Cited by

See, e.g., Kaiser, d at 387 (vacating judgment and remanding for new trial when “the defense was [arguably] not prejudiced” but the prosecuting attorney actively prevented disclosure); (“[B]earing in mind the lack of justification for the prosecutor’s failure to disclose, we reverse and remand for a new trial.”).

able probability that the outcome at trial would have been different) ; -45 (Minn. 1982) (granting a new trial in the “interests of justice and to [ensure] that the reciprocal discovery rules” are observed by both the prosecution and defense where state failed to notify the defense of a statement that discredited the defendant’s alibi); d 552, 553-54 (Minn. 1981) (granting new trial because the state, without justification, failed to disclose exculpatory, impor tant evidence to the defense); d 6

See, (granting a new trial for the state’s failure to notify the defense of evidence that bore on his decision to waive marital privilege); (granting a new trial in the interests of justice for the state’s failure to disclose information concerning culpability of a third party, which might have led the defense to other useful information); -87 (Minn. 1992) (granting a new

-15 (Minn.1982) (granting new trial “in the interests of justice” despite the strength of the State’s evidence because the State failed to notify the de *480 fendant of a statement that “discredited defendant’s alibi” that the prosecutor received after defense counsel examined the State’s file); (granting new trial because the State, without any “justification,” failed to disclose exculpatory, “important” evidence to the defense).

(new trial necessary, where defendant convicted of third-degree murder for setting fire to house and killing two children, where prosecutor failed to disclose information obtained from children’s grandmother regarding possible culpability and involvement of mother in children’s deaths).

("Our cases require much more of the prosecution than the federal cases require and do not always insist on a traditional showing of prejudice in order to justify a new trial.”); State v, Schwantes

8; (denying motion for mistrial); (reversing for failure to disclose).

See (reversing a conviction based on the prosecutor’s failure to disclose information concerning the culpability of a person closely connected to the case).

*340 we granted the defendant a new trial because the prosecutor improperly failed to disclose to defendant’s trial counsel certain information that the prosecutor had obtained from the children’s grandmother concerning the possible culpability of the mother in the children’s death.

rejudicial violation of the disclosure rules); (delay in disclosing evidence held nonprejudicial); (failure to comply with disclosure rules held to require new trial); (prosecutor’s failure to comply with disclosure rules held to require new trial); (failure to disclose exculpatory information to defendant before trial held *639 to require new trial).

this court reversed based on the prosecution’s failure to disclose prior to trial certain information concerning the culpability of a person closely connected to the case.

was no prejudicial error, we hasten to add that, “[W]e will not tolerate intentional abuses of the discovery process by the prosecutor and * * * we will not hesitate to reverse on this ground if the facts warrant it.”

“We emphasize, however, that we will not tolerate intentional abuses of the discovery process by the prosecutor and that we will not hesitate to reverse on this ground if the facts warrant it.”

which granted defendants new trials because of failure by the state to comply with the discovery rules.