Cited by

(2) to facilitate commission of any felony or flight thereafter.” “The confinement or removal must be criminally significant in the sense of being more than merely incidental to the underlying crime.” d 711, 722 (Minn. 2005) (quotation omitted).

d 711, 724 (Minn. 2005) (“[J]ury verdicts on [vacated] counts remain in force.”).

-24 (Minn. 2005) (recognizing that a finding of guilt remains even when a conviction is vacated by operation of section 609.04).

To constitute a kidnapping, the confinement or removal must be “more than merely incidental to the underlying crime.” (quotation omitted).

“The c onfinement or removal must be criminally significant in the sense of being more than merely incidental to the underlying crime, in order to justify a separate criminal sentence.” (quotation omitted).

2 (2012), but permit the finding of guilt to remain, -24 (Minn. 2005) (recognizing a finding of guilt remains even when convictions are vacated by operation of Minn. Stat. § 609.04).

We review the district court’s findings of fact regarding the circumstances surrounding a suspect’s statement for clear error, but make “an independent subjective 7 determination as to whether the waiver was voluntary.” State v. Earl

In order for confinement to be criminally significant, it must be “more than merely incidental to the underlying crime .” State v. Earl , (quotation omitted).

See State v. Earl , , 724 (Minn. 2005) ("[J]ury verdicts on [vacated] counts remain in force.").

“F ailure to object to jury instructions generally results in a waiver of the issue on appeal.” d 711, 720 (Minn. 2005).

Although this behavior facilitated Jar os’s sexual assault, it is not merely incidental to the sexua l assault and constitutes “purpos eful behavior in its own right.” See State v. Earl , (holding that the “confinement or removal” of burglary victims by awakening them and moving them to another room, “although [it] may have been necessary to commit the burglary, it was not merely incidental,” but “purposeful behavior in its own right”).

See State v. Earl , , 723-24 (Minn. 2005) (holding that underlying guilty verdict on lesser-included offense remained intact after adjudicated conviction was vacated and that the district court could later convict and sentence on that crime if primary conviction was vacated).

-24 (Minn. 2005) (vacating multiple first-degree-murder convictions that were based on the same conduct against the same victim, but leaving the guilty verdicts intact).

“[C]onfinement or removal must be criminally significant in the sense of being more than merely incidental to the underlying crime, in order to justify a separate criminal sentence.” (quotation omitted).

Kelley, d at 273 ; (“Failure to object to jury instructions generally results in a waiver of the issue on appeal.”).

though “removal was committed at approximately the same time as [defendant]’s criminal sexual conduct and was intended to facilitate that conduct,” since defendant “moved [victim] away from a safe location—in which she was out in the open and close to her friends—and transported her to a place that was confined and isolated, and where she would be more vulnerable to him”), 722–23 (Minn. 2005) (concluding that removing victims from their living room and bedrooms and confining them in their kitche

The state agrees that those convictions should be vacated, but notes that “the underlying jury verdicts of guilty [on the unsentenced convictions] must remain intact.” (“The State does not object to vacating the [unsentenced] convictions, but asks us to note that the underlying guilty verdicts remain in force.”); -24 (Minn. 2005) (“[T]he state agrees [with the defendant that seven of his ten convictions based on the same conduct against the same victim must be vacated] but points out that the un

-23 (Minn.2005) (rejecting defendant’s argument that no eriminally-significant kidnapping occurred “because his victims were confined merely to keep them out of the way while he committed burglary,” and noting that “[although the confinement or removal in this case may have been necessary to commit the burglary, i

Our inquiry focuses on “the perceptions of the suspect rather than on the intent of the police, and must consider the totality of the circumstances surrounding the suspect’s custody.” (citing Innis, 446 U.S. at 301 , 100 S.Ct.

Specifically, Larson argues that the district court erred by using the above version of the jury instruction that uses the phrase “reasonably foreseeable,” rather than the phrase “reasonably foreseeable to the person,”

we “suggest[ed]” that future jury instructions regarding aiding and abetting under Minn.Stat.

It is sufficient to vacate the unsentenced convictions and recognize, as we did in State v. Earl, that “the jury verdicts on [the vacated] counts remain in force.”

See, -23 (Minn.2006); -21 (Minn.2004); -33 (2003).