Cited by

(noting that the party challenging the constitutionality of a search bears the burden of proving a “subjective expectation of privacy”).

Thus, “[p]robable cause not only requires that the evidence sought likely exists, but also that there is a fair probability that the evidence will be found at the specific site to be searched.” Yarbrough, d at 622 ( 11 (Minn. 2006)).

this court upheld the same Hennepin County selection process.”); -62 (Minn. 2006) (rejecting a challenge to a Hennepin County jury venire because, although “only one person self -identified as African-American on the 50- person venire,” the defendant “provided no evidence to satisfy the Williams standard,” and even if the court assumed underrepresentation, the court previous

Under the Katz approach, a defendant must show that he had an “actual subjective expectation of privacy” in the object searched and that his “expectation [was] reasonable.” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

This expectation of privacy must also be maintained subjectively, Westrom does not argue that we should interpret our state constitution more broadly than the federal consti

Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983); 10 II.

In State v. Gail, the supreme court again rejected a challenge to a Hennepin County jury venire while observing that “only one person self-identified as African-American on the 50-person venire.”

ct on corroboration of accomplice testimony constitutes reversible error, including whether the accomplice testified in exchange for leni ency, whether the accomplice’s testimony was emphasized in the prosecution’s closing argument, and whether the accomplice’s 12 testimony was corroborated by significant evidence.” ().

Courts interpret applications for search warrants “in a common -sense and realistic manner” when determining whether they “contain information which would warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that the articles sought are located at the place to be searched.” (quotation omitted).

The probable -cause standard is satisfied if “there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” State v. Gail , , 858 (Minn. 2006) (quotation omitted).

But Thompson argues that the “evidence is not substantial enough under the totality of the circumstances to constitu te a substantial connection bet ween [Thompson] and the home.” To support his argument, Thompson draws this court’s

( vouching occurs when state refers to facts outside record when arguing for witness credibility).

State v. Gail , , 863 n.9 (Minn. 2006).

State v. Gail , , 859-60 (Minn. 2006) (rejecting the defendant's claim that cell phone records should have been suppressed because he did "not me[e]t his burden of showing he had a subjective expectation of privacy in the cell phone records").

Courts interpret search-warrant applications “in a common-sense and realistic manner” when determining whether they “contain information which would warrant a pe rson of reasonable cau tion to believe that the articles sought are located at the place to be searched.” (quotation omitted).

See State v. Gail , n.9 (Minn. 2006) (“Generally, this court reviews the failure to provide a sua sponte jury instruction under a plain error standard of review.”).

The facts underlying Gail’s crjme are set forth in detail in State v. Gail (Gail I)

d 851, 860 (Minn. 2006).

(stating that vouching occurs if the state implies a guarantee of a witness’s truthfulness or expresses a personal opinion regarding a witness’s credibility).

“[T]he resolution of doubtful or marginal cases should be largely determined by the preference to be accorded to warrants.” (quotations omitted); see also Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727, 734, 104 S. Ct. 2085, 2089 (1984) (stating that “[a]lthough in a particular case it may not be easy to 3 determine when an affidavit demonstrates the existence of probable cause, the

The search-warrant application must be “interpreted in a common-sense and realistic manner.” (quotation omitted).

See, (calling a witness “a believable person” and “frank and sincere” was not improper vouching); (holding that prosecutor’s comments that a witness was “very sincere” and “very frank in his testimony” were not improper vouching because the stateme

Probable cause for a search warrant exists when the application for the warrant “contain[s] information which would warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that the articles sought are located at the place to be searched.”

Griffin was not the subscriber and therefore a stranger to Sprint/Nextel, the holder of the records.