State of Minnesota v. Nicholas Scott Thompson

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0574

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Nicholas Scott Thompson,
Appellant.

Filed February 23, 2026
Affirmed
Frisch, Chief Judge

Jackson County District Court
File No. 32-CR-18-159

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Thomas R. Ragatz, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota; and

Kristi Meyeraan, Jackson County Attorney, Jackson, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Michael McLaughlin, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Frisch, Chief Judge; Ede, Judge; and Bentley, Judge.

NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

FRISCH, Chief Judge

Appellant challenges the district court’s order finding him not competent to

participate in his criminal proceedings. He argues that the district court erred in declining

to consider his request to discharge his criminal defense counsel and that he received
ineffective assistance from his defense counsel who testified at the contested competency

hearing that appellant was not competent. Because the district court did not err in declining

to consider the request to discharge defense counsel and defense counsel’s performance

was objectively reasonable, we affirm.

FACTS

This is the fourth pretrial appeal in this matter. In September 2018, respondent State

of Minnesota charged appellant Nicholas Scott Thompson with one count of second-degree

intentional murder and two counts of second-degree unintentional felony murder for

allegedly killing his mother. Since then, the criminal proceedings and related appeals have

involved issues related to Thompson’s competency. See State v. Thompson, No. A19-0787

(Minn. App. Mar. 3, 2020) (order op.); State v. Thompson, No. A20-1232 (Minn. App. July

26, 2021), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 27, 2021); State v. Thompson, 988 N.W.2d 149 (Minn.

App. 2023), rev. denied (Minn. June 20, 2023).

Following remand after Thompson’s third appeal, the district court ordered a

competency evaluation and, after a contested competency hearing, found Thompson

competent to proceed. Criminal proceedings resumed in the normal course through mid-

2024.

In late July 2024, the state extended a plea offer to Thompson. Thompson rejected

the offer the same day. About a week later, Thompson’s criminal defense counsel moved

the district court to suspend the criminal proceedings and conduct a competency evaluation,

citing Thompson’s mental illness. Four days later, Thompson filed a handwritten note

requesting the removal of his criminal defense counsel and objecting to the motion to

2
suspend proceedings. The next day, at a hearing on defense counsel’s motion, defense

counsel reiterated “serious concerns” about Thompson’s competency, explaining that

Thompson’s “delusional thinking” had become intertwined with decisions about plea

negotiations, whether to go to trial, and whether to testify. Thompson noted that he

opposed the motion, reiterated his position that he was competent, and asked the district

court to continue the matter so that he could “make the adjustment to my legal team and

ensure my right to effective counsel.”

The district court suspended proceedings and ordered a Rule 20 competency

evaluation. Following the suspension of proceedings, Thompson stated, “I just wi[s]h to

expel both attorneys at this point.” The district court replied, “I understand that’s your

request. I’m not going to rule on that or make any determinations until after we have

completed the Rule 20 evaluation, because I have suspended all proceedings until that

evaluation is completed. I am not going to rule on any motions about the attorneys.”

Defense counsel in the criminal case did not represent Thompson in the competency

proceedings. Instead, a separate attorney was appointed to represent Thompson

(competency counsel). Thompson declined to participate in the competency evaluation.

Relying on treatment records and past evaluations, two competency examiners opined that

Thompson’s delusional disorder was actively symptomatic and prevented him from

rationally consulting with criminal defense counsel or participating in his defense in the

criminal matter. Thompson personally objected to the competency report and requested a

contested hearing.

3
 In December, the district court held a contested competency hearing. Thompson

was represented by competency counsel. Thompson did not request to discharge

competency counsel or otherwise object to their representation. At that hearing,

Thompson, criminal defense counsel, a mental-health nurse practitioner, and the two

competency examiners who examined Thompson testified. Following the contested

competency hearing, the district court found Thompson not competent and suspended the

criminal proceedings.

Thompson appeals.

DECISION

Thompson raises two issues on appeal. He argues that the district court was required

to consider and rule on his request to discharge criminal defense counsel. He also argues

that he received ineffective assistance from his criminal defense counsel because counsel

testified at the contested competency hearing that he was not competent. We disagree.

The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee a criminal defendant the right to

counsel of their choice. See U.S. Const. amend. VI; amend XIV, § 1; see also Minn. Const.

art. I, § 6. A criminal defendant may not be tried and convicted while legally incompetent.

State v. Camacho, 561 N.W.2d 160, 171 (Minn. 1997). A criminal defendant who is found

not competent to stand trial is likewise not competent to waive counsel. Godinez v. Moran,

509 U.S. 389, 399 (1993); see also Camacho, 561 N.W.2d at 171-72 (discussing this aspect

of Godinez). If the district court “has reason to doubt the defendant’s competence, the

court must make a finding that the defendant is competent to stand trial” before deciding

4
that the defendant’s “waiver of his constitutional rights is knowing and voluntary.”

Camacho, 561 N.W.2d at 171 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted) (quotation omitted).

The district court was obligated to ensure Thompson’s competence at the time he

requested to discharge criminal defense counsel. Thompson’s request to discharge defense

counsel came only after defense counsel moved to suspend the proceedings on the grounds

that Thompson could no longer rationally consult with counsel or make reality-based

decisions about plea and trial strategy. The district court acted within its broad discretion

to manage the proceedings by addressing Thompson’s competence first and deferring the

discharge decision until the district court could determine whether Thompson was

competent to participate in the criminal proceedings. See Rice Park Props. v. Robins,

Kaplan, Miller & Ciresi, 532 N.W.2d 556, 556 (Minn. 1995) (“[T]he district court has

considerable discretion in scheduling matters and in furthering what it has identified as the

interests of judicial administration and economy.”); Camacho, 561 N.W.2d at 172 (stating

“that the standards for competency to stand trial and for competency to waive counsel are

the same”). And the Minnesota Supreme Court has confirmed that, as relevant here, “if a

court has reason to doubt the defendant’s competence, the court must make ‘a finding that

the defendant is competent to stand trial’” before the defendant can waive the right to

counsel. Camacho, 561 N.W.2d at 171 (footnote omitted) (quoting Godinez, 509 U.S. at

400). Because the district court received information giving it reason to doubt Thompson’s

competence, the district court properly declined to rule on Thompson’s request to discharge

his defense counsel until it considered and resolved the question of Thompson’s

competence.

5
 In any event, we discern no prejudice to Thompson associated with the district

court’s reservation of Thompson’s motion during the suspended proceedings. That is

because Thompson was represented by separate competency counsel—not his criminal

defense counsel—in the contested competency proceedings from which this appeal is

taken. See State v. Loebach, 310 N.W.2d 58, 64 (Minn. 1981) (requiring a party to show

error and prejudice resulting from that error to prevail on appeal). Although criminal

defense counsel testified at the contested competency hearing, the fact and substance of

that testimony is unrelated to the discharge motion. And Thompson did not request to

discharge his competency counsel. Even though criminal defense counsel remains counsel

of record in the criminal proceedings, counsel did not undertake any substantive action in

the criminal proceeding following notice to the district court questioning Thompson’s

competence. Given these circumstances, the district court’s decision not to rule on

Thompson’s request had no adverse effect on Thompson.

Thompson also seeks reversal of the competency order, alleging that his criminal

defense counsel was ineffective by testifying at the contested competency hearing in a

manner that “was directly adverse to [his] position that he was competent for trial.” We

disagree.

A criminal defendant has a constitutional right to the assistance of counsel. U.S.

Const. amend. VI; Minn. Const. art. I, § 6. In evaluating a claim of ineffective assistance

of counsel, we apply the two-pronged test established in Strickland v. Washington, 466

U.S. 668 (1984). State v. Nicks, 831 N.W.2d 493, 504 (Minn. 2013). To prove ineffective

assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that (1) their “counsel’s representation fell

6
below an objective standard of reasonableness”; and (2) “there was a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would have been

different.” State v. Vang, 881 N.W.2d 551, 557 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted). We

may address the “prongs in either order and may dispose of a claim on one without

analyzing the other.” Martin v. State, 825 N.W.2d 734, 744 (Minn. 2013). We disagree

that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness for two

reasons.

First, counsel is obligated to inquire into a criminal defendant’s competence on

suspicion that the defendant is not competent. Rule 20 requires defense counsel to request

a competency evaluation if they, “at any time . . . , doubt[] the defendant’s competency to

proceed.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 20.01, subd. 3(a). Once defense counsel suspected that

Thompson was not competent, as here, counsel was obligated pursuant to Rule 20 to raise

the issue of Thompson’s competence with the district court, and counsel fulfilled that

obligation. Indeed, if counsel had reason to question Thompson’s competency and did not

comply with the obligations set forth in Rule 20, such inaction may fall below an objective

standard of reasonableness. State v. Epps, 996 N.W.2d 226, 239 (Minn. App. 2023), rev.

denied (Minn. Dec. 19, 2023).

Second, defense counsel was not required to obtain Thompson’s consent to raise the

issue of his competency and is permitted to share non-privileged information related to

competency. Minn. Stat. § 611.42, subd. 3(a) (2024); Minn. R. Crim. P. 20.01, subd. 3(a).

Further, defense counsel may provide non-privileged testimony, “subject to the

prosecutor’s cross-examination,” at a contested competency hearing, also without

7
Thompson’s consent. Minn. Stat. § 611.44, subd. 2(b) (2024). Given this well-settled

authority, the actions of Thompson’s criminal defense counsel did not fall below an

objective standard of reasonableness.

We therefore conclude that Thompson’s criminal defense counsel acted in an

objectively reasonable manner by requesting a competency evaluation upon suspicion to

doubt Thompson’s competence and in testifying to that effect at the contested competency

hearing. Indeed, Rule 20 obligated Thompson’s defense counsel to inquire into

Thompson’s competency to stand trial when they suspected that he was not competent.

Thompson therefore fails to meet his burden to establish that defense counsel’s

representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.

Affirmed.

8