Cited by

had been falsified and his comment regarding the failure of appellant to explain his absence were absolutely inappropriate and impermissible,” and concluding that “it is questionable whether, under the circumstances of this case, the [district] court’s cautionary instructions could have prevented the jury from reaching conclusions that were unduly prejudicial to appellant”); (explaining that, “[w]here .

- 95 (Minn. 1955) (holding a curative instruction may not always assuage prejudice that improper remarks may cause).

Additionally, Cermak cites State v. Reardon for the proposition that there is a “naïve assumption that prejudicial effects can be overcome by instructions to the jury, [which] all practicing lawyers know to be unmitigated fiction.” 245 Minn. 509, 513, (quoting Krulewitch v. United States , 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949) ).

See State v. Reardon, 245 Minn. 509, 513, -95 (1955) (stating a curative instruction may not always assuage prejudice that improper remarks may cause).

In the seminal case of State v. Caldwell, Supreme Court Justice Douglas Amdahl, discussing the argument that cautionary instructions could help overcome evidence that was improperly admitted stated, [w]e noted in State v. Reardon, 245 Minn. 509, [,] that where ‘the impact of the prejudicial remark may be such as to impart to the minds of the jury substantial prejudicial evidence not properly a part of the case, it is taking too much for granted to say its effect can be moved by an

State v. Reardon, 245 Minn. 509, 513, (stating that where “the impact of the prejudicial remark may be such as to impart to the minds of the jury substantial prejudicial evidence not properly a part of the case, it is taking too much for granted to say its effect can be removed by an instruction from the court”).

We have granted a defendant a new trial when “the impact of [a] prejudicial remark [is] such as to impart to the minds of the jury substantial prejudicial evidence.” State v. Reardon, 245 Minn. 509, 513

See State v. Reardon, 245 Minn. 509, 513-14

See State v. Reardon, 245 Minn. 509, 513 , -95 (1955).

See State v. Rear-don, 245 Minn. 509 , (ordering new trial after prosecutor told jury that defendant had previously pleaded guilty to offense); see also State v. Sha, 292 Minn. 182 , (ordering new trial when prosecutor elicited testimony that defendant said he wanted to plead guilty).

However, when “the impact of the prejudicial remark may be such as to impart to the minds of the jury substantial prejudicial evidence not properly a part of the case, it is taking too much for granted to say its effect can be removed by an instruction from the court.” State v. Huffstutler, 269 Minn. 153, 156 , (quoting State v. Reardon, 245 Minn. 509, 513 , ).

But where a fair trial has been denied “to allow factually strong cases to erode such a basic right is to deny the existence of the right.” State v. Reardon, 245 Minn. 509, 514

See State v. Reardon, 245 Minn. 509, 513-14 , (due process, as guaranteed by the Minnesota and Federal Constitutions, includes the right of a person to be tried according to the law and evidence in the case).

State v. Reardon, 245 Minn. 509, 513-14

State v. Reardon, 245 Minn. 509, 513-514

926, 927 (1928), we said, “We are unable to separate the statement made by the defendant to the presiding judge from the rest of the vacated judicial 'proceeding.” See also State v. Reardon, 245 Minn. 509 , State v. Sha, 292 Minn. 182

We noted in State v. Reardon, 245 Minn. 509 , that where “the impact of the prejudicial remark may be such as to impart to the minds of the jury substantial prejudicial evidence not.properly a part of the case, it *591 is taking too much for granted to say its effect can be removed by an instruction from the court.

In *397 State v. Reardon, 245 Minn. 509, 513 , we said: “* * * Where * * * the impact of the prejudicial remark may be such as to impart to the minds of the jury substantial prejudicial evidence not properly a part of the case, it is taking too much for granted to say its effect can be removed by an instruction from the court.”

In this state, our decision in State v. Reardon, 245 Minn. 509 , controls.

State v. Anderson, 173 Minn. 293 , ; State v. Hook, 174 Minn. 590 , ; State v. Cater, 190 Minn. 485 , ; State v. McGunn, 208 Minn. 349 , ; State v. Reardon, 245 Minn. 509 , 73 N. W. (2d) 192 .

In State v. Reardon, 245 Minn. 509, 513 , 73 N. W. (2d) 192, 194 , we said: “It is well recognized that mistakes occur in most trials and, where they do not substantially affect the rights of the parties, it may be expected that the trial court by proper instruction can rely upon the intelligence and restraint of a jury to disregard them.

4 See, State v. Reardon, 245 Minn. 509 , 73 N. W. (2d) 192 .

In other situations where the evidence convicting defendant was more conclusive than here, this court has refused to act as “a super-jury.” State v. Flowers, 262 Minn. 164 , 114 N. W. (2d) 78 ; 3 State v. Reardon, 245 Minn. 509 , 73 N. W. (2d) 192 .

State v. Reardon, 245 Minn. 509 , 73 N. W. (2d) 192 .

*169 More recently this court reaffirmed its position and reversed an order denying a new trial, because of misconduct on the part of the prosecutor in State v. Reardon, 245 Minn. 509, 513 , 73 N. W. (2d) 192, 195 , stating: “The state contends that whether or not there was prejudice requiring a new trial is determined by whether or not the error affected the result.

In that connection it must be remembered that the defendant is here on this charge of assault in the second degree, and any reference to this complicity in some other offense is in no sense evidence of guilt in this particular case.” We considered the same argument in State v. Reardon, 245 Minn. 509, 513 , 73 N. W. (2d) 192, 195 , where we observed that it is well recognized that mistakes occur in most trials and, where they do not substantially affect the rights of the parties, it may be expect