Cited by

Opinions in Minnesota that cite Opsahl v. State, 710 N.W.2d 776.

49 citing documents.

State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2024
Because the district court “is in a unique position to assess witness credibility” in postconviction proceedings, we must accord the district court “considerable deference in this regard.”
Lance Arnold Kingbird, petitioner, Appellant, Minn. Ct. App. 2023
Thomas Robert Tichich, petitioner, Appellant, Minn. Ct. App. 2023
George Cornelius Watkins, petitioner, Appellant, Minn. Ct. App. 2022
( concluding that “a simple statement contradicting earlier testimony is not sufficient” to satisfy the first prong of the Larrison test).
Larry Jonnell Gilbert, petitioner, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2022
(holding that the postconviction court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that it was not well satisfied that any witness gave false testimony at trial).
Jetaun Helen Wheeler, petitioner, Appellant, Minn. Ct. App. 2020
(“[O]ur standard of review reminds us that the postconviction court is in a unique position to assess witness credibility, and we must therefore give the postconviction court considerable deference in this regard.”).
State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2020
But “our standard of review reminds us that the postconviction court is in a unique position to assess witness credibility, and we must therefore give the postconviction court considerable deference in this regard.”
State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2019
A18-2039 Minn. Ct. App. 2019
State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2018
First, under the first Larrison prong, the “court must be reasonably certain that the alleged recantation is genuine.” d 776, 782 (Minn. 2006) (quotation omitted) (Opsahl II).
Brown v. State 895 N.W.2d 612 Minn. 2017
Brown v. State 895 N.W.2d 612 Minn. 2017
Thus, because the State’s conduct in addressing D.M.’s alleged recantation did not constitute improper intimidation, the postconviction court did not abuse its discretion by denying Brown’s claim.
A16-0648 Minn. 2017
Thus, because the State’s conduct in addressing D.M.’s alleged recantation did not constitute improper intimidation , the postconviction court did not abuse its discretion by denying Brown’s claim.
Seth Clayton Francis Crawford v. State of Minnesota Minn. Ct. App. 2017
Seth Clayton Francis Crawford v. State of Minnesota Minn. Ct. App. 2017
Because “the postconviction court is in a unique position to assess witness credibility,” we “give the postconviction court considerable deference.”
Rene Julian McKenzie v. State of Minnesota 872 N.W.2d 865 Minn. 2015
Rene Julian McKenzie v. State of Minnesota 872 N.W.2d 865 Minn. 2015
LaMonte Rydell Martin v. State of Minnesota 865 N.W.2d 282 Minn. 2015
LaMonte Rydell Martin v. State of Minnesota 865 N.W.2d 282 Minn. 2015
State of Minnesota v. Tony Don Minn. Ct. App. 2015
State of Minnesota v. Tony Don Minn. Ct. App. 2015
State of Minnesota v. Thomas Joseph McManus Minn. Ct. App. 2014
State of Minnesota v. Thomas Joseph McManus Minn. Ct. App. 2014
State of Minnesota v. Juan Jasso, Jr. Minn. Ct. App. 2014
State of Minnesota v. Juan Jasso, Jr. Minn. Ct. App. 2014
Lincoln Lamar Caldwell v. State of Minnesota 853 N.W.2d 766 Minn. 2014
Lincoln Lamar Caldwell v. State of Minnesota 853 N.W.2d 766 Minn. 2014
Cf. Opsahl v. State (Opsahl II), (holding that relief was unavailable in part because some recanting witnesses “reversed any recantation they may have made” and others “claim[ed] merely that they did not give a full explanation of their testimony at trial”).
Hooper v. State 838 N.W.2d 775 Minn. 2013
Hooper v. State 838 N.W.2d 775 Minn. 2013
We have consistently emphasized that “the postconviction court is in a unique position to assess witness credibility.”
McDonough v. State 827 N.W.2d 423 Minn. 2013
McDonough v. State 827 N.W.2d 423 Minn. 2013
Based on the court’s findings and the “considerable deference” we give to a postconviction court’s credibility determinations, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion when it denied McDonough’s claim of newly discovered evidence.
Martin v. State 825 N.W.2d 734 Minn. 2013
Martin v. State 825 N.W.2d 734 Minn. 2013
Opsahl v. State (Opsahl II)
Evans v. State 788 N.W.2d 38 Minn. 2010
Evans v. State 788 N.W.2d 38 Minn. 2010
-83 (Minn.2006) (explaining that it was unnecessary to consider the second and third prongs of Larrison where the petitioner failed to satisfy the first prong).
Doppler v. State 771 N.W.2d 867 Minn. 2009
Doppler v. State 771 N.W.2d 867 Minn. 2009
Vance v. State 752 N.W.2d 509 Minn. 2008
Vance v. State 752 N.W.2d 509 Minn. 2008
Opsahl v. State (Opsahl II), ().
State v. Caine 746 N.W.2d 339 Minn. 2008
State v. Caine 746 N.W.2d 339 Minn. 2008
Pippitt v. State 737 N.W.2d 221 Minn. 2007
Pippitt v. State 737 N.W.2d 221 Minn. 2007
Thus, the first prong of the Larrison test is not met by “a simple statement contradicting earlier testimony.” Opsahl v. State (Opsahl II)
Fields v. State 733 N.W.2d 465 Minn. 2007
Fields v. State 733 N.W.2d 465 Minn. 2007
State v. Turnage 729 N.W.2d 593 Minn. 2007
State v. Turnage 729 N.W.2d 593 Minn. 2007
Opsahl v. State (Opsahl III)
Wilson v. State 726 N.W.2d 103 Minn. 2007
Wilson v. State 726 N.W.2d 103 Minn. 2007
Opsahl v. State (Opsahl III)