Cited by

(“[T]he words of a court rule, like those of a statute, must be taken and construed in the sense in which they were understood and intended at the time the rule was promulgated.” (quotation omitted)).

for an abuse of discretion.” (-24 (Minn. 2006), review denied (Minn. Jan.

Consequently, the scope of review on appeal is “to determine whether the evidence sustains the findings of fact and whether such findings sustain th e conclusions of law and the judgment.”

2 And, as previously stated, we “consider only those issues that the record shows were presented and considered by the trial court in deciding the matter before it.” See Thiele, 425 N.W .2d at 582; (declining to address “due process claim” because appellant “did not raise [it] in the district court”).

Rubey v. Vannett , , 422-24 (Minn. 2006).

Rubey v. Vannett , , 421 (Minn. 2006).

At oral argument, the County argued that our decisions in Madson v. Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co. , and Rubey v. Vannett , compelled the conclusion that the time limitation for a hearing was a procedural, rather than a jurisdictional issue.

4(a) is not jurisdictional); In re Civil Commitment of Giem , –28 (Minn. 2007) (discussing cases and concluding that not all time limits are jurisdictional); Ruby v. Vannett , –22 (Minn. 2006) (holding that deadlines for filing and hearing motion for a new trial or for amended findings under Minn. R. Civ.

(reasoning that “there is a fundamental difference between finding that a deadline is mandatory and concluding that it operates to take away the district court’s authority to act”); (holding that “60-day time limit for hearing new trial [or] amended findings motions is a procedural tool and does not divest the district court of jurisdiction”); (holding that district court’s failure to hold hearing within statutory' timé

403, 405 , 163 L.Ed.2d 14 (2005) (discussing distinction between jurisdictional rules and "claim-processing rules”); (noting same distinction as Eberhart).

Unlike the requirement that notice of a motion for JMOL or a new trial be filed within 30 days, the 60-day time limit for hearing such motions “is a procedural tool and does not divest the district court of jurisdiction.”

(“[S]ubject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived.”).

11 as “not operating to limit the subject-matter jurisdiction of the district court”) (citing Eberhart, 546 U.S. at 16, 126 S. Ct at 403); (concluding that the 60-day time limit for hearing new-trial and amended-findings motions “is a procedural tool and does not divest the district court of jurisdiction” (citing Eberhart, 546 U.S. at 15, 126 S. Ct at 405).

at 869; see also Farmers Co-op Ass’n of Bertha, Minn. v. Kotz, 222 Minn. 153, 158, (“When a corporation is insolvent, its directors cannot, by taking advantage of their fiduciary relation, secure to themselves a preference over other creditors.”)

403, 407 , 163 L.Ed.2d 14 (2005) (holding that time limit for new-trial motion is claims-processing rule); -22 (Minn.2006) (holding that time limit for post-trial motions is non-jurisdictional procedural rule); -30 (Minn.2007) (holding that failure to meet statutory deadlines in commitment proceeding did not divest district court of jurisdiction).

(“A reviewing court must generally consider only those issues that the record shows were presented and considered by the trial court in deciding the matter before it.” (quotation omitted)); (declining to address “due process claim” because “Rubey did not raise [it] in the district court”); Greuling v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc., (“We decline to address Greuling’s theory of equitable estoppel raised for the first time on appeal”).