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Appellant next argues that the district court abused its discretion by admitting Exhibit 4 as impeachment evidence on the ground that it violated the Dexter rule, which prevents evidence that is not substantively admissible from being presented to the jury “in the guise of impeachment.” -22 (Minn. 1978).

King argues that the admission of Baker’s 3 In support of his argument, King asserts that the State knew Baker intended to recant the statements he made during his plea hearing and that it called Baker as a trial witness solely for impeachment purposes, thereby creating a risk that the trier of fact would use the evidence for an improper purp

(noting risk that jury will misuse, as substantive evidence, otherwise inadmissible prior inconsistent statement introduced to impeach witness who signified intent to testify in favor of defendant).

of calling [the officer] is clear; it is to introduce otherwise inadmissible hearsay through his testimony, therefore the statements under 613(b) are inadmissible for impeachment purposes.” The district court’s reasoning is consistent with State v. Dexter, in which the supreme court held that a party may not seek to introduce otherwise inadmissible evidence “in the guise of impeachment.”

As a result of A.R.’s recantation, Coleman moved, 1 to prohibit the state from calling A.R.

To support this argument, appellant relies on State v. Ortlepp

S Y L L A B U S A which prevents the misuse of impeachment evidence, does not occur unless the party who called the witness was aware that the witness would recant before the witness took the stand.

because they were offered as substantive evidence and were admissible under the residual-hearsay exception.

In State v. Dexter , the Minnesota Supreme Court construed rule 607, holding that the prosecutor’s attempt to impeach its witness with a prior inconsistent statement was an impermissible pursuit “to present, in the guise of impeachment, evidence which [was] not otherwise admissible.” (Mi nn.

(observing that the state was “seeking .

Appellant also argues that the district court abused its discretion in admitting A.P.’s precludes the state from calling a witness to testify only to impe ach the witness with a prior inconsistent statement.

But the state “may not misuse Rule 3 607 to expose the jury to hearsay under the guise of impeachment when the sole purpose in calling the witness is to introduce the witness’ prior statement.” Thames, d at 125

In State v. Dexter, we affirmed a district court’s ruling “barring the prosecution from impeaching one of its own witnesses with extrinsic evidence of prior inconsistent statement[s]” because the State sought “to present, in the guise of *757 impeachment, evidence which is not otherwise admissible.”

Bobo argues that the failure of his counsel to object to the State calling Sam James to the stand three times was unreasonable error and that the State’s

(stating that Minn.- R. Evid.

wherein the court held evidence of a prior inconsistent statement inadmissible because the prosecution merely sought to present, in the guise of impeachment, evidence which was otherwise not admissible.

We have sometimes called this problem “the Dexter problem,” where we discussed the problem in detail.

we first addressed the problem created by a party’s impeachment of its own witness with a prior inconsistent statement and the interplay between Minn. R.Evid.

Defendant’s contention relating to the admission of extrajudicial statements of a where we held that a prosecutor may not misuse Minn.R.Evid.