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As to the permissive length of a departure, the supreme court has stated that when a departure is justified, “the extent of the departure should be limited to that justified by the reason for departure.”

She requests that this court “reduce the excessive sentence to a term that is commensurate to [her] level of culpability.” In general, “the extent of [an upward sentencing] departure should be limited to that justified by the reason for departure .” State v. Schantzen

for the proposition that the sentence in this case was disproportionate to the severity of the offense.

He cites cases providing that an appellate court may modify a sentence in the interests of uniformity and fairness, or on “a strong feeling” that the sentence is not proportional to the severity of the crime and the defendant’s criminal history

Generally, we “will not interfere with [the district court’s] discretion unless [we have] a ‘strong feeling’ that the sentence is disproportionate to the offense.” ().

Similarly, we have concluded that a district court abused its discretion by departing from the Sentencing Guidelines when the departure resulted in a sentence that was “disproportional to the severity of the offense of conviction and the extent of the offender’s criminal history as aggravated by the circumstances of the offense.” accord Spain, d at 89-90 .

999) (stating that an appellate court’s decision whether to modify a sentence is based on its “collective collegial experience in reviewing a large number of criminal appeals from all the judicial districts”) (quotation omitted); (modifying a sentence that unfairly exaggerated the criminality of the defendant’s conduct); (stating that an appellate court may modify a departure if it has a strong feeling that the sentence imposed is disproportional to the severity of the offense and the extent of

-87 (Minn.1981), we explained that the fact that the defendant sprayed the handcuffed victims with chemicals supported the district court’s stated reason (particular cruelty) for imposing a sentence outside the range on the grid.

We have consistently held that an upward sentencing departure is appropriate if the trial court's reason for departure was based on the factors specified in the sentencing guidelines and if the extent of the departure was "limited to that justified by the reason for departure.”

The reasons for departure from the guidelines “are intended to describe specific situations involving only a small number of cases.”

see, (holding that offender acts with particular cruelty when he threatens to break every bone in victim’s body if -victim reports sexual abuse); (affirming upward dura-tional departure in sentence

Gratuitous infliction of pain will qualify as “particular cruelty.”

(stating an appellate court “will overturn the decision of the trial court upon reaching a ‘collegial conclusion’ that a sanction is disproportional to the severity of the crime” ()), review denied (Minn. Mar.

We “will not interfere with a trial court’s discretion in sentencing unless the sentence is disproportionate to the offense.” ().

This court has held that “[gratuitous infliction of pain * * * qualifies as ‘particular cruelty’ within II.D.2.b(2) of the Guidelines.” (holding that gratuitously spraying handcuffed robbery victims with mace constituted particular cruelty); (holding that defendant’s threat to 12-year-old sexual assault victim that he would break every bone in the boy’s body if he revealed the

Gratuitous infliction of pain will qualify as “particular cruelty.”

(threats “to break every bone” in victim’s body constitute particularly cruel conduct); (gratuitous infliction of pain qualifies as particular cruelty); -73 (Minn.App.1984) (upward departure proper where threats made to robbery victim were purely gratuitous and psychologically brutal).