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“[T]he state has an obligation to caution its witnesses against making prejudicial testimony.”

While references to a defendant’s prior incarceration “can be unfairly prejudicial,” there is no “general rule that it is prejudicial for the jury to learn that a defendant is in jail for the crime for which he or she is on trial.”

(concluding that unobjected-to statements were not “clearly or obviously inadmissible hearsay” when “the state was not given the opportunity to establish that some or all of the statements were admissible under one of the numerous exceptions to the hearsay rule”).

Minnesota courts have noted the importance of objecting to potential hearsay evidence at trial due to the “complexity and subtlety of the operation of the hearsay rule and its exceptions,” so that a “full discussion of admissibility [can] be conducted at trial.”

A. Error Generally, “references to prior incarceration of a defendant can be unfairly prejudicial.”

Moreover, appellant made no further record concerning the hearsay objection.2 Officer Dunaski testified that he spent “the last nine years doing high risk warrants,” and Officer Bilek affirmatively responded to the prosecutor’s question, “Is it your job to enforce warrants?” 2 During discussion after the state rested, outside the presence of the jury, the district court asked if there

Minnesota courts have noted the importance of objecting to potential hearsay evidence at trial due to the “complexity and subtlety of the operation of the hearsay rule and its exceptions,” so that a “full discussion of admissibility [can] be conducted at trial.”

It is well-settled that “references to prior incarceration of a defendant can be unfairly prejudicial.” (emphasis omitted); -28 (Minn. 1979).

and so prejudicial to the defendant’s right to a fair trial, that the defendant’s failure to object—and thereby present the trial court with an opportunity to avoid prejudice—should not forfeit his right to a remedy.” (quotation omitted).

(noting plain-error standard for district court’s failure to act sua sponte to limit effect of inadmissible testimony by giving a curative instruction or granting a mistrial).

Additionally, “[t]he number and variety of exceptions to the hearsay exclusion make objections to such testimony particularly important to the creation of a record of the trial court’s decision-making process in either admitting or excluding a given statement.”

We note the importance of objecting to potential hearsay evidence at trial due to the “complexity and subtlety of the operation of the hearsay rule and its exceptions,” so a “full discussion of admissibility can be conducted at trial.”

Tscheu, d at 863 (involving a case in which the law had not changed during the pendency of the appeal); (same); (same); (same); (same); (same).

the other references in this trial that were proper” and the fact that the court gave a cautionary instruction, “I don’t think [H.T.’s additional testimony] prejudiced him any further.” “[A] mistrial should not be granted unless there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would be different if the event that prompted the motion had not occurred.” (alteration in original) (quotation omitted).

The Minnesota Supreme Court has recognized that “[t]he number and variety of exceptions to the hearsay exclusion make objections to such testimony particularly important to the creation of a record of the [district] court’s decision-making process in either admitting or excluding a given statement.”