State of Minnesota v. Dayonne Marquis Lachapelle

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0219

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Dayonne Marquis Lachapelle,
Appellant.

Filed February 9, 2026
Affirmed
Cochran, Judge

Anoka County District Court
File No. 02-CR-22-5972

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Brad Johnson, Anoka County Attorney, Carl E. Erickson, Assistant County Attorney,
Anoka, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Hannah B. Laub, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Frisch, Chief Judge; Cochran, Judge; and Kirk, Judge. *

*
Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
 NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

COCHRAN, Judge

Appellant challenges the district court’s denial of his motion for a downward

dispositional departure from the presumptive guidelines sentence following his conviction

for third-degree assault. In the alternative, appellant argues that the district court abused

its discretion by denying his motion for a continuance of the sentencing hearing. Because

the district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing the guidelines sentence or by

denying appellant’s continuance request, we affirm.

FACTS

In October 2022, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Dayonne

Marquis Lachapelle with third-degree assault involving substantial bodily harm under

Minnesota Statutes section 609.223, subdivision 1 (2022), and fifth-degree assault under

Minnesota Statutes section 609.224, subdivision 2(a) (2022). The complaint alleged that,

while in custody at the Anoka County Jail, Lachapelle assaulted another inmate. According

to the complaint, the victim was using the microwave in the common area of the jail when

Lachapelle punched him in the head several times. Lachapelle’s punches caused the victim

to spill a hot beverage onto his skin, resulting in a substantial burn to the victim’s arm.

In January 2024, Lachapelle reached a plea agreement with the state. Lachapelle

agreed to plead guilty to third-degree assault and, in exchange, the state agreed to dismiss

the charge for fifth-degree assault. The state also agreed to dismiss a charge for ineligible

possession of a firearm or ammunition in another pending case. The parties agreed to

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recommend a 36-month prison sentence, with the understanding that Lachapelle would

seek a dispositional departure from the presumptive sentence.

At the plea hearing, Lachapelle pleaded guilty and provided a factual basis to

support his plea. Lachapelle admitted that he was in custody in the county jail when he

“assaulted another male” in the common room. During the confrontation, the victim spilled

a hot beverage on himself and suffered a third-degree burn as a result of Lachapelle’s

assault. Lachapelle did not contest that the victim’s burn constituted a substantial bodily

injury. The district court found that Lachapelle provided a sufficient factual basis for the

plea and accepted the plea. The district court also ordered Lachapelle to cooperate with

and complete a presentence investigation (PSI), to contact corrections, to remain law

abiding, and to appear for a scheduled sentencing hearing in April 2024.

Lachapelle did not complete a PSI or contact corrections. Probation submitted the

PSI to the district court in March 2024. Probation noted that it had not been able to

interview Lachapelle based on his failure to cooperate. The PSI recommended that the

district court commit Lachapelle to the commissioner of corrections for a period within the

presumptive range of 29 to 39 months.

In April 2024, Lachapelle missed his scheduled sentencing hearing due to being

involved in a major car accident. The district court rescheduled the sentencing hearing to

June 2024 and ordered an updated PSI. Probation had difficulty contacting Lachapelle and

a PSI interview was not completed. In the updated PSI, probation again recommended that

Lachapelle receive an executed prison sentence within the presumptive range.

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 The district court held the scheduled sentencing hearing in June 2024, but

Lachapelle failed to appear. Several months later, Lachapelle was taken into custody on a

bench warrant. He appeared in court in November 2024 for sentencing. Shortly before the

hearing, Lachapelle requested a continuance, which the district court denied. Prior to the

hearing, Lachapelle also moved for a downward dispositional departure on the ground that

he was particularly amenable to probation. The state opposed the departure request and

urged the district court to impose a 36-month sentence. The district court denied

Lachapelle’s motion for a downward dispositional departure and sentenced him to 36

months in prison.

Lachapelle appeals.

DECISION

Lachapelle raises two arguments on appeal. First, he contends that the district court

abused its discretion by denying his motion for a downward dispositional departure.

Second, and in the alternative, Lachapelle argues that the district court abused its discretion

by denying his request to continue the sentencing hearing. We consider each argument in

turn.

I. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Lachapelle’s motion
for a downward dispositional departure.

The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines set forth presumptive sentences for felony

offenses. Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.C (2022). A downward dispositional departure from

the presumptive sentence occurs when the guidelines sentence calls for a prison sentence,

“but the district court instead stays execution or imposition of the sentence” and places the

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defendant on probation. State v. Solberg, 882 N.W.2d 618, 623 (Minn. 2016); Minn.

Sent’g Guidelines 1.B.5.a(2) (2022). To maintain uniformity and proportionality in

sentencing, departures from the presumptive guidelines sentence are discouraged.

State v. Rund, 896 N.W.2d 527, 532 (Minn. 2017). Under the sentencing guidelines, “[t]he

[district] court must pronounce a sentence of the applicable disposition . . . unless there

exist identifiable, substantial, and compelling circumstances to support a departure.” Minn.

Sent’g Guidelines 2.D.1 (2022).

The sentencing guidelines include a nonexclusive list of mitigating factors that a

district court may use to support a downward dispositional departure, including when the

defendant “is particularly amenable to probation.” Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.D.3.a(7)(a)

(2022) (emphasis added). “By requiring a defendant to be particularly amenable to

probation . . . we ensure that the defendant’s amenability to probation distinguishes the

defendant from most others and truly presents the substantial and compelling

circumstances that are necessary to justify a departure.” State v. Soto, 855 N.W.2d 303,

309 (Minn. 2014) (quotation omitted). The supreme court has recognized factors that may

be relevant to a district court’s determination of whether a defendant is particularly

amenable to probation, “including the defendant’s age, his prior record, his remorse, his

cooperation, his attitude while in court, and the support of friends and/or family.”

State v. Trog, 323 N.W.2d 28, 31 (Minn. 1982). These factors are commonly known as

the Trog factors. But the presence of one or more Trog factors does not obligate a district

court to depart from the presumptive sentence. See State v. Walker, 913 N.W.2d 463, 468-

69 (Minn. App. 2018). A district court may impose the presumptive sentence even when

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the record shows a defendant is particularly amenable to probation. State v. Olson,

765 N.W.2d 662, 664-65 (Minn. App. 2009) (noting that “the district court has discretion

to impose a downward dispositional departure if a defendant is particularly amenable to

probation, but it is not required to do so”).

A district court has “great discretion in the imposition of sentences” and we will

reverse its decision “only for an abuse of that discretion.” Soto, 855 N.W.2d at 307-08

(quotation omitted). Accordingly, we will not interfere with a district court’s decision to

impose the presumptive sentence “as long as the record shows the sentencing court

carefully evaluated all the testimony and information presented before making a

determination.” State v. Pegel, 795 N.W.2d 251, 255 (Minn. App. 2011) (quotation

omitted). It is only in a “rare” case that we will reverse a district court’s decision not to

depart. Walker, 913 N.W.2d at 468 (quoting State v. Kindem, 313 N.W.2d 6, 7 (Minn.

1981)).

Here, the district court denied Lachapelle’s motion for a downward dispositional

departure. In explaining its decision at the sentencing hearing, the district court noted that

Lachapelle failed to cooperate with the PSI after he entered his plea in January 2024 and

he did not appear in June 2024 for the scheduled sentencing hearing. The district court

told Lachapelle at the subsequent November 2024 sentencing hearing that “but for being

arrested on the new domestic [assault case] in Hennepin County, I don’t think you would

be here today. We wouldn’t be moving forward with sentencing.” The district court

continued, “this was an agreed upon 36-month sentence with the option to argue for a

departure, knowing that the [s]tate was going to oppose it.” And the district court ended

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by saying, “[s]o with that I just feel like my hands are tied and I don’t have a choice.” The

district court then imposed an executed presumptive sentence of 36 months’ imprisonment.

Lachapelle argues that the district court’s denial of his motion for a downward

dispositional departure constitutes an abuse of discretion because he established that he is

particularly amenable to probation. He notes that, at the time of sentencing, he had been

accepted into a treatment program and completed his GED. And he further argues that he

demonstrated remorse, accepted responsibility, cooperated with the court, and has the

support of his mother. For these reasons, Lachapelle contends that the district court abused

its discretion by declining to depart. We do not agree.

Here, the record reflects that the district court carefully considered the

circumstances for and against departure—including the arguments of counsel and

Lachapelle’s statements to the district court—before denying his request for a downward

dispositional departure. The district court reasoned that Lachapelle was not particularly

amenable to probation because he failed to cooperate with the PSI and did not appear for

the June 2024 sentencing hearing. And, although the district court did not specifically

address the Trog factors before imposing the presumptive sentence, it was not required to

do so. See State v. Van Ruler, 378 N.W.2d 77, 80 (Minn. App. 1985) (noting that a district

court “is required to give reasons for departure,” but “an explanation is not required when

the court considers reasons for departure but elects to impose the presumptive sentence”).

Because the district court carefully considered the record and the arguments before it on

Lachapelle’s motion for a departure, we discern no abuse of discretion by the district court

in its decision to deny the motion and instead impose the presumptive sentence. Pegel,

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795 N.W.2d at 255. And, even assuming the justifications put forth by Lachapelle could

support a downward dispositional departure on the basis of particular amenability, “the

mere fact that a mitigating factor is present . . . does not obligate the [district] court to place

[a] defendant on probation . . . .” Id. at 253-54 (quotation omitted). The district court acted

well within its discretion when it denied Lachapelle’s motion for a downward dispositional

departure and imposed the presumptive guidelines sentence.

In urging this court to reach a different result, Lachapelle argues that the district

court abused its discretion by stating that its “hands [were] tied” and that the court did not

“have a choice” because the plea agreement anticipated a 36-month sentence. Lachapelle

maintains that “the district court believed it did not have any discretion” to grant a

departure, which constitutes error. We are not persuaded that the record reflects that the

district court believed it did not have the discretion to grant a departure.

An appellate court may remand for resentencing when a district court fails to

exercise its discretion. See State v. Curtiss, 353 N.W.2d 262, 264 (Minn. App. 1984)

(remanding when the district court failed to exercise discretion). When viewed as a whole,

it is clear that the district court declined to depart based on the underlying facts and

circumstances in the record. In other words, the district court exercised its discretion. The

district court’s colloquial statement that its “hands [were] tied” did not suggest that it

lacked discretion. Rather, the district court was indicating that Lachapelle had not

demonstrated that he was particularly amenable to probation and, therefore, the district

court had no basis on which to grant a downward dispositional departure. And although

the district court could have provided a more fulsome explanation, appellate courts do not

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require a district court to provide an explanation for its decision when it “considers reasons

for departure but elects to impose” a sentence within the guidelines range. Van Ruler,

378 N.W.2d at 80.

Taken as a whole, we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion when it

decided to deny the motion for a downward dispositional departure. This is not the “rare

case” compelling this court to disturb the district court’s imposition of the presumptive

sentence. Soto, 855 N.W.2d at 305.

II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Lachapelle’s motion
to continue the sentencing hearing.

Lachapelle argues in the alternative that the district court abused its discretion by

denying his motion to continue the sentencing hearing. Lachapelle urges us to remand the

matter to the district court with instructions to conduct another sentencing hearing. We

decline to do so.

We review a district court’s denial of a continuance of a sentencing proceeding for

an abuse of discretion. State v. Mix, 646 N.W.2d 247, 250 (Minn. App. 2002), rev. denied

(Minn. Aug. 20, 2002). We “will not reverse the denial of a motion for continuance” absent

a showing of prejudice. Id. A district court abuses its discretion if it “acts arbitrarily,

without justification, or in contravention of the law.” Id. The district court has broad

discretion to consider whether to grant or deny a motion to continue the sentencing hearing,

provided the parties have adequate time to prepare. See Minn. Stat. § 244.10, subd. 1

(2024) (stating that a sentencing “hearing shall be scheduled so that the parties have

adequate time to prepare and present arguments regarding the issue of sentencing”).

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 Lachapelle requested a continuance of the sentencing hearing to allow him to

“complete a meaningful PSI.” Lachapelle also argued that a continuance would give him

more time to “obtain further documentation of his medical condition,” which he claims

prevented him from appearing at the initial sentencing hearing in June 2024. The district

court denied the request. The district court stated that Lachapelle “didn’t cooperate with

the PSI, didn’t appear for sentencing,” and did not keep counsel informed of his medical

issues. The district court found that “[t]he only reason” Lachapelle was in court was

because he was in custody on another charge. For these reasons, the district court denied

Lachapelle’s continuance request.

We discern no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision. A district court’s

decision to grant or deny a continuance “should be based on all facts and circumstances

surrounding the request.” State v. Vance, 254 N.W.2d 353, 358 (Minn. 1977). Here, the

district court denied Lachapelle’s continuance request based on all the circumstances,

including Lachapelle’s lack of cooperation with the PSI, his failure to appear at hearings,

and his failure to remain in contact with the district court. The record supports the district

court’s decision. As to the PSI, the district court ordered Lachapelle to complete the PSI

and report to corrections, but Lachapelle failed to do so. Probation submitted a PSI

indicating that it had not been able to interview Lachapelle. The district court instructed

probation to create an updated PSI after Lachapelle’s car accident, but Lachapelle provided

only minimal information on the questionnaire and did not complete the PSI interview.

Additionally, the record supports the district court’s statements that Lachapelle failed to

appear for the initial sentencing hearing in June 2024, and did not remain in contact with

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the district court. Indeed, Lachapelle did not appear in court again until November 2024,

after he was taken into custody. On this record, we are satisfied that the district court’s

decision to deny Lachapelle’s continuance request was “based on all facts and

circumstances surrounding the request.” Id.

Further, we will reverse the denial of a continuance request only if the moving party

shows that they were prejudiced because of the denial. See Mix, 646 N.W.2d at 250; see

also Vance, 254 N.W.2d at 358-59 (stating that, “[i]n determining whether the [district]

court was within its sound discretion in denying a motion for a continuance, [a reviewing

court] looks to whether the defendant was so prejudiced in preparing or presenting his

defense as to materially affect the outcome of the trial”). Lachapelle argues that he was

prejudiced because he was sentenced “without a complete PSI” and without the opportunity

to participate in treatment. Lachapelle contends that, if given the opportunity, he could

have gathered more evidence concerning his amenability to treatment and provided his

medical records to the court. We are not persuaded. There is nothing in the record

suggesting that the district court would have granted Lachapelle’s departure request even

with a continuance. See Mix, 646 N.W.2d at 250 (determining that the appellant did not

make a showing of prejudice because, although the appellant hoped the district court would

grant a departure motion, “the record establishe[d] no basis for a presumption that [the

judge] would have departed”). Thus, Lachapelle has not shown that he was prejudiced by

the denial of his motion to continue the sentencing hearing.

Because the district court did not “act[] arbitrarily, without justification, or in

contravention of the law” by denying Lachapelle’s continuance request, and because

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Lachapelle has not demonstrated prejudice, we do not disturb the district court’s decision

to deny Lachapelle’s continuance request. Id.

Affirmed.

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