Cited by

In reviewing a termination -of-parental-rights order based on palpable unfitness, the “case relies not primarily on past history, but ‘to a great extent upon the projected permanency of the parent’s inability to care for his or her child.’” d 364, 368 (Minn. 1980) ().

(observing need for connection between parent’s mental illness and parenting conduct to support termination).

A diagnosis of mental illness alone does not “permit termination of parental rights.”

health of all individuals involved”); (affirming termination of parental rights where mother’s conduct stemming from mental illness was likely to be detrimental to physical and mental health of child); –74 (Minn. App. 1988) (affirming custody determination predicated in part on mother’s mental hea

In a termination case, the district court “relies not primarily on past history, but ‘to a great extent upon the projected permanency of the parent’s inability to care for his or her child.’” ( (emphasis added)).

We have held that mental illness, in and of itself, does not “permit termination of parental rights.”

This amendment makes it inappropriate to employ the language of the supreme court in (putting conduct in front of condition), which was developed under a definition of palpable unfitness that said termination could be based on a finding “[t]hat the parents are unfit by reason of debauchery, intoxication or habitual use of narcotic drugs, or repeated lewd and lascivious behavior, or ot

Hennepin County cites wherein this court upheld the district court’s conclusion that 17 years’ mental illness without remission rendered the further provision of services futile.

(chronic mental illness resulting in conduct detrimental to child deemed proper basis for termination).

For this reason, we exercise “great caution in [parental] termination proceedings, finding such action proper only when the evidence clearly mandates such a result in accordance with the statutory grounds.”

While some deference is accorded the trial court’s findings, appellate courts “closely inquire into the sufficiency of the evidence to determine whether the evidence is clear and convincing.” ().

See also In re Welfare of Barron, 268 Minn. 48, 53

e applicable standard of review, we stated: Although “some deference” is given to the trial court’s findings, the appellate courts “ ‘exercise great caution in termination proceedings,’ ” and will closely inquire into the sufficiency of the evidence to determine whether the evidence is clear and convincing.” ().

Although “some deference” is given to the trial court’s findings, appellate courts “ ‘exercise great caution in termination proceedings,’ ” and “will closely inquire into the sufficiency of the evidence to determine whether the evidence is clear and convincing.” ().

While “some deference” is given to the trial court’s findings, the appellate courts “ ‘exercise great caution in termination proceedings,’ ” and “will closely inquire into the sufficiency of the evidence to determine whether the evidence is clear and convincing.” Clausen, d at 156 ().

The standard of appellate review is something of a hybrid as on the one hand the findings should be respected unless clearly erroneous, but on the other hand the court will “exercise great caution in termination proceedings, finding such action proper only when the evidence clearly mandates such a result in accordance with statutory grounds.”