State of Minnesota v. Kyle Adam Bruce, Midwest Bonding, LLC

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1627

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Kyle Adam Bruce,
Defendant,

Midwest Bonding, LLC,
Appellant.

Filed March 23, 2026
Affirmed
Frisch, Chief Judge

Stearns County District Court
File Nos. 73-CR-22-10486, 73-CR-22-10487, 73-CR-22-10488,
73-CR-22-10489, 73-CR-22-10490, 73-CR-22-10491, 73-CR-22-10492,
73-CR-22-10530, 73-CR-23-24, 73-CR-23-28

Janelle P. Kendall, Stearns County Attorney, Michael J. Lieberg, Chief Deputy County
Attorney, St. Cloud, Minnesota (for respondent)

James McGeeney, McGeeney Law Office, LLC, Rochester, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Ede, Presiding Judge; Frisch, Chief Judge; and Bentley,

Judge.
 NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

FRISCH, Chief Judge

Appellant Midwest Bonding LLC (Midwest) challenges the district court’s partial

denial of its petition to reinstate and discharge a forfeited bail bond, arguing that the district

court abused its discretion in weighing the factors regarding reinstatement. Because we

discern no abuse of discretion by the district court, we affirm.

FACTS

In late December 2022 and early January 2023, Kyle Adam Bruce was charged with

ten offenses in ten different cases. Through Midwest, Bruce posted a $100,000 bail bond

for all of the cases, and the district court authorized a conditional release, including the

condition that he appear at future court hearings.

The district court scheduled a September 11, 2023 pretrial hearing for all of the

cases and sent his attorney notice of the hearing. Bruce did not appear at the hearing. The

following day, the district court issued a body-only warrant for Bruce and ordered that the

bond would be forfeited in 60 days “if [Bruce] hasn’t been turned into custody by the

bonding company or has not voluntarily returned to custody.” The district court directed

court administration to “notify the bonding company of the non-appearance,” and Midwest

was sent notice of the September 12 order. When Bruce did not return to custody by

November 17, the district court issued an order directing Midwest to pay the bond within

90 days. On January 4, 2024, the district court recalled the warrant after learning that Bruce

had been apprehended and was in custody.

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 On February 4, Midwest petitioned the district court to reinstate and discharge the

unpaid bond. Midwest submitted an affidavit from its vice president attesting that, on

September 7, Midwest sent Bruce a reminder of the September 11 hearing via an automated

voice-messaging system and that he “accepted notification.” After Bruce failed to appear

at the court hearing, Midwest “immediately” began “efforts to locate” him. It first tried to

contact Bruce by phone and conducted “an electronic search of all the jails in Minnesota.”

It then hired “a professional fugitive recovery agency,” which “conducted efforts to locate”

Bruce, “including investigating the contact information collected at the time the Bond was

posted, and investigative software to search for [him].” The affidavit noted that “[a]mid”

the investigation, “it was revealed” that Bruce was in custody. The state filed no response

to the petition.

The district court conducted a hearing, at which the state appeared but “took no

position” on the petition. The district court thereafter issued an order addressing the four

factors set forth by the supreme court in Shetsky v. Hennepin County (In re Shetsky), 60

N.W.2d 40, 46 (Minn. 1953), and partially granted the petition, reinstating and discharging

$50,000 of the $100,000 bond.

Midwest appeals.

DECISION

We review a district court’s denial of a petition to reinstate and discharge a forfeited

bond for an abuse of discretion. State v. Askland, 784 N.W.2d 60, 62 (Minn. 2010). A

district court abuses its discretion if it bases its decision on an erroneous view of the law,

id., or if it exercises its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner or makes clearly

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erroneous factual findings, see Nelson v. State, 947 N.W.2d 31, 36 (Minn. 2020)

(explaining abuse of discretion in postconviction context).

When a criminal defendant is released on a bond and fails to perform on the

conditions of the bond, the amount of the bond is forfeited to the district court. Minn. Stat.

§ 629.58 (2024); State v. Storkamp, 656 N.W.2d 539, 541 (Minn. 2003). When a bail bond

is forfeited, a district court “may forgive or reduce the penalty according to the

circumstances of the case and the situation of the party on any terms and conditions it

considers just and reasonable.” Minn. Stat. § 629.59 (2024); see also Minn. Gen. R.

Prac. 702(f) (addressing procedures for reinstatement of forfeited bond).

When determining whether to reinstate a forfeited bond, a district court must

consider the four Shetsky factors. Askland, 784 N.W.2d at 62. First, the district court must

consider “the purpose of bail, the civil nature of the proceedings, and the cause, purpose

and length of a defendant’s absence.” Id. Bail serves multiple purposes: relieving a

defendant and the state from the burdens of pretrial imprisonment by placing the defendant

in the custody of the surety, which then assumes responsibility to “ensure the accused’s

presence at trial”; encouraging sureties to pay penalties when defendants fail to appear; and

encouraging sureties “to locate, arrest, and return defaulting defendants to the authorities.”

Storkamp, 656 N.W.2d at 541-42. Second, the district court must consider “the good faith

of the bond company as measured by the fault or willfulness of the defendant,” Askland,

784 N.W.2d at 62, meaning that the “[d]efendant’s willfulness or bad faith is attributable

to the surety,” State v. Vang, 763 N.W.2d 354, 358 (Minn. App. 2009). Third, the district

court must consider “the good-faith efforts of the bond company to apprehend and produce

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the defendant.” Askland, 784 N.W.2d at 62. Fourth, the district court must consider any

prejudice to the state “in its administration of justice.” Id. The petitioner bears the burden

of proof to establish the first three factors, while the state bears the burden of proving

prejudice. See Storkamp, 656 N.W.2d at 542. We address each factor in turn.

The Purpose of Bail; Civil Nature; Cause, Purpose & Length of Absence

The district court found that the purpose of bail was “frustrated” because Midwest

did not locate or return Bruce and did not voluntarily pay the penalty for failing to ensure

his presence. It determined that this factor weighs against reinstating the bond.

Midwest contends the district court abused its discretion in analyzing this factor

because it “relie[d] exclusively on its conclusion that Bruce’s failure to appear was

intentional.” But the district court said nothing about whether Bruce’s nonappearance was

intentional in its discussion of this factor. We likewise reject Midwest’s assertion that it

had no obligation to voluntarily pay the penalty to ensure Bruce’s presence because bail is

intended “to encourage sureties to voluntarily pay the penalty for failing to ensure the

presence of the accused without requiring that the state undergo the expense of litigation

to recover the defaulted bond amount.” Id.

Midwest also argues that the purpose of bail was satisfied because Bruce was absent

for about three months and that we have “found the purpose of bail satisfied in cases with

a similar period,” citing Askland, 784 N.W.2d at 63, Storkamp, 656 N.W.2d at 543, and

Farsdale v. Martinez, 586 N.W.2d 423, 425 (Minn. App. 1998). We disagree with

Midwest’s characterization of our authorities. None of these cases address whether the

length of a defendant’s absence favors or disfavors reinstatement of a forfeited bond. And

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none stand for the proposition that a district court abuses its discretion when it determines

that the purpose of bail is frustrated when the surety fails to ensure the defendant’s

appearance, locate and return him, or voluntarily pay the bond. Because the district court

expressly determined that the purpose of bail was frustrated in multiple respects, and the

record supports its findings, we discern no abuse of discretion in its determination that the

first Shetsky factor weighs against reinstatement.

Fault or Willfulness of the Defendant

The district court found that Bruce “intentionally” failed to appear because notice

of the hearing was mailed to his attorney, there is no evidence that the notice was

undeliverable or that Bruce was unaware of the hearing, and Midwest did not present any

evidence that Bruce’s absence was justified. The district court weighed this factor against

reinstatement.

The petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating that this factor favors

reinstatement of the forfeited bond. Storkamp, 656 N.W.2d at 542. Midwest did not

present any evidence that Bruce was unaware of the hearing or otherwise justified in his

absence. Midwest therefore failed to meet its burden to establish that this factor favors

reinstatement. Midwest argues that the notice sent to Bruce’s attorney does not support a

finding that he actually knew of the hearing and willfully absented himself. But it cites no

authority for this proposition, which otherwise disregards its burden of proof. We therefore

conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by weighing this favor against

reinstatement.

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Bond Company’s Good-Faith Efforts

The district court found that Midwest presented “insufficient evidence” that it made

good-faith efforts to locate Bruce. The district court noted the information Midwest

provided about its efforts before the hearing date to ensure Bruce’s appearance but

highlighted numerous information gaps about Midwest’s efforts to find him after he failed

to appear. In particular, the district court noted that Midwest provided only “boilerplate”

descriptions of its efforts, using “language previously submitted verbatim in other

matters”—never referencing Bruce by name, never naming the fugitive recovery agency it

hired or identifying when it hired the agency, and never identifying or describing the

investigative software that the agency used. And the district court noted that it was the

sheriff’s office that arrested Bruce, without any apparent contribution or assistance from

Midwest. The district court determined that this factor “weighs heavily against

reinstatement.”

Midwest contends the district court abused its discretion by weighing this factor

against reinstatement. Midwest first argues that the district court improperly mentioned its

prehearing efforts, saying that it is not required to make any such efforts. We disagree with

Midwest’s characterization of the district court’s order. The district court’s brief discussion

of these efforts merely recounted information that Midwest chose to provide and was

consistent with Midwest’s responsibility as surety to “ensure the accused’s presence.” See

Storkamp, 656 N.W.2d at 541. Regarding Midwest’s efforts to locate Bruce after his

nonappearance, Midwest seeks to minimize the duration of Bruce’s absence. But the

record confirms that the district court sent Midwest notice of Bruce’s absence the day after

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the missed hearing, and Bruce was not returned to custody until more than three months

later, and only then through the efforts of the sheriff’s office. Midwest also acknowledges

the lack of “specifics” in its affidavit but contends this “does not overcome [its] good faith

efforts.” We disagree. It is Midwest’s burden to show that it made good-faith efforts. Id.

at 542. In light of Midwest’s vague, generic descriptions of its recovery efforts, we discern

no abuse of discretion in the district court’s determination that Midwest failed to satisfy

that burden and, consequently, that this factor weighs heavily against reinstatement.

Prejudice to the State

The district court noted that the state did not respond to Midwest’s petition. It added

that Bruce’s failure to appear delayed the administration of justice and closure for the

victims of his ten alleged offenses. The district court determined that this factor “does not

weigh strongly in favor of or against reinstatement.”

Midwest emphasizes that the state did not argue that it was prejudiced and contends

the district court’s statements about delaying the administration of justice and closure for

victims are unsupported by the record, particularly because the matters resolved relatively

quickly after Bruce was apprehended. It argues that the prejudice factor should weigh in

favor of reinstatement. We are not persuaded. While this factor weighs against

reinstatement if the state demonstrates prejudice, Askland, 784 N.W.2d at 63, Midwest

identifies no authority for the proposition that the factor affirmatively favors reinstatement

if the state does not claim prejudice. Even if the district court’s findings regarding

prejudice are improper, any error is harmless because the district court treated this factor

as neutral. And because the district court affirmatively considered the circumstances of

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this case and exercised its discretion to return half of the posted bond to Midwest, any error

in its evaluation of this factor does not appear to have influenced the district court’s

ultimate decision regarding reinstatement. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 61 (directing courts to

“disregard any error” that does not affect a party’s substantial rights); Palladium Holdings,

LLC v. Zuni Mortg. Loan Tr. 2006-OA1, 775 N.W.2d 168, 178 (Minn. App. 2009) (“An

appealing party bears the burden of demonstrating both error and prejudice.”), rev. denied

(Minn. Jan. 27, 2010).

In sum, because the record supports the district court’s determination that three

Shetsky factors weigh against reinstatement—one “heavily” so—and the fourth is neutral,

we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by reinstating half of the

bond amount.

Affirmed.

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