State of Minnesota v. Tommy Eastman

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0382

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Tommy Eastman,
Appellant.

Filed December 1, 2025
Affirmed
Wheelock, Judge

Anoka County District Court
File No. 02-CR-22-4786

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Brad Johnson, Anoka County Attorney, Wendy O. Sanchez, Kelsey R. Kelley, Assistant
County Attorneys, Anoka, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sean Michael McGuire, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bentley, Presiding Judge; Wheelock, Judge; and Larson,

Judge.

SYLLABUS

The 2023 amendment to Minnesota Statutes section 609.14, subdivision 1(a), does

not create a new or heightened standard that requires a district court, before it may revoke

a defendant’s probation, to make any findings that rehabilitation has failed additional to or

different from those currently required by existing caselaw.
 OPINION

WHEELOCK, Judge

Appellant challenges the district court’s order revoking his probation, arguing that

the district court abused its discretion by (1) violating his constitutional right to an impartial

judge when it conflated his case with another defendant’s criminal case, (2) failing to

properly consider the Austin 1 factors when revoking his probation, and (3) failing to find

that all attempts at rehabilitation had failed before revoking probation in violation of

Minnesota Statutes section 609.14, subdivision 1(a) (2024). We affirm.

FACTS

In August 2022, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Tommy Eastman

with criminal sexual conduct in the first degree in violation of Minnesota Statutes

section 609.342, subdivision 1a(e) (2020), for sexually assaulting a 12-year-old child,

Child A.

Eastman pleaded guilty to the offense. At the plea hearing, Eastman admitted that

he used Snapchat to coordinate with another adult male, D.B., to give D.B. a ride “to go

see [D.B.’s] girl,” Child A, and bring them all back to D.B.’s residence. Eastman admitted

that, once he and D.B. picked up Child A, they returned to D.B.’s residence and the men

took turns penetrating her. Later, at the sentencing hearing in August 2023, counsel for the

1
The district court must make three findings before it may revoke a defendant’s probation
following a violation. See State v. Austin, 295 N.W.2d 248, 250 (Minn. 1980). “[T]he
court must 1) designate the specific condition or conditions that were violated; 2) find that
the violation was intentional or inexcusable; and 3) find that [the] need for confinement
outweighs the policies favoring probation.” Id.

2
state noted that Eastman participated in the penetration of Child A as “payment” for giving

Child A and D.B. a ride to D.B.’s home. The district court granted Eastman’s motion for

a downward dispositional departure and imposed a sentence of 144 months’ imprisonment

stayed for 30 years of supervised probation with conditions.

In September 2024, Eastman’s probation officer began receiving reports that

Eastman was violating his probation conditions by using an unapproved cell phone, using

Snapchat, residing at an unapproved address, and having unapproved contact with minors.

The district court held a probation-violation hearing at which Eastman admitted each of the

alleged violations.

After Eastman admitted the allegations, counsel for the state argued for execution

of the imposed sentence. Counsel for the state reminded the district court of the details of

Eastman’s offense, including Eastman’s use of Snapchat to arrange to pick up Child A

from her home and his subsequent “penetration of this 12-year-old with another adult male

present.” Counsel for the state also asserted that Eastman had been “lying to [his probation

officer] and hiding information” since the start of his probation, including by using

Snapchat to reach out to “many, many females” for dating purposes and saving to his

Snapchat account a photo of Eastman and a female who appeared to be a minor of similar

age to Child A.

Eastman’s counsel requested an intermediate sanction and pointed out that it was

Eastman’s first violation, he was “only 23 years old,” and he “does not have [an] extensive

criminal history.” Eastman’s counsel said that Eastman understood the “severity of his

mistakes” and would provide value to the community if granted an intermediate sanction.

3
 After hearing arguments from each party, the district court made an oral finding on

the record that the need for confinement outweighed the policies favoring probation.

Specifically, the district court observed that Eastman was in violation of the most

significant of his probation conditions: “use of chat lines, [not] maintaining his residence,

[and] having unauthorized cell phones.” The district court executed Eastman’s 144-month

sentence.

Eastman appeals.

ISSUES

I. Did the district court violate Eastman’s due-process right to an impartial judge by
considering, when revoking Eastman’s probation, the actions of another defendant
in committing a different offense?

II. Did the district court abuse its discretion by determining that the need for
confinement outweighs the policies favoring probation?

III. Did the legislature’s 2023 amendment to Minnesota Statutes section 609.14,
subdivision 1(a), create a new standard for probation-violation proceedings that
requires a district court to determine that all possible options for rehabilitation have
been exhausted before it may revoke probation?

ANALYSIS

I. The district court did not violate Eastman’s procedural due-process right to an
impartial judge by considering, when revoking Eastman’s probation, the
actions of another defendant in committing a different offense.

Eastman argues that his constitutional right to due process was violated because the

district court exhibited bias when it considered the underlying offense of another defendant

as a basis for revoking Eastman’s probation. Eastman contends that he was thus “deprived

4
of a neutral and detached decision maker.” Eastman did not raise this issue at the

probation-violation hearing. 2

To conform with standards of procedural due process, a defendant on probation has

a constitutional right to a hearing before their probation can be revoked. Gagnon v.

Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973) (determining that the due-process procedure outlined

for parolees in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972), also applies to

probationers). At such a hearing, the issue of revocation must be determined by a “neutral

and detached” decisionmaker. Pearson v. State, 241 N.W.2d 490, 492 (Minn. 1976)

(quoting Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489).

To succeed on this claim, Eastman must prove that “a reasonable examiner [with

full knowledge of the facts and circumstances] would question the judge’s impartiality.”

State v. Cleary, 882 N.W.2d 899, 904 (Minn. App. 2016) (stating that whether a judge is

biased during a probation-violation hearing is not based on whether the judge was actually

biased, but whether a reasonable examiner would question the judge’s impartiality); see

also State v. Lopez, 988 N.W.2d 107, 117 (Minn. 2023) (discussing three distinct types of

bias that may exist when a district court acts as fact-finder and stating that emergent-bias

concerns arise when “the trier of fact is not actually biased, but during the [proceeding],

something happens that transforms it into a partial trier of fact”). When a district court sits

as a finder of fact, it is obligated to set aside personal knowledge and decide cases based

2
We need not determine whether plain-error review applies to this issue because we
conclude that there was no error at all, given that the district court’s statements did not
reflect either actual bias or the appearance of bias against Eastman.

5
solely on the merits of the evidence presented in the proceeding before it. Lopez,

988 N.W.2d at 119-21; see also State v. Dorsey, 701 N.W.2d 238, 250 (Minn. 2005)

(establishing that, if the record demonstrates that a district court conducted independent

investigation of information outside of the record to decide the case, the court’s impartiality

would reasonably be questioned). We review “whether a district court deprived a

defendant of [the] right to a fair trial and an impartial fact-finder de novo.” Lopez,

988 N.W.2d at 120.

Eastman asserts that the district court exhibited bias when it considered the “actions

of another individual,” pointing out that the district court mentioned Eastman’s use of

Snapchat and that it then relied on information outside of the record. Eastman claims that

he “was not involved with using Snapchat to solicit minors” and that, therefore, the judge

must have confused his case with another defendant’s case or “used her knowledge of

[another defendant’s] case to inform her decision” to revoke probation. But the district

court’s statements at the hearing do not demonstrate that the district court considered any

use of Snapchat in making its probation-revocation decision other than that to which

Eastman admitted during his plea.

During the hearing, counsel for the state properly recited the facts of Eastman’s

offense, specifically that Eastman used Snapchat to coordinate the assault of Child A:

“[W]hat Mr. Eastman was convicted of included using Snapchat, using social media to

arrange for pickup of this 12-year-old where he was engaging in penetration of this

12-year-old with another adult male present.” While Eastman suggests that the district

court conflated his case with that of another defendant charged with assaulting Child A,

6
there is no indication in the record that the district court relied on evidence of events outside

Eastman’s underlying offense and probation violations when it revoked his probation. The

district court properly considered arguments from the state and Eastman, testimony from

the probation officer, and the factual basis for Eastman’s plea and found that the need for

Eastman’s confinement outweighed the policies favoring probation.

To support his argument, Eastman relies on Cleary, in which we determined it was

error for the judge who presided over Cleary’s case in drug court to also preside over his

probation-violation hearing in district court. 882 N.W.2d at 901-02. We reasoned that the

participation of the judge in both proceedings could risk injustice to the parties and

undermine public confidence in the judicial process. Id. at 908. But Eastman’s reliance is

misguided because Cleary is factually distinguishable.

In Cleary, we explained that the “unique structure” and purpose of drug court

changes the relationship between judge and defendant and is different than that in other

courts. Id. at 906. Drug court judges interact with defendants on a much more personal

level than is typical in other court settings. Id. at 905. As part of the drug court program,

Cleary submitted a journal that detailed his feelings and personal life once a week to the

judge; the drug court team also celebrated Cleary with a party when he reached one year

of sobriety. Id. In addition, there is no “formal record” for drug court, so there is no

“reviewable record” for many of the interactions between the judge and a defendant

regarding the defendant’s participation in the program. Id. at 906. For those reasons, we

concluded that there was opportunity for the appearance of partiality if a drug court judge

7
presided over a probation-violation hearing for a defendant the judge oversaw in drug

court. Id. at 908.

Unlike in Cleary, the record here does not suggest a relationship between Eastman

and the district court judge that would show any appearance of partiality; indeed, there is

no assertion of any relationship between them at all. Furthermore, we see no indication

that the judge relied on personal knowledge or information outside of the record to revoke

Eastman’s probation. During the probation-violation hearing, the district court recalled

Eastman’s sentencing as part of a “very egregious case with a number of young men that

were all involved in transporting basically by Uber, if I remember correctly—paying for

an Uber to get a young girl to various residences where the men had sex with her.” We are

not persuaded that this reference shows the district court conflated Eastman’s case with

that of another defendant because, while the use of an Uber was not present in Eastman’s

case, Eastman admitted at his plea hearing that he gave Child A and D.B. a ride to D.B.’s

residence and that D.B. and Eastman took turns having sexual intercourse with Child A.

We thus conclude that any reasonable examiner with full knowledge of the facts and

circumstances of the case would not question the judge’s impartiality.

Eastman has not shown that the district court relied on facts outside the record, and

therefore, we discern no bias.

II. The district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the need for
Eastman’s confinement outweighs the policies favoring probation.

Eastman argues that the district court abused its discretion when it revoked his

probation by (1) failing to analyze the Modtland subfactors and (2) improperly weighing

8
the significance of his violations based on evidence from another defendant’s case. We

address each argument in turn.

“The [district] court has broad discretion in determining if there is sufficient

evidence to revoke probation and should be reversed only if there is a clear abuse of that

discretion.” Austin, 295 N.W.2d at 249-50. But whether the district court made the

required findings to revoke probation is a question of law that we review de novo. State v.

Modtland, 695 N.W.2d 602, 605 (Minn. 2005). To revoke probation, a district court must

make specific findings on what are known as the Austin factors. Austin, 295 N.W.2d at

250. The court must (1) identify the specific condition of probation violated, (2) determine

that the violation was intentional or inexcusable, and (3) assess whether the need for

confinement outweighs the policies favoring probation. Id. When analyzing the third

Austin factor, the district court must further consider three subfactors known as the

Modtland subfactors and must make findings as to whether

(i) confinement is necessary to protect the public from
further criminal activity by the offender; or
(ii) the offender is in need of correctional treatment
which can most effectively be provided if [they are] confined;
or
(iii) it would unduly depreciate the seriousness of the
violation if probation were not revoked.

Modtland, 695 N.W.2d at 607 (quotation omitted). A district court needs to find only one

Modtland subfactor to support a finding favoring confinement on the third Austin factor.

State v. Smith, 994 N.W.2d 317, 320 (Minn. App. 2023), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 27,

2023).

9
 The decision to revoke probation “cannot be a reflexive reaction to an accumulation

of technical violations but requires a showing that the offender’s behavior demonstrates

that he or she cannot be counted on to avoid antisocial activity.” Austin, 295 N.W.2d at

251 (quotations omitted). District courts must make “thorough, fact-specific records” and

“seek to convey their substantive reasons for revocation and the evidence relied upon.”

Modtland, 695 N.W.2d at 608.

Eastman argues that the district court did not make any findings pursuant to the

Modtland subfactors and that, therefore, its finding on the third Austin factor—whether the

need for confinement outweighs the policies favoring probation—was not supported. The

record belies Eastman’s assertion.

Eastman admitted to multiple probation violations, including (1) possessing an

unapproved cell phone, (2) using Snapchat, (3) residing at a location where he was not

registered, and (4) having contact with minors without prior approval. On the first

Modtland subfactor, the district court found that, due to the seriousness of his underlying

offense and number of significant probation violations, Eastman was not amenable to

probation and his confinement was necessary to protect the public from further criminal

activity.

Eastman was using Snapchat as a dating service to “contact more young women”

only eight months after he pleaded guilty to a criminal-sexual-conduct offense that

involved using Snapchat to facilitate his sexual assault of a 12-year-old child. At the

probation-violation hearing, Eastman admitted that he used his Snapchat account to find

people whom he wanted to date. But at his plea hearing, Eastman had admitted that he and

10
D.B. used Snapchat to communicate with each other to coordinate the retrieval of Child A

from her home and that, after he picked up D.B. and then Child A from her home and gave

them a ride to D.B.’s home, he sexually penetrated Child A. Snapchat played a substantial

role in Eastman’s assault of Child A.

The significant violation of using Snapchat as a dating service on an unapproved

cell phone supports the district court’s finding on the first Modtland subfactor. In support

of its finding, the district court stated:

The need for confinement at this point, in light of the
seriousness of the underlying case for which he was given
probation, and he was given probation over the State’s
objection, and the violations here that have occurred, which is
apparently having an unapproved cell phone and utilizing that
cell phone to attempt to contact more young women, the Court
finds that the need for confinement is outweighed by the
policies favoring probation. There’s no indication that
Mr. Eastman could be or can be supervised on probation since
he was in violation of the most significant of conditions, that
being no use of chat lines, maintaining his residence, having
unauthorized cell phones.

As this was a clear violation of the probation condition prohibiting use of social

media, the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Eastman’s violation was

significant and that the need for confinement outweighs the policies favoring probation

because it “is necessary to protect the public from further criminal activity” by Eastman.

See Modtland, 695 N.W.2d at 607.

Eastman also argues that the probation conditions he violated were given more

weight than they deserved because the district court conflated his case with that of another

defendant who committed a more severe offense. Eastman highlights the weight the

11
district court placed on his use of Snapchat while on probation as proof that it was

confusing his case with that of another defendant. The record, however, supports the state’s

recitation of the facts, and as previously discussed, the use of Snapchat played a significant

role in Eastman’s underlying offense. There is no evidence to support the assertion that

the district court considered the facts of another defendant’s case when weighing

Eastman’s probation violations.

Because the district court properly considered the first Modtland subfactor when

determining whether the need for confinement outweighs the policies favoring probation

in its decision to revoke Eastman’s probation, we discern no abuse of discretion that would

support a reversal of the district court’s revocation decision.

III. The 2023 amendment to Minnesota Statutes section 609.14, subdivision 1(a),
does not create a new standard for the revocation of probation.

Eastman also challenges the district court’s order revoking his probation by arguing

that Minnesota Statutes section 609.14, subdivision 1(a) (2024), requires a district court to

find that all possible rehabilitation has failed before it may revoke probation. In 2023, the

Minnesota Legislature amended subdivision 1(a) to include the sentence, “Revocation shall

only be used as a last resort when rehabilitation has failed.” 2023 Minn. Laws ch. 52,

art. 17, § 32, at 1114. Eastman asserts that this amendment demonstrates the legislature’s

intention to establish a new standard for the revocation of probation distinct from that

established by Austin: that a district court must find that all possible attempts at

rehabilitation have failed before revoking probation. This argument requires us to interpret

the 2023 amendment to Minnesota Statutes section 609.14, subdivision 1(a).

12
 Statutory interpretation is a question of law we review de novo. State v. Holl,

966 N.W.2d 803, 808 (Minn. 2021). “Our objective in statutory interpretation is to

effectuate the intent of the legislature.” State v. Riggs, 865 N.W.2d 679, 682 (Minn. 2015)

(quotation omitted). Our analysis begins by considering whether the statutory language at

issue is ambiguous. Roberts v. State, 945 N.W.2d 850, 853 (Minn. 2020). A statute is

ambiguous if it is “subject to more than one reasonable interpretation.” Id. “To determine

whether a statute is ambiguous, we first construe words and phrases in the statute according

to rules of grammar and according to their common and approved usage.” Fordyce v. State,

994 N.W.2d 893, 897 (Minn. 2023) (quotations omitted). If the language of the statute is

not ambiguous on its face, we apply its plain meaning. Id. If, however, the language of

the statute is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, we apply the canons

of construction to ascertain the statute’s meaning and “resolve the ambiguity.” State v.

Thonesavanh, 904 N.W.2d 432, 435 (Minn. 2017).

The language at issue here is the sentence, “Revocation shall only be used as a last

resort when rehabilitation has failed.” Minn. Stat. § 609.14, subd. 1(a). Eastman argues

that the plain language of the sentence requires a district court to maintain a defendant on

probation “unless all [possible] attempts to rehabilitate the defendant have failed.” In other

words, he argues, “[u]nless the probationer is so incorrigible that all attempts at

rehabilitation have failed, the court may not revoke probation.”

Based on the legislature’s use of the word “shall,” it is reasonable to construe the

amendment as imposing a mandatory duty on the district court. See Minn. Stat. § 645.44,

subd. 16 (2024) (“‘Shall’ is mandatory.”). And it is similarly reasonable to construe “when

13
rehabilitation has failed” as referring to a circumstance in which all avenues for

rehabilitation have been explored and have failed. Accordingly, it is reasonable to interpret

the amendment’s language as precluding the revocation of probation until this condition

precedent—the exhaustion of all possible attempts at rehabilitation—has been satisfied.

We conclude that it is also reasonable, however, to construe the phrase “when

rehabilitation has failed” as referring to a circumstance in which the nature of a defendant’s

conduct in violating probation demonstrates no reasonable probability of future reform

sufficient to outweigh either the risk to public safety as demonstrated by that conduct or

the need for the execution of the sentence as an appropriate consequence, even if other

rehabilitative opportunities remain available. Stated differently, if a defendant has been

afforded an opportunity for rehabilitation but violates probation in a manner that either

demonstrates an unacceptable risk to public safety or requires revocation as a proportional

consequence, a district court may conclude that rehabilitation has failed notwithstanding

that relevant rehabilitative programming may remain available in the community. Because

we conclude that the statutory language is susceptible to more than one reasonable

interpretation, it is ambiguous, and we therefore resort to the canons of statutory

construction to ascertain its meaning. See Thonesavanh, 904 N.W.2d at 436.

We conclude that the better interpretation of “when rehabilitation has failed” is that

“the offender’s behavior demonstrates that he or she cannot be counted on to avoid

antisocial activity” or “[t]he [defendant] has been offered treatment but has failed to take

advantage of the opportunity or to show a commitment to rehabilitation.” Austin,

295 N.W.2d at 251 (quotations omitted); see also Thonesavanh, 904 N.W.2d at 436

14
(discerning the meaning of a statute based on the “better interpretation”); State v. Hayes,

826 N.W.2d 799, 805 (Minn. 2013) (embracing the more reasonable of the two

interpretations of a statute); In re Est. of Butler, 803 N.W.2d 393, 397 (Minn. 2011)

(adopting the “better interpretation” of a statute). Such a definition is not merely

practicable on its face, but it also comports with a concept that Minnesota courts have

applied for the nearly 50 years since Austin was decided. Indeed, we conclude that the

intention of the legislature in amending subdivision 1(a) was not to supplant the district

courts’ reliance on the Austin analysis when revoking probation, but rather to mandate it.

We reach this conclusion for two reasons.

First, the language used in the amendment to subdivision 1(a) is substantially similar

to that used in Austin, in which the supreme court stated that “[t]he purpose of probation is

rehabilitation and revocation should be used only as a last resort when treatment has

failed.” 295 N.W.2d at 250 (emphasis added). As Eastman notes, the amendment uses

“shall” in lieu of “should” and “rehabilitation” in lieu of “treatment,” but we reject his

argument that these alterations indicate “a departure from Austin and its progeny” because

closer examination contradicts such a conclusion.

Although the supreme court in Austin used the permissive “should” in describing

the restraint to be exercised in revoking probation, it nevertheless implemented a

mandatory analysis that district courts must undertake in doing so. Shortly after using

“should,” the Austin court stated without qualification that the “decision to revoke . . .

requires a showing that the offender’s behavior demonstrates that he or she cannot be

counted on to avoid antisocial activity.” Id. at 251 (emphasis added) (quotations omitted).

15
And there is no indication that the supreme court in Austin intended to ascribe materially

distinct meanings to the terms “rehabilitation” and “treatment.” Because it first noted that

the “purpose of probation is rehabilitation,” its use of “treatment” in the following clause

suggests that it intended the words to be synonymous. Id. at 250. And nowhere else in the

opinion does the supreme court suggest that a revocation decision should focus more or

exclusively on the failure of treatment programming to the exclusion of the broader concept

of rehabilitation.

Second, it is significant that the legislature declined to provide any guidance to

district courts in determining when “rehabilitation has failed.” Given that the amended

language so closely mirrors that of Austin’s own policy statement on the same topic, it is

reasonable to assume that the legislature was fully aware of the existing caselaw governing

probation-violation proceedings. See Sterry v. Minn. Dep’t of Corr., 8 N.W.3d 224, 232

(Minn. 2024) (stating that appellate courts “presume that statutes are consistent with the

common law, and [they] do not presume that the legislature intended to abrogate or modify

a rule of the common law on the subject any further than that which is expressly declared

or clearly indicated” (quoting Jepsen v. County of Pope, 966 N.W.2d 472, 484 (Minn.

2021))). And considering that the legislature made no attempt to establish a distinct

procedure for determining when rehabilitation has failed, it is likewise reasonable to

conclude that the legislature did not intend to abrogate Austin’s analysis with the

amendment, but to codify it.

This interpretation complies with the most relevant—and indeed dispositive—

canon of discerning legislative intent, that courts presume that “the legislature does not

16
intend a result that is absurd, impossible of execution, or unreasonable.” Minn. Stat.

§ 645.17(1) (2024). When we apply this presumption, Eastman’s proposed interpretation

also fails.

First, an interpretation of “when rehabilitation has failed” that requires the failure

of “all [possible] attempts to rehabilitate the defendant” would be impossible to

consistently or uniformly apply. Because rehabilitation is fundamentally a subjective and

internal process, there is no practical means of determining when a defendant on probation

is truly beyond rehabilitation. So long as the imposed probationary term has not expired

and the defendant retains agency over their own decision-making, there is always the

possibility that continued probation will bring about the desired change in thinking and

behavior. Accordingly, the only way to comprehensively determine that “all attempts to

rehabilitate the defendant have failed” is to do so retrospectively—only once probation has

ended and the district court is no longer able to provide additional opportunities for

rehabilitation could one conclude that all such efforts had failed.

If there is indeed a point at which all hope of rehabilitation becomes lost for a

defendant prior to the expiration of probation, a district court will be unable to determine

with any specificity when exactly that point has been reached, particularly if the defendant

continues to profess a desire for change and an intention to take advantage of the

opportunities for doing so. Thus, any conclusion that “all attempts to rehabilitate the

defendant have failed” made before the termination of probation itself will necessarily

entail nothing more than a district court’s best guess at divining whether a defendant has

exhausted opportunities for continued correctional treatment in a community setting. And

17
considering that the current iteration of the statute provides no guidance to courts in how

to reach such a conclusion, it would be impractical to implement a standard for the

revocation of probation that turns entirely on a district court’s ability to accurately predict

future behavior.

Second, applying such a construction would lead to absurd and unreasonable results

because it would effectively insulate defendants from revocation—regardless of the

severity or frequency of their probation violations—so long as they can demonstrate any

potential for future reform. To require the exhaustion of any and all rehabilitative

opportunities before a district court may revoke probation would deprive district courts of

the ability to impose meaningful and proportional sanctions for violation behavior that

demonstrates an ongoing risk to public safety solely because the defendant might do better

next time. It would essentially nullify the relevance of the violating behavior itself in the

determination of whether the defendant should remain in the community. Such a result is

not only irrational as a matter of logic but is antithetical to Minnesota’s long-standing

perspective that the revocation of probation must involve “a balancing of the probationer’s

interest in freedom and the state’s interest in insuring his rehabilitation and the public

safety.” Austin, 295 N.W.2d at 251.

Accordingly, we hold that the 2023 amendment to Minnesota Statutes

section 609.14, subdivision 1(a), does not create a new or heightened standard that requires

a district court, before it may revoke a defendant’s probation, to make any findings that

rehabilitation has failed additional to or different from those currently required by existing

caselaw. In other words, a district court’s determination pursuant to Austin that the “need

18
for confinement outweighs the policies favoring probation” is sufficient to satisfy the

statutory requirement that the district court find that rehabilitation has failed before

revoking probation. 295 N.W.2d at 250.

DECISION

The district court did not act with bias or rely on information outside the record

during the probation-violation proceeding and did not abuse its discretion by determining

that the need for confinement outweighs the policies favoring probation and then revoking

Eastman’s probation. Furthermore, the 2023 amendment to Minnesota Statutes

section 609.14, subdivision 1(a), does not create a new or heightened standard that district

courts must apply when revoking probation.

Affirmed.

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