. Ecker, 524 N.W.2d 712, 719 (Minn. 1994)), rev. denied

(Minn. Aug. 19, 2003). To determine whether a plea was voluntary, courts must consider

“all of the relevant circumstances surrounding it.” State v. Danh, 516 N.W.2d 539, 544

(Minn. 1994) (quotation omitted). A district court’s determination that a plea is voluntary

is a finding of fact that appellate courts will not disturb unless it is clearly erroneous. Id.

Jama argues that his plea was involuntary because it was “hastily entered” and made

under “improper pressure.” The district court rejected that view of the record. It determined

that the state’s imposition of the deadline was “objectively” not coercive. It considered that

Jama “had more than two years to consider how he wanted to resolve the case,” that Jama

had learned of the plea offers a couple weeks before the hearing, and that Jama “chose not

to” go forward with a trial.

In reaching that decision, the district court compared the facts of this case to those

in Abdisalan. We agree that Abdisalan provides a helpful point of comparison. There, a

defendant asked this court to reverse the denial of his motion to withdraw a guilty plea,

7
arguing in part that the plea was coerced and hastily entered. Abdisalan, 661 N.W.2d

at 694. We concluded that no improper coercion occurred in that case because the decision

to plea was left “to him alone,” he was informed of his rights and the consequences of the

plea, and he admitted to the factual basis of his conviction. Id. at 694-95. We further

determined that the plea was not hastily entered because Abdisalan had two days to

consider the plea offer before he decided to enter a plea, he “changed his mind back and

forth” throughout pretrial proceedings and voir dire, and when Abdisalan ultimately

decided to enter the plea, his attorney offered him more time to consider his decision if

needed. Id. at 695.

Jama argues that Abdisalan is distinguishable because Jama had not been

contemplating the plea offers “in light of a deadline” before the hearing and he was not

offered additional time to consider them, as Abdisalan was. We are not persuaded that these

are material differences. First, even if the deadline added pressure to the decision, Jama

had two weeks to consider the plea offers, whereas Abdisalan had two days. Second, the

district court asked Jama twice at the hearing whether he had enough time to discuss his

decision with his attorney. Each time, Jama said that he did. Jama’s attorney also stated on

the record that she had expressed her concerns about the deadline to him, including

suggesting that they could “ask[] the Court to set a plea hearing for a few days.” Jama still

decided to enter a plea that day.

We are mindful that the state imposed a deadline here with little advanced notice,

which caught Jama and his counsel off guard. Yet, as the district court noted, Jama has not

presented authority requiring the state to keep a plea offer open for a certain amount of

8
time. Rather, the sudden imposition of a deadline is a factor the district court should—and

did—consider in determining whether a plea was voluntary. Based upon the circumstances

in this case, we are not persuaded that the district court’s finding that the plea was voluntary

was clearly erroneous.

Because we are unpersuaded by Jama’s position that the district court clearly erred

in finding that the plea was voluntary, we need not consider the extent of prejudice to the

state. See Raleigh, 77 N.W.2d at 98 (concluding that a lack of state prejudice is immaterial

when the defendant “fail[s] to advance reasons why withdrawal is fair and just”). We

therefore conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Jama’s

motion to withdraw under the fair-and-just standard. 3

II

Jama separately argues that the district court abused its discretion in denying his

motion for a dispositional departure. District courts have great discretion to impose

sentences in accordance with the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines. State v. Soto, 855

N.W.2d 303, 307-08 (Minn. 2014). A district court may depart from the guidelines only if

a “substantial and compelling” reason is provided. Id. at 308 (quotation omitted); Minn.

3
Jama also invokes the manifest-injustice standard in his brief, but he does not clearly
apply that standard in his arguments. In any event, because the fair-and-just standard is less
demanding, a challenge under the manifest-injustice standard would fail for the same
reasons that lead us to conclude Jama is not entitled to relief under the fair-and-just
standard. Because the district court did not clearly err in determining that the plea was
voluntary, which is the only apparent basis underlying Jama’s manifest-injustice argument,
Jama has not established that a manifest injustice occurred. See State v. Theis, 742 N.W.2d
643, 646 (Minn. 2007) (noting that a manifest injustice occurs when a plea is not accurate,
voluntary, or intelligent).

9
Sent’g Guidelines 2.D.1.c (2022). We review a district court’s decision to deny a motion

for dispositional departure for abuse of discretion, again reversing only in the “rare case.”

State v. Bertsch, 707 N.W.2d 660, 668 (Minn. 2006). We will affirm the district court’s

sentencing decision “as long as the record shows the sentencing court carefully evaluated

all the testimony and information presented before making a determination.” State v. Van

Ruler, 378 N.W.2d 77, 81 (Minn. App. 1985).

The guidelines contemplate several reasons for departure from a presumptive

sentence, including when the offender is “particularly amenable to probation.” Minn.

Sent’g Guidelines 2.D.3.a.(7) (2022). When determining whether particular amenability to

probation exists, a district court may consider the following factors: “the defendant’s age,

his prior record, his remorse, his cooperation, his attitude while in court, and the support

of friends and/or family.” State v. Trog, 323 N.W.2d 28, 31 (Minn. 1982). But “[t]he fact

that a mitigating factor was clearly present [does] not obligate [a] court to place defendant

on probation or impose a shorter term than the presumptive term.” State v. Wall, 343

N.W.2d 22, 25 (Minn. 1984).

Jama argues that the district court abused its discretion in determining he is not

particularly amenable to probation, because he is motivated to enter treatment, he has

shown remorse, and he has recently cooperated with law enforcement. He maintains that

those considerations outweigh the district court’s focus on his criminal history and

chemical dependency, and they justify a dispositional departure.

We are not persuaded that the district court abused its discretion. As the district

court pointed out, several of the Trog factors weigh against Jama’s amenability to

10
probation. With respect to Jama’s prior record, the court stated that Jama’s “criminal

activity has been going on for quite a while” and noted that this would be his fifth felony

conviction. The court also found that Jama’s lack of cooperation throughout the case

proceedings weighed against a departure, emphasizing Jama’s conditional release

violations and the fact that there was an outstanding warrant for his arrest for over a year

before he was apprehended. These findings have a firm basis in the record and reflect

careful evaluation by the district court in reaching its decision. See Van Ruler, 378 N.W.2d

at 81. As a result, even if other mitigating factors are present, the district court did not

abuse its discretion in declining to depart. See Wall, 343 N.W.2d at 25.

The cases Jama cites do not convince us otherwise. Jama relies on State v. Malinski,

353 N.W.2d 207 (Minn. App. 1984), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 16, 1984), and State v.

Hennessey, 328 N.W.2d 442 (Minn. 1983), as examples of similar circumstances under

which dispositional departures were granted and then affirmed on appeal. Given our

standard of review that is deferential to the district court, these cases are inapposite to the

inquiry here, where we must decide whether to reverse a denial of a departure. In any event,

the facts of those cases are distinguishable.

In Malinski, the district court had determined that departure was appropriate, despite

the defendant’s extensive criminal record, because of his significant, positive lifestyle

changes that are not present in the record here. 353 N.W.2d at 209-10. In Hennessey, the

district court granted a departure, even though the defendant had a significant criminal

history, because he would be participating in a strict probation rehabilitation program, he

displayed self-motivation to change, and his prior felonies were property crimes. 328

11
N.W.2d at 442-43. Here, Jama had a history of noncompliance with release conditions and

the district court concluded that treatment and programming for chemical dependency was

available for Jama in prison.

In sum, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying

the motion for dispositional departure and imposing a presumptive sentence.

Affirmed.

12