Cited by

“The trial judge is in the best position to determine whether an outburst creates sufficient prejudice to deny the defendant a fair trial such that a mistrial should be granted.”

“A mistrial should not be granted unless there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would be different if the event that prompted the motion had not occurred.” State v. Manthey , (quotation omitted ).

See State v. Manthey , (declining to find plain error where defendant did not object to hearsay, because statemen ts arguably c ould have come in u nder one of the many 1 The full context of the prosecutor’s statement was: You [are] going to hear family drama; you may h

(noting that unobjected-to hearsay is pa rticularly difficult to deem inadmissible on plain-error review due to the many hearsay exceptions and the absence of a clear ruling on the issue at trial); see also Minn. R. Evid.

Moreover, even if trial cou nsel was deficient by not objecting to and actually referencing Banks’s arrest, as the postconviction court noted, the Minnesota Supreme Court has stated that there is not a general rule requiring a finding of prejudice when the jury “learn[s] that a defendant is in jail for the crime for which he or she is on trial.”

Under the plain-error standard, the defendant must show “(1) error (2) that was plain and (3) that affected the defendant’s substantial rights.”

The Minnesota Supreme Court has stated that it is “particularly important” for counsel to object to hearsay evidence with specificity because of the “complexity and subtlety of the opera tion of the hearsay rule and its exceptions.”

See, (disagreeing with the proposition that the district court must or should interfere with 13 potential trial strategies by acting sua sponte because it would risk highlighting or enforcing rights the defendant chose to waive); (noting that courts are not advised to make such affirmative intrusions into proceedings and concluding that plain error did not occur).

“The rules bar the admission of hearsay unless it fits under one of a number of exceptions, which generally reflect the recognized reliability of statements made in certain situations.”

An error affects the defendant’s substantial rights if the prejudice “forms the basis for a reasonable likelihood the error substantially affected the verdict.”

12 We have previously held that “references to prior incarceration of a defendant can be unfairly prejudicial.” (-28 (Minn. 1979)).

“[A] mistrial should not be granted unless there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would be different if the event that prompted the motion had not occurred.” (quotation omitted).

An error affects the defendant’s substantial rights if the prejudice “forms the basis for a reasonable likelihood the error substantially affected the verdict.”

“[T]he state has an obligation to cauti on its witnesses against making prejudicial testimony.”

and so prejudicial to the defendant’s right to a fair trial, that the defendant’s failure to object—and thereby present the trial court with an opportunity to avoid prejudice—should not forfeit his right to a remedy.” d 498, 504 (Minn. 2006).

10 The Minnesota Supreme Court has noted that it is “particularly important” for counsel to object to potential hearsay evidence because of the “complexity and subtlety of the operation of the hearsay rule and its exceptions” so “that a full discussion of admissibility can be conducted at trial.”

“[T]he district court is in the best position to evaluate the prejudicial impact, if any, of an event occurring during the trial.” ().

1989 (noting “the existing practice of requiring not only a timely objection, but a specific objection unless the context of the question makes the grounds for objection obvious”); (noting because of the “complexity and subtlety of the operation of the hearsay rule and its exceptions,” objections are particularly critical to give a party an “opportunity to establish that some or all of the statements were admissible under one of the numerous exceptions to the hearsay rule”).

“[A] mistrial should not be granted unless there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would be different.” (quoting Spann, d at 53).

3 DECISION I. Mistrial “[T]he state has an obligation to caution its witnesses against making prejudicial testimony.”