Cole Robert Hooker v. David Sean Kennedy

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1188

Cole Robert Hooker,
Respondent,

vs.

David Sean Kennedy,
Appellant.

Filed January 20, 2026
Affirmed
Connolly, Judge

Sherburne County District Court
File No. 71-CV-25-930

Tyler R. Dahlen, Tamburino Law Group, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

David S. Kennedy, Vancouver, Washington (pro se appellant)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Bond, Judge; and Smith,

John P., Judge.

NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

CONNOLLY, Judge

In this dispute related to a harassment restraining order (HRO), pro se appellant

argues that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over him. Because the district

court did not err in determining that it had personal jurisdiction over appellant, we affirm.


Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
 FACTS

In June 2025, respondent Cole Robert Hooker, who lives in Minnesota, filed a

petition for an HRO against appellant David Sean Kennedy, who resides in the State of

Washington. The petition alleged that, beginning in April 2022, appellant began harassing

respondent through threatening phone calls and text messages, and by mailing letters and

items to respondent’s home. The petition also alleged that appellant harassed respondent

by impersonating respondent on a social media account.

Based on the allegations in respondent’s HRO petition, as well as the attached

exhibits that consisted of communications sent by appellant to respondent, the district court

granted an ex parte HRO in favor of respondent. Appellant subsequently filed a motion to

dismiss with prejudice under Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(b), arguing that,

under Minn. Stat. § 543.19 (2024), the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over him.

In appellant’s filings, he admitted to sending communications to respondent, but disputed

the number and content of these communications. Appellant also claimed that certain

communications stemmed from two conciliation-court cases in which appellant sought the

return of items he had given to respondent.

A hearing was held at which the district court stated on the record that it had personal

jurisdiction over appellant because Minn. Stat. § 609.748, subd. 2(d) (2024), provides “that

an application can be filed in any county where either party lives or where the harassment

has occurred.” The district court, therefore, denied appellant’s motion to dismiss. And,

because appellant wished to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss, the parties did not

address the merits of respondent’s petition, and the ex parte HRO remained in effect.

2
 Appellant filed a motion asking the district court to reconsider the denial of his

motion to dismiss. The district court denied the motion “for failure to follow the Minnesota

General Rules of Practice.” In so ruling, the district court clarified its oral ruling of the

motion to dismiss, reiterating that it had personal jurisdiction under Minn. Stat. § 609.748,

subd. 2(d). And the district court determined that, even if it “were to consider Minnesota’s

long-arm statute, the [HRO] petition and supporting exhibits show on a prima facia basis

that the Court has personal jurisdiction over [appellant], and [appellant] does not

sufficiently rebut that showing in his motion filing to require an evidentiary hearing on the

issue.” This appeal follows.1

DECISION

Appellant challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to dismiss respondent’s

HRO petition for lack of personal jurisdiction. “[P]ersonal jurisdiction refers to the court’s

power to exercise control over the parties.” Swanson v. Wolf, 986 N.W.2d 217, 220 (Minn.

App. 2023) (quotation omitted). Appellate courts review questions of personal jurisdiction

de novo. Rilley v. MoneyMutual, LLC, 884 N.W.2d 321, 326 (Minn. 2016). To overcome

a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff must make “a prima facie

showing of personal jurisdiction.” Id.

As a threshold matter, the district court relied on section 609.748, subdivision 2(d),

to deny appellant’s motion to dismiss the HRO petition for lack of personal jurisdiction at

the hearing. This statute provides that “[a]n application for relief under this section may

1
Respondent did not file a brief in this matter and this court ordered that the case be
determined on the merits pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 142.03.

3
be filed in the county of residence of either party or in the county in which the alleged

harassment occurred. There are no residency requirements that apply to a petition for a[n

HRO].” Minn. Stat. § 609.748, subd. 2(d).

Appellant argues that the district court erred by relying on section 609.748,

subdivision 2(d), because the “plain language” of this statute “addresses venue, not power

over a nonresident.” Appellant contends that, because “[a] venue statute cannot create

personal jurisdiction,” the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss for lack of

personal jurisdiction.

Assuming, without deciding, that section 609.748, subdivision 2(d), relates to venue

rather than personal jurisdiction, we conclude that the district court did not err in

determining that it had personal jurisdiction over appellant under Minnesota’s long-arm

statute. Minnesota’s long-arm statute governs its exercise of personal jurisdiction over a

nonresident defendant. Minn. Stat. § 543.19, subd. 1. The long-arm statute allows courts

in Minnesota to assert personal jurisdiction over a respondent to the full extent permissible

under federal due-process requirements. Juelich v. Yamazaki Mazak Optonics Corp., 682

N.W.2d 565, 570 (Minn. 2004). To abide by due-process requirements, a respondent must

have certain minimum contacts with Minnesota, and the exercise of jurisdiction must not

offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Id. Minimum contacts exist

when a respondent purposefully avails himself to the privileges, benefits, and protections

of Minnesota to such a degree that he should reasonably anticipate being called into court.

Rilley, 884 N.W.2d at 327.

4
 In Minnesota, five factors are analyzed to determine whether the minimum-contact

and fair-play requirements are met: “(1) the quantity of contacts with the forum state;

(2) the nature and quality of those contacts; (3) the connection of the cause of action with

these contacts; (4) the interest of the state providing a forum; and (5) the convenience of

the parties.” Id. at 328 (quotation omitted). The first three factors concern minimum

contacts, and the last two concern fair play and substantial justice. Id. Any doubts as to

jurisdiction must be “resolved in favor of retention of jurisdiction.” Hardrives, Inc. v. City

of LaCrosse, 240 N.W.2d 814, 818 (Minn. 1976).

Here, as the district court determined, respondent has asserted that appellant

engaged in acts initiated by appellant outside of Minnesota, such as sending unwanted,

aggressive, and threatening letters through United States mail, text messages, emails, and

other means of digital communications. And respondent claimed that these acts caused

him injury in Minnesota by making him feel frightened and threatened. In determining

whether respondent has made a prima facie showing of jurisdiction, this court does not

delve into the merits of respondent’s claims, but merely accepts the factual allegations in

respondent’s petition and supporting documents as true. See Rilley, 884 N.W.2d at 326.

Under this standard of review, on the limited issue of personal jurisdiction, respondent

made a prima facie showing of minimum contacts.

Appellant argues that his communications with respondent are insufficient to

establish minimum contacts. His argument appears to focus on letters he admittedly sent

to respondent that appellant claims are “directly related to the subject” of a conciliation

court case between appellant and respondent involving “[r]espondent’s noncompliance

5
with a settlement agreement and [a]ppellant’s intent to enforce it.” Appellant argues that,

because these letters “are protected by Minnesota’s absolute litigation privilege,” they are

insufficient to serve as the minimum contacts required for personal jurisdiction.

To support his position, appellant relies on Leiendecker v. Asian Women United of

Minn., 848 N.W.2d 224 (Minn. 2014), and Mahoney & Hagberg v. Newgard, 729 N.W.2d

302 (Minn. 2007). But neither one of these cases involve personal-jurisdiction issues, nor

do they stand for the proposition for which they are cited. As such, these cases do not

support appellant’s position that the letters he sent to respondent are insufficient to serve

as the minimum contacts required for personal jurisdiction because they are protected by

litigation privilege.

Moreover, as the district court determined, the “letters, on their face, have very little

litigation value,” and instead “either demean [respondent] or . . . try to make [respondent]

feel bad for [appellant].” Indeed, the record reflects that appellant sent three letters through

the mail to respondent. In the first letter, only one paragraph of the two-page letter

references the litigation process by stating that appellant intends to file an affidavit of non-

compliance because he had not received certain items respondent allegedly agreed to send

appellant. The rest of the letter is an expression of appellant’s emotions and contains

personal attacks and insults of respondent. Similarly, the second letter, which is six pages

in length, consists of more expressions of appellant’s emotions and recitals of past events,

and contains nothing related to litigation. And the third letter, which consists of seven

pages, includes what appears to be a diagram detailing appellant’s emotions in the “post-

[respondent]” time-frame. Although the letter may contain some litigation information,

6
the letter is mostly derogatory and threatening. In light of the lack of litigation value

contained in the letters, appellant cannot show that these letters must be withheld from the

minimum-contacts analysis. As the district court pointed out, appellant “does not get to

avoid consequences for sending allegedly harassing letters to [respondent] just because he

briefly mentions the next steps he will take in their on-going litigation.”

In addition to the letters appellant sent respondent, the record reflects that appellant

sent electronic communications to respondent. Indeed, our supreme court has stated that,

“[i]n the modern digital era, with ubiquitous e-commerce and electronic communication,

it would be arbitrary to exclude emails from consideration in the minimum contacts

analysis, or to limit email to an exclusively supplemental role.” Rilley, 884 N.W.2d at 332.

Here, the record reflects that appellant sent respondent several electronic

communications between 2022 and 2025, including emails and text messages, messages

through an iCloud account, and at least one phone call. In fact, appellant admits to emailing

respondent once, sending him two series of text messages, and calling him once. Although

appellant claims that these communications were for litigation purposes, the nature of these

communications have little litigation value. Instead, as the district court found, these

communications were demeaning, “aggressive,” and support respondent’s claim that

appellant “threatened and harassed him.” These electronic communications, combined

with the letters appellant sent respondent through United States mail, establish sufficient

minimum contacts between appellant and the State of Minnesota. And, because appellant

availed himself of Minnesota systems by sending respondent various forms of harassing

communications, it is within traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice to allow

7
respondent to proceed with his HRO petition. Therefore, the district court did not err in

concluding that it had personal jurisdiction over appellant.

Affirmed.

8