State of Minnesota v. Jim Duramax Whitcomb

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0268

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Jim Duramax Whitcomb,
Appellant.

Filed January 20, 2026
Affirmed
Frisch, Chief Judge

Crow Wing County District Court
File No. 18-CR-22-3726

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Kelsey A. Hopps, Crow Wing County Attorney, Brainerd, Minnesota; and

Travis J. Smith, Special Assistant County Attorney, Slayton, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Andrea Barts, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Frisch, Chief Judge; Worke, Judge; and Cochran, Judge.

SYLLABUS

For possession of pornographic work involving a minor, cloud storage is a “storage

system of any other type” within the meaning of Minn. Stat. § 617.247, subd. 4(a) (2020).

OPINION

FRISCH, Chief Judge

Appellant Jim Duramax Whitcomb challenges his convictions of 12 counts of

possession of pornographic works involving a minor under 14 years of age, in violation of
Minn. Stat. § 617.247, subd. 4(b)(3) (2020). He seeks reversal of his convictions, alleging

that the evidence is insufficient to prove that (1) he possessed child pornography or a

storage system containing child pornography and (2) he knew or had reason to know the

content and character of the child pornography. Because we conclude that the evidence is

sufficient to support the convictions, we affirm.

FACTS

In September 2021, the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children

(NCMEC) received nine tips from Google regarding suspected child pornography

downloaded in Minnesota. NCMEC reported these tips to the Minnesota Bureau of

Criminal Apprehension (BCA). The BCA subpoenaed Google, and internet providers

Spectrum 1 and the Consolidated Telecommunications Company (CTC). Google provided

the BCA with general subscriber information identifying the Google cloud account 2 that

downloaded the child pornography, the date the account was created, and a list of IP

1
Spectrum was formerly known and referenced during trial as “Charter.”
2
Every Google Account includes cloud storage, shared across Gmail, Google Drive, and
Google Photos. How your Google storage works, Gmail Help (2025),
https://support.google.com/mail/answer/9312312 [https://perma.cc/AES2-SJWR].
“Cloud Storage is a mode of computer data storage in which digital data is stored on servers
in off-site locations.” What is Cloud Storage?, Google Cloud (2025),
https://cloud.google.com/learn/what-is-cloud-storage [https://perma.cc/N2BA-CARL].
“Cloud computing is the capacity of Internet-connected devices to display data stored on
remote servers rather than on the device itself.” State v. Pauli, 979 N.W.2d 39, 43 n.1
(Minn. 2022) (quoting Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 397 (2014)).

2
addresses 3 that had accessed the account. The email address for the Google cloud account

includes the name of Whitcomb’s former girlfriend and her date of birth (the Google cloud

account). Spectrum provided the BCA with subscriber information for the IP address

identified by Google as having uploaded the photos to the Google cloud account. Spectrum

identified appellant Jim Duramax Whitcomb in Crosby as the account subscriber associated

with this IP address during the relevant time period.

In early December, law enforcement executed a search warrant at Whitcomb’s home

in Crosby. During the search, officers seized multiple devices. None of the seized devices

contained child pornography.

On the same day, a BCA agent interviewed Whitcomb at his workplace. During the

interview, Whitcomb informed the agent that:

● he lives at the Crosby home with his wife and stepdaughter;

● he started working at his workplace in May 2021 and his typical work
schedule is 8:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.;

● he uses Spectrum internet and his name is on the Spectrum account;

● he has three email accounts, one of which included in the address the same
four numbers reflecting his former girlfriend’s birthdate—like the Google
cloud account at issue here;

● he stores information, mostly photos, in his Google cloud account;

● only he and his wife have access to his cell phone;

3
A Spectrum privacy specialist testified that the company identifies subscribers through a
uniquely assigned IP address, which the specialist described as “a unique number that
identifies the device such as a cable modem . . . that in turn identifies the
subscriber . . . that’s browsing the internet” and that only one device can use an IP address
at a time.

3
 ● his wife would not be responsible for child pornography because she did not
like child pornography; 4 and

● he has a curiosity about child pornography and that it “was more of a problem
than he would like to admit.”

In response to a search warrant, Google provided the BCA with the contents of the

Google cloud account. The Google cloud account contained two folders: a general photos

folder and a folder titled “For Our Special Little One.” The general photos folder contained

around 4,000 photos, the majority of which were adult pornography. The folder also

contained photos of Whitcomb, his house, his wife, and his stepdaughter. Five sexually

explicit photos that appeared to be of Whitcomb were also present in the general photos

folder.

The “For Our Special Little One” folder contained over 160 photos, the majority of

which were child pornography. The remaining photos in this folder were sexually explicit

photos of Whitcomb and nonexplicit photos of his stepdaughter.

Respondent State of Minnesota charged Whitcomb with 12 counts of possession of

pornographic works involving a minor under 14 years of age, in violation of Minn. Stat.

§ 617.247, subd. 4(b)(3).

At trial, the state called seven witnesses: Whitcomb’s former girlfriend;

Whitcomb’s manager; a Google records custodian; a Spectrum privacy specialist; a CTC

specialist; and two BCA agents. Whitcomb did not testify or call any witnesses.

4
Whitcomb reiterated this statement about his wife at least three times during the interview.

4
 Whitcomb’s former girlfriend—whose name and birthdate comprise the email

address associated with the Google cloud account—testified that she had been in a

relationship with Whitcomb between 2012 and 2017 but had not seen him since September

2021. She testified to never having visited Whitcomb at his Crosby home or at his

workplace. She testified that she did not create or use the Google cloud account. When

asked if she knew of an email account in that name, former girlfriend said she was not sure,

but that during her relationship with Whitcomb, he “made a lot of stuff” in her name. When

asked the significance of the four numbers in the email address associated with the Google

cloud account, former girlfriend said that the numbers reflected her birthdate. When shown

a photo of Whitcomb and his wife which appeared in the Google cloud account, former

girlfriend stated that Whitcomb’s wife sent her that photo via Facebook messenger, but she

did not remember when.

Whitcomb’s manager testified that Whitcomb had been employed and worked at the

job location between May and September 2021, that Whitcomb’s normal work hours were

8:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., and that Whitcomb sometimes covered the after-hours service calls.

The manager testified that he had seen Whitcomb use his cell phone at work, and that he

sometimes saw Whitcomb’s wife at his workplace, but she usually waited in the parking

lot and did not enter the store.

A Google records custodian testified to the authenticity of records provided by

Google, which included information about access times and corresponding IP addresses

for the Google cloud account.

5
 A Spectrum privacy specialist testified to the authenticity of documents provided

by Spectrum, which identified multiple IP addresses associated with Whitcomb in Crosby,

and the time period the IP addresses were linked to the Crosby home.

A CTC network manager testified that the IP address at Whitcomb’s workplace did

not change during the relevant time period. The Google subscriber information showed

that the IP address at Whitcomb’s workplace also accessed the email account between May

and December 2021. And many of the logins to the Google account from this IP address

occurred during Whitcomb’s daily work schedule of 8:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.

Finally, two BCA agents testified. The BCA agent who interviewed Whitcomb at

his workplace testified to their conversation. A separate BCA agent testified that, before

cloud storage existed, it was more common to find child pornography on hard drives or

desktops. The agent testified that a cloud storage account is a location where “you can

store [images] . . . that you can access from any internet capable device and still access

those images in folders and videos without actually having to have that as like a digital file

in your photo gallery.” The agent testified that, after receiving the tip from Google, the

BCA sent subpoenas to Spectrum and Google. The agent testified as to the contents of the

folders located in the cloud storage associated with the Google cloud account and produced

in response to the subpoena, including: nine photos and three videos of child pornography

that formed the basis for the charges, a photo of a liquor bottle that was also seen at

Whitcomb’s house during the search, photos of Whitcomb that appear to have been taken

at the Crosby home, a photo of Whitcomb that appears to have been taken at his workplace,

photos of Whitcomb’s workplace, a photo of Whitcomb and his wife, and a photo of a

6
naked male that appears to be Whitcomb.

The jury found Whitcomb guilty of all 12 counts. Whitcomb appeals.

ISSUES

I. Is the evidence sufficient to prove that Whitcomb possessed child pornography or
possessed a storage system containing child pornography?

II. Is the evidence sufficient to prove that Whitcomb knew or should have known the
content and character of the child pornography?

ANALYSIS

Whitcomb challenges the sufficiency of the evidence underlying his 12 convictions

of possession of pornographic works involving a minor under 14 years of age in violation

of Minn. Stat. § 617.247, subd. 4(b)(3). Whitcomb argues that the state failed to prove

beyond a reasonable doubt his possession of child pornography or of a storage system

containing child pornography, and that he knew or should have known the content and

character of the child pornography. The state counters that there was ample evidence

presented at trial to convict Whitcomb.

“In a criminal proceeding, under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment to the United States Constitution, the State must prove every element of the

offense beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Culver, 941 N.W.2d 134, 142 (Minn. 2020).

To convict Whitcomb of possession of pornographic works involving a minor under 14,

the state was required to prove that Whitcomb (1) possessed a pornographic work involving

a minor under 14 or possessed a “storage system of any other type” containing a

pornographic work involving a minor under 14 and (2) knew or had reason to know the

7
“content and character” of the pornographic work involving a minor under 14. Minn. Stat.

§ 617.247, subd. 4(a), (b)(3).

In considering a claim of insufficient evidence, we examine the record “to determine

whether the facts and the legitimate inferences drawn from them would permit the jury to

reasonably conclude that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the offense

of which he was convicted.” State v. Griffin, 887 N.W.2d 257, 263 (Minn. 2016)

(quotation omitted). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict. Id.

We assume that the fact-finder disbelieved any evidence that conflicted with the verdict.

Id. We will not disturb the verdict if the fact-finder could reasonably conclude that the

defendant was guilty of the charged offense. Id.

The applicable standard of review depends on whether the conviction is supported

by direct or circumstantial evidence. State v. Segura, 2 N.W.3d 142, 155 (Minn. 2024).

“[D]irect evidence is evidence that is based on personal knowledge or observation and that,

if true, proves a fact without inference or presumption.” State v. Harris, 895 N.W.2d 592,

599 (Minn. 2017) (quotation omitted). “[C]ircumstantial evidence . . . [is] evidence from

which the factfinder can infer whether the facts in dispute existed or did not exist.” Id.

(quotation omitted). The parties do not dispute that the state offered circumstantial

evidence in support of Whitcomb’s convictions.

“Circumstantial evidence must form a complete chain that, in view of the evidence

as a whole, leads so directly to the guilt of the defendant as to exclude beyond a reasonable

doubt any reasonable inference other than guilt.” State v. Al-Naseer, 788 N.W.2d 469, 473

(Minn. 2010) (quotation omitted). When an element of an offense is proved by

8
circumstantial evidence, we conduct a two-step analysis. State v. Colgrove, 996 N.W.2d

145, 150 (Minn. 2023). First, “we identify the circumstances proved.” State v. Hassan,

977 N.W.2d 633, 640 (Minn. 2022). To identify the circumstances proved, we “winnow

down the evidence presented at trial by resolving all questions of fact in favor of the jury’s

verdict.” Harris, 895 N.W.2d at 600. “In determining the circumstances proved, we

disregard evidence that is inconsistent with the jury’s verdict.” Id. at 601.

Second, we examine the reasonableness of all inferences that might be drawn from

the circumstances proved. State v. Noor, 964 N.W.2d 424, 438 (Minn. 2021). “[W]e give

no deference to the factfinder’s choice between reasonable inferences.” State v. Andersen,

784 N.W.2d 320, 329-30 (Minn. 2010) (quotation omitted). “The State’s circumstantial

evidence is sufficient when the reasonable inferences are consistent with the hypothesis

that the accused is guilty and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis other than guilt.”

Hassan, 977 N.W.2d at 640.

We begin our analysis by identifying the circumstances proved at trial. Those are:

● The Google cloud account was created on May 25, 2021, at an IP address
associated with the Crosby home;

● The email address for the Google cloud account contains the name of
Whitcomb’s former girlfriend and her date of birth;

● Former girlfriend did not create the Google cloud account. She had never
been to the Crosby home or Whitcomb’s workplace;

● The naming convention in the email address is consistent with another email
address for an account used by Whitcomb;

● The Google cloud account was accessed numerous times between May and
December 2021 from two IP addresses associated with Whitcomb’s home;

9
 ● The Google cloud account was accessed numerous times between May and
December 2021 from an IP address associated with Whitcomb’s workplace;

● An IP address can only be used by one device at a time;

● The Google cloud account access patterns at Whitcomb’s workplace are
consistent with Whitcomb’s work schedule;

● Whitcomb’s wife was known by the manager to pick up Whitcomb at the end
of the day, but not to enter the lobby of his workplace;

● At trial, a BCA agent testified that a cloud storage account is where “you can
store [images] . . . that you can access from any internet capable device and
still access those images in folders and videos without actually having to
have that as like a digital file in your photo gallery”;

● The contents of the Google cloud account are stored in a cloud maintained
by Google. The account contained two photo folders. The general photos
folder contained around 4,000 files, including: sexually explicit photos of
Whitcomb, photos of Whitcomb in his home, and photos of Whitcomb’s wife
and stepdaughter. The folder named “For Our Special Little One” contained
nine photos of child pornography and three videos of child pornography. It
also contained sexually explicit photos of Whitcomb and nonexplicit photos
of his stepdaughter;

● Whitcomb admitted that his curiosity about child pornography “was more of a
problem than he would like to admit”; and

● Whitcomb stated that his wife would not be responsible for child
pornography because she did not like child pornography.

Having identified the circumstances proved, the next step in our analysis of the

sufficiency of the evidence considers the reasonable inferences from these circumstances

and whether they are “consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and

inconsistent with any rational hypothesis other than guilt.” Segura, 2 N.W.3d at 155

(quotation omitted). Here, the state was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that

Whitcomb (1) possessed a pornographic work involving a minor under 14 or possessed a

10
“storage system of any other type” containing a pornographic work involving a minor

under 14 and (2) knew or had reason to know the “content and character” of the

pornographic work involving a minor under 14. Minn. Stat. § 617.247, subd. 4(a), (b)(3).

The statute itself provides that the first element may be satisfied in one of two ways: proof

of possession of a pornographic work involving a minor under 14 or proof of possession

of a storage system containing a pornographic work involving a minor under 14. See State

v. Bakken, 883 N.W.2d 264, 268 (Minn. 2016).

Whitcomb challenges the sufficiency of the state’s evidence as to both elements. As

to the first element, Whitcomb argues that the evidence is not sufficient to prove that he

possessed pornographic works involving a minor under 14 or a storage system containing

pornographic works involving a minor under 14. As to the second element, he argues that

the evidence is not sufficient to prove that he knew or had reason to know the content and

character of the pornographic works involving a minor under 14 stored in the cloud storage

associated with the Google cloud account. We address each argument below.

I. The evidence is sufficient to prove that Whitcomb possessed child
pornography.

Whitcomb argues that the state’s evidence was insufficient to prove that he

possessed child pornography because (1) a Google cloud account is not a storage system

of any other type within the meaning of Minn. Stat. § 617.247, subd. 4(a), and (2) the

evidence was insufficient to prove that he actually or constructively possessed child

pornography. We address each issue in turn.

11
 A. A Google cloud account is a “storage system of any other type” within
the meaning of Minn. Stat. § 617.247, subd. 4(a).

Whitcomb argues that cloud storage of the content of a Google account is not “a

storage system of any other type” within the meaning of Minn. Stat. § 617.247, subd. 4(a).

He asserts that the term “storage system” is undefined, that cloud storage was not publicly

available when the legislature drafted the relevant portion of the statute, and the legislature

therefore could not have intended to include cloud storage as a “storage system of any other

type” within the meaning of Minn. Stat. § 617.247, subd. 4(a). We disagree.

“A claim of insufficient evidence that turns on the meaning of the statute under

which the defendant was convicted presents an issue of statutory interpretation that we

review de novo.” State v. Stone, 995 N.W.2d 617, 621-22 (Minn. 2023). The goal of

statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the legislature. Minn.

Stat. § 645.16 (2024); Bakken, 883 N.W.2d at 267. “To do so, we must first determine

whether the statute is ambiguous on its face.” Fordyce v. State, 994 N.W.2d 893, 897

(Minn. 2023) (quotation omitted). “ If the language of a statute is clear on its face, then the

statute is unambiguous, and we apply its plain meaning.” State v. Plancarte, 20 N.W.3d

30, 37 (Minn. 2025). “But if a statute is susceptible to more than one reasonable

interpretation, then the statute is ambiguous and we may consider the canons of statutory

construction.” Fordyce, 994 N.W.2d at 897 (quotation omitted).

“The language of a statute is unambiguous when there is only one reasonable way

to read the text.” Nash v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 4 N.W.3d 812, 816 (Minn. 2024)

(quotation omitted). We determine plain meaning “by looking to the text and textual

12
context of the statute.” Wocelka v. State, 9 N.W.3d 390, 394 (Minn. 2024). And in

“determining whether the statute is ambiguous, we consider the canons of interpretation

listed in Minn. Stat. § 645.08 [(2024)], and interpret the statute as a whole to harmonize

and give effect to all its parts.” Bakken, 883 N.W.2d at 268 (quotation omitted).

As a threshold matter, Whitcomb does not offer more than one reasonable

interpretation of the statutory text. Instead of dissecting the statutory language itself to

ascribe multiple reasonable interpretations to the language selected by the legislature,

Whitcomb instead argues that the legislature could not have intended to include cloud

storage within the definition of a “storage system of any other type,” given the state of

available technology at the time this language was added to the statute. But we do not look

outside of the statutory text in determining whether a statute is ambiguous. See State v.

Fugalli, 967 N.W.2d 74, 79 (Minn. 2021) (“We do not need to resort to legislative history

when a statute is unambiguous.”); Hagen v. Steven Scott Mgmt., Inc., 963 N.W.2d 164, 170

(Minn. 2021) (explaining that determining whether a statute is ambiguous requires

analyzing “the statute’s text, structure, and punctuation.” (quotation omitted)). And

Whitcomb has not set forth more than one reasonable interpretation of the statute based on

the language chosen by the legislature. The legislature has directed that when “the words

of a law in their application to an existing situation are clear and free from all ambiguity,

the letter of the law shall not be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing the spirit.” Minn.

Stat. § 645.16. When the language of a statute is unambiguous, we disregard arguments

that are “not really textual in character” but instead amount to arguments “that the

Legislature could not have intended what the words say.” State v. Khalil, 956 N.W.2d 627,

13
637 (Minn. 2021). Accordingly, Whitcomb’s assertions about the state of available

technology and intent of the legislature are not germane to the interpretive question

presented to us.

In any event, we discern no ambiguity in the statute. The stated purpose of the

statute is “to protect minors from the physical and psychological damage caused by their

being used in pornographic work depicting sexual conduct which involves minors.” Minn.

Stat. § 617.247, subd. 1 (2020). Section 617.247, subdivision 4(a), criminalizes the

possession of child pornography found in “a computer disk or computer or other electronic,

magnetic, or optical storage system or a storage system of any other type.” Minn. Stat.

§ 617.247, subd. 4(a) (emphasis added). In crafting this broad language, the legislature

criminalized the possession of contraband—child pornography—that may be located in a

variety of places. In the statute itself, the legislature described certain known locations,

such as a computer or computer disk. But the legislature also included in the statute a

general description of potential “other” locations where such contraband may be found,

including a “storage system of any other type.” (Emphasis added.) And “using the word

any demonstrates an intent to be inclusive, not restrictive.” In re Welfare of Child of

B.D.D., 25 N.W.3d 707, 713 (Minn. 2025) (quotation omitted). “When used in the

affirmative, ‘any’ means every or all.” Id. (quotation omitted). We therefore discern only

one reasonable interpretation of this broad language: “a storage system of any other type”

unambiguously means a storage system of any other type. See Minn. Stat. § 645.08(3)

(stating “general words are construed to be restricted in their meaning by preceding

particular words”); see also State v. Sanschagrin, 952 N.W.2d 620, 627 (Minn. 2020)

14
(“[When] words particularly designating specific acts or things are followed by and

associated with words of general import, the rule of ejusdem generis states that the latter

are generally to be regarded as comprehending only matters of the same kind or class as

those particularly stated.” (quotation omitted)). When the text of a statute is susceptible to

only one reasonable interpretation, we apply that meaning. State v. Bee, 17 N.W.3d 150,

153 (Minn. 2025).

Having determined that the applicable statute unambiguously reaches child

pornography located in a storage system of any type, we conclude that the cloud storage

associated with a Google account is such a storage system “of any other type.” At trial, a

BCA agent described a cloud storage account as a place where a person “can store

[images] . . . that [they] can access from any internet capable device and still access those

images in folders and videos without actually having to have that as like a digital file in

[their] photo gallery.” Google describes its cloud storage as a service in which “[u]sers

upload data to servers via an internet connection, where it is saved on a virtual machine on

a physical server,” and for which Google uses remote servers to save the data. 5 Microsoft

defines cloud storage as “a vast online storage space where people and businesses store

their files and applications, accessible from anywhere with an internet connection.” 6 And

other courts confirm that a cloud account is a remote storage space, akin to physical folders

5
What is Cloud Storage?, Google Cloud (2025), https://cloud.google.com/learn/what-is-
cloud-storage [https://perma.cc/N2BA-CARL].
6
The cloud—what is it? Microsoft (2025), https://azure.microsoft.com/en-
us/resources/cloud-computing-dictionary/what-is-the-cloud [https://perma.cc/5GZ4-
ED57].

15
but stored remotely. See State v. Bowers, 985 N.W.2d 123, 135 (Wis. Ct. App. 2022)

(concluding that a cloud-based storage account is a digital version of a physical storage

container); see also Riley, 573 U.S. at 397 (“Cloud computing is the capacity of Internet-

connected devices to display data stored on remote servers rather than on the device

itself.”). We therefore hold that for possession of pornographic work involving a minor,

cloud storage is a “storage system of any other type” within the meaning of Minn. Stat.

§ 617.247, subd. 4(a).

B. The evidence is sufficient to prove that Whitcomb possessed the Google
cloud account containing child pornography.

Whitcomb argues that the evidence is not sufficient to establish possession of the

child pornography because a fact-finder could rationally infer from the circumstances

proved that he did not actually or constructively possess the child pornography itself or the

Google cloud account containing the child pornography. We disagree.

“[T]o succeed in a challenge to a verdict based on circumstantial evidence, a

convicted person must point to evidence in the record that is consistent with a rational

theory other than guilt.” State v. Ostrem, 535 N.W.2d 916, 923 (Minn. 1995). Actual

possession involves “direct physical control.” State v. Simion, 745 N.W.2d 830, 842

(Minn. 2008). For constructive possession, the state must prove: (1) that the police found

contraband “in a place under defendant’s exclusive control to which other people did not

normally have access,” or (2) that, if police found the contraband in a place where others

had access, “there is a strong probability (inferable from other evidence) that defendant

was at the time consciously exercising dominion and control over [the contraband].” State

16
v. Florine, 226 N.W.2d 609, 611 (Minn. 1975). “[T]wo or more people can constructively

possess an item jointly.” Harris, 895 N.W.2d at 592 n.9. “[T]he circumstances proved

must support a reasonable inference that the defendant, singly or jointly, was at the time

consciously exercising dominion and control over the item.” Id.

Whitcomb argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he constructively

possessed the Google cloud account because (1) the state did not prove that he uploaded

the photos and videos stored in the account, (2) a photo sent by Whitcomb’s wife to

Whitcomb’s former girlfriend appeared in the account, and (3) Whitcomb’s wife also lived

at the home and could have accessed the account. We interpret Whitcomb’s argument to

be first that the circumstances proved are not consistent with a rational hypothesis of guilt

and second that the circumstances proved are consistent with a rational hypothesis other

than guilt.

First, the circumstances proved are consistent with a rational hypothesis that

Whitcomb consciously exercised dominion and control over the Google cloud account, and

thus constructively possessed the account. Specifically, the circumstances proved establish

that: (1) the account was created at an IP address associated with Whitcomb’s home and

accessed several times from the IP address associated with Whitcomb’s home;

(2) Whitcomb’s former girlfriend did not create the account and never went to Whitcomb’s

home or Whitcomb’s workplace; (3) the account was accessed several times from

Whitcomb’s workplace, at times consistent with Whitcomb’s work hours; (4) Whitcomb’s

wife was not known to enter the lobby of Whitcomb’s workplace; (5) an IP address can be

used by only one device at a time; (6) the naming convention on the account is consistent

17
with other accounts created and used by Whitcomb; (7) the folders in the account contained

several photos of Whitcomb (including sexually explicit photos), Whitcomb’s work, and

Whitcomb’s family, many of which appeared to be taken at Whitcomb’s home and at his

workplace; (8) Whitcomb admitted that his curiosity about child pornography “was more

of a problem than he would like to admit”; and (9) Whitcomb admitted that his wife would

not be responsible for child pornography because she did not like child pornography. A rational

inference from these circumstances proved is that there is a strong possibility that the child

pornography was located in a place where Whitcomb was at the time consciously

exercising dominion and control over the contraband.

Second, the circumstances proved are inconsistent with a rational hypothesis other

than guilt. While it is true, as Whitcomb notes, that absent from the circumstances proved

is evidence that he uploaded or viewed the child pornography on the account, the absence of

such evidence does not negate the rational inference from the circumstances proved that

Whitcomb consciously exercised dominion and control over the child pornography located

in the Google cloud account. And that inference is the only rational inference from the

circumstances proved. That Whitcomb’s wife may also have had the ability to access the

Google cloud account does not negate the reasonable inference that Whitcomb consciously

exercised dominion and control over the account. See Harris, 895 N.W.2d at 592 n.9. Nor

do the circumstances proved lead to a rational inference that she did, in fact, consciously

exercise dominion and control over the account. To the contrary, the circumstances proved

include that Whitcomb’s wife would not be responsible for child pornography because she

did not like child pornography. Accordingly, the evidence is sufficient to establish that

18
Whitcomb constructively possessed the Google cloud account containing child

pornography. 7

II. The evidence is sufficient to prove that Whitcomb knew or should have known
the content and character of the child pornography.

Whitcomb argues that the evidence is not sufficient to prove that he knew or should

have known the content and character of child pornography stored in the Google cloud

account because a rational inference from the circumstances proved is that he did not view

or upload the nine photos and three videos containing contraband located in the cloud.

Again, we disagree.

“[U]nder Minn. Stat. § 617.247, subd. 4(a), a possessor of child [pornography] has

reason to know that [child pornography] . . . involves a minor where the possessor is

subjectively aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the work involves a minor.”

State v. Mauer, 741 N.W.2d, 107, 115 (Minn. 2007) (quotations omitted). “Proof of either

actual knowledge or reason to know that [child pornography] . . . involves a minor may

also be made by circumstantial evidence.” Id.

7
Because we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to prove that Whitcomb
constructively possessed the cloud contents of the Google cloud account, we do not address
the parties’ alternative arguments regarding actual possession. We also need not address
the parties’ arguments regarding possession of the child pornography itself. See Bakken,
883 N.W.2d at 268 (concluding that Minn. Stat. § 617.247 criminalizes both possession of
pornographic work itself and possession of a computer storing the pornographic work).

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 To satisfy its burden, the state was required to prove that Whitcomb knew or had

reason to know of the character of the contraband material. 8 Minn. Stat. § 617.247,

subd. 4(a); see Kamencic, 2021 WL 1525172, at *4 (“The state was not required to prove

when or how the [pornographic works involving minors] were downloaded; it needed to

prove only that appellant possessed the photos and knew or had reason to know of their

character.”). The circumstances proved are consistent with a rational hypothesis that

Whitcomb knew or should have known of the character of the contraband and inconsistent

with a rational theory other than guilt. Among other circumstances proved, the Google

cloud account was created from an IP address associated with the Crosby home; the account

was accessed multiple times from the Crosby home and Whitcomb’s workplace; Whitcomb

admitted that his curiosity in child pornography “was more of a problem than he would like to

admit”; and the child pornography was found in folders containing photos of Whitcomb,

photos taken in the Crosby home, and photos of Whitcomb of a sexually explicit nature.

The only rational hypothesis from these circumstances proved is that Whitcomb knew or

should have known of the child pornography stored in the same folders. And from these

circumstances proved, Whitcomb offers no reasonable alternative hypothesis. See State v.

Taylor, 650 N.W.2d 190, 206 (Minn. 2002) (“[P]ossibilities of innocence do not require

reversal of a jury verdict so long as the evidence taken as a whole makes such theories

8
Whitcomb argues, without authority, that the state was required to prove that Whitcomb
actually viewed or personally downloaded the contraband. We are unaware of any such
requirement to establish guilt under the governing statute, and persuasive authority refutes
that proposition. See State v. Kamencic, No. A20-0050, 2021 WL 1525172, at *4 (Minn.
App. Apr. 19, 2021), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 24, 2021). We cite nonprecedential cases
only for their persuasive value. See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

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seem unreasonable.” (quotation omitted)). The evidence is therefore sufficient to sustain

the verdict.

DECISION

We hold that, for possession of pornography involving a minor, cloud storage is a

“storage system of any other type” within the meaning of Minn. Stat. § 617.247, subd. 4(a).

The evidence is sufficient to prove that Whitcomb possessed the Google cloud account

containing pornographic works involving a minor under 14 years of age and that he knew

or should have known the content and character of the contraband stored in that Google

cloud account. We therefore affirm the 12 convictions of possession of pornographic

works involving a minor under 14 pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 617.247, subd. 4(b)(3).

Affirmed.

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