Cited by

Opinions in Minnesota that cite Ranum v. Swenson, 19 N.W.2d 327.

105 citing documents.

  • Brager v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Fargo 375 N.W.2d 884 Minn. Ct. App. 1985
  • Brager v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Fargo 375 N.W.2d 884 Minn. Ct. App. 1985
    Ranum v. Swenson, 220 Minn. 170, 173-74
  • Rome v. Rome 239 N.W.2d 232 Minn. 1976
  • Rome v. Rome 239 N.W.2d 232 Minn. 1976
    1 Boraas v. Carlson, 267 Minn. 478, 482 , Ranum v. Swenson, 220 Minn. 170, 174 , Annotation, 47 A. L. R. 2d 6, 16.
  • Schoepke v. Alexander Smith & Sons Carpet Co. 187 N.W.2d 133 Minn. 1971
  • Schoepke v. Alexander Smith & Sons Carpet Co. 187 N.W.2d 133 Minn. 1971
    Knox v. Knox, 222 Minn. 477 , 25 N. W. (2d) 225 ; Kaehler v. Kaehler, 219 Minn. 536 , 18 N. W. (2d) 312 ; Ranum v. Swenson, 220 Minn. 170 , 19 N. W. (2d) 327 .
  • Wallace v. Nelson 178 N.W.2d 698 Minn. 1970
  • Wallace v. Nelson 178 N.W.2d 698 Minn. 1970
    We pointed out that, although earlier cases had strictly applied this rule (Hermanson v. Switzer, 188 Minn. 455 , ; Chandler v. Buchanan, supra), later cases (Abraham v. Byman, 214 Minn. 355 , 8 N. W. [2d] 231; Ranum v. Swenson, 220 Minn. 170 , 19 N. W. [2d] 327; Wagenhals v. Flint, 262 Minn. 326 , 114 N. W. [2d] 641) held that the issue presents a question of fact for the jury “except where it is clearly apparent to all reasonable minds there were no circumstances on which to justify a failure
  • Fisher v. Edberg 176 N.W.2d 897 Minn. 1970
  • Fisher v. Edberg 176 N.W.2d 897 Minn. 1970
    See, also, Ranum v. Swenson, 220 Minn. 170 , 19 N. W. (2d) 327 ; Kolatz v. Kelly, 244 Minn. 163 , 69 N. W. (2d) 649 .
  • Lapides v. Wagenhals 173 N.W.2d 334 Minn. 1969
  • Lapides v. Wagenhals 173 N.W.2d 334 Minn. 1969
    See, Abraham v. Byman, 214 Minn. 355 , 8 N. W. (2d) 231 ; Ranum v. Swenson, 220 Minn. 170 , 19 N. W. (2d) 327 ; Wagenhals v. Flint, 262 Minn. 326 , 114 N. W. (2d) 641 .
  • Roberts v. Kettner 161 N.W.2d 302 Minn. 1968
  • Roberts v. Kettner 161 N.W.2d 302 Minn. 1968
    *207 In Ranum v. Swenson, 220 Minn. 170 , 19 N. W. (2d) 327 , this court rejected the automatic “look-and-not-see” rule — that failure to see that which is in plain sight necessarily constitutes negligence as a matter of law.
  • Sandvik v. Jammes 160 N.W.2d 700 Minn. 1968
  • Sandvik v. Jammes 160 N.W.2d 700 Minn. 1968
    Goldfine v. Johnson, 208 Minn. 449 , ; Ranum v. Swenson, 220 Minn. 170 , 19 N. W. (2d) 327 .” *91 It has often been stated by this court that where there is no reasonable chance for deriving different conclusions from the facts the question of negligence is for the court.
  • Coenen v. Buckman Building Corporation 153 N.W.2d 329 Minn. 1967
  • Coenen v. Buckman Building Corporation 153 N.W.2d 329 Minn. 1967
    * * * * * * * * “The arbitrary principle that failure to see that which is in plain sight necessarily constitutes contributory negligence as a matter of law without regard to surrounding circumstances, has now been rejected.” See, Ranum v. Swanson, 220 Minn. 170 , 19 N. W. (2d) 327 ; Abraham v. Byman, 214 Minn. 355 , 8 N. W. (2d) 231 , and other cases cited in 13B Dunnell, Dig.
  • Kantar v. West End Air Conditioning Co. 144 N.W.2d 592 Minn. 1966
  • Kantar v. West End Air Conditioning Co. 144 N.W.2d 592 Minn. 1966
    In Ranum v. Swenson, 220 Minn. 170 , 19 N. W. (2d) 327 , this court overruled the Hermanson case to the extent that the mere failure on the part of one who looks and does not see that which is in plain sight and which he might have seen does not in itself make him guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law.
  • Boraas v. Carlson 127 N.W.2d 439 Minn. 1964
  • Boraas v. Carlson 127 N.W.2d 439 Minn. 1964
    Ranum v. Swenson, 220 Minn. 170 , 19 N. W. (2d) 327 ; Merritt v. Stuve, 215 Minn. 44 , 9 N. W. (2d) 329 ; Abraham v. Byman, 214 Minn. 355 , 8 N. W. (2d) 231 ; Olson v. Byam, 176 Minn. 619 , .
  • Knutson v. Nielsen 99 N.W.2d 215 Minn. 1959
  • Knutson v. Nielsen 99 N.W.2d 215 Minn. 1959
    Ranum v. Swenson, 220 Minn. 170 , 19 N. W. (2d) 327 .
  • Burdick v. Bongard 96 N.W.2d 868 Minn. 1959
  • Burdick v. Bongard 96 N.W.2d 868 Minn. 1959
    3 Jeske v. George R. Wolff Holding Co. 250 Minn. 16 , 83 N. W. (2d) 729 ; Ranum v. Swenson, 220 Minn. 170 , 19 N. W. (2d) 327 .
  • Coble v. Lacey 90 N.W.2d 314 Minn. 1958
  • Coble v. Lacey 90 N.W.2d 314 Minn. 1958
    1 See, Ranum v. Swenson, 220 Minn. 170 , 19 N. W. (2d) 327 ; Schweikert v. Peters Sausage Co. 206 Minn. 596 , ; Kulla v. E. B. Crabtree Co. 203 Minn. 105 , ; Turnmire v. Jefferson Transp.
  • Dahling v. Dammann 87 N.W.2d 25 Minn. 1957
  • Dahling v. Dammann 87 N.W.2d 25 Minn. 1957
    In Ranum v. Swenson, 220 Minn. 170 , 19 N. W. (2d) 327 , involving a different fact situation, we rejected the policy of applying arbitrary standards of behavior amounting in effect to rules of law to all cases without regard to surrounding circumstances.
  • Jeske v. George R. Wolff Holding Co. 83 N.W.2d 729 Minn. 1957
  • Jeske v. George R. Wolff Holding Co. 83 N.W.2d 729 Minn. 1957
    Kolatz *21 v. Kelly, 244 Minn. 163 , 69 N. W. (2d) 649 ; Ranum v. Swenson, 220 Minn. 170 , 19 N. W. (2d) 327 .
  • Ballweber v. Kleist 78 N.W.2d 671 Minn. 1956
  • Ballweber v. Kleist 78 N.W.2d 671 Minn. 1956
    The court made it clear in the Kujath case that the right-of-way rule when applicable to an intersection must be applied in the light of all existing circumstances in each and every case where it is in effect, and this court in the Kujath case also quoted with approval from Ranum v. Swenson, 220 Minn. 170, 174 , 19 N. W. (2d) 327, 330 , the following: “* * * We expressly reject the policy of applying arbitrary standards of behavior amounting in effect to rules of law to all cases without regard
  • Faust Ex Rel. Faust v. Przybilla 77 N.W.2d 737 Minn. 1956
  • Faust Ex Rel. Faust v. Przybilla 77 N.W.2d 737 Minn. 1956
    4 Ranum v. Swenson, 220 Minn. 170 , 19 N. W. (2d) 327 ; Schubitzke v. Minneapolis, St.
  • Mortenson Ex Rel. Mortenson v. Hindahl 77 N.W.2d 185 Minn. 1956
  • Shastid v. Shue 77 N.W.2d 273 Minn. 1956
  • Shastid v. Shue 77 N.W.2d 273 Minn. 1956
    Carpenter v. Birkholm, 242 Minn. 379 , 65 N. W. (2d) 250 ; Johnson v. Mancilman, 241 Minn. 461 , 63 N. W. (2d) 569 ; Ryan v. Griffin, 241 Minn. 91 , 62 N. W. (2d) 504 ; Schleuder v. Soltow, 239 Minn. 453 , 59 N. W. (2d) 320 ; Ranum v. Swenson, 220 Minn. 170 , 19 N. W. (2d) 327 .
  • Mortenson Ex Rel. Mortenson v. Hindahl 77 N.W.2d 185 Minn. 1956
    Schleuder v. Soltow, 239 Minn. 453 , 59 N. W. (2d) 320 ; Ranum v. Swenson, 220 Minn. 170 , 19 N. W. (2d) 327 .
  • Jablinske v. Eckstrom 76 N.W.2d 654 Minn. 1956
  • Jablinske v. Eckstrom 76 N.W.2d 654 Minn. 1956
    Moreover, this court has “expressly reject [ed] the policy of applying arbitrary standards of behavior amounting in effect to rules of law *145 to all cases -without regard to surrounding circumstances.” Ranum v. Swenson, 220 Minn. 170, 174 , 19 N. W. (2d) 327, 330 .
  • Skinner v. Neubauer 74 N.W.2d 656 Minn. 1956
  • Skinner v. Neubauer 74 N.W.2d 656 Minn. 1956
    Co. 218 Minn. 532 , 16 N. W. (2d) 758 ; Ranum v. Swenson, 220 Minn. 170 , 19 N. W. (2d) 327 .
  • Kolatz v. Kelly 69 N.W.2d 649 Minn. 1955
  • Kolatz v. Kelly 69 N.W.2d 649 Minn. 1955
    In Ranum v. Swenson, 220 Minn. 170, 174 , 19 N. W. (2d) 327, 330 , this court said, in discussing the plain-sight rule established in the aforesaid cases, that: “* * * We expressly reject the policy of applying arbitrary standards of behavior amounting in effect to rules of law to all cases without regard to surrounding circumstances.” and further that
  • Schubitzke v. Minneapolis, St. Paul & Sault Ste. Marie Railroad 69 N.W.2d 104 Minn. 1955
  • Schubitzke v. Minneapolis, St. Paul & Sault Ste. Marie Railroad 69 N.W.2d 104 Minn. 1955
    9 Ranum v. Swenson, 220 Minn. 170 , 19 N. W. (2d) 327 .
  • Simeon v. Anderson 66 N.W.2d 553 Minn. 1954
  • Simeon v. Anderson 66 N.W.2d 553 Minn. 1954
    The statement of this court in Ranum v. Swenson, 220 Minn. 170, 176 , 19 N. W. (2d) 327, 331 , is equally applicable to the situation presented here: “* * * There was but a fleeting moment left for plaintiff, as an ordinarily prudent person, to determine the wisest course to follow.