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Reasonable suspicion requires “something more than an unarticulated hunch”; “the officer must be able to point to something that objectively supports the suspicion at issue.” (quotation omitted); see also Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22, 88 S. Ct. at 1880.

Two years later, the supreme court applied Carter to a dog sniff outside the door of an apartment in a common hallway of a multi-unit apartment building.

The reasonable- suspicion standard is not high, but the suspicion must be “something more than an unarticulated hunch,” (quotation omitted), and more than an “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion,” (quotation omitted).

Whether a reasonable, articulable suspicion exists is assessed in light 2 of the totality of the circumstances, and “seemingly innocent factors may weigh into the analysis.”

-83 (Minn. 2007); State v. Lindquist, 295 Minn. 398, 400, (“One who voluntarily comes forward and identifies [himself] is more likely to be telling the truth because [he] presumably knows that the police could arrest [him] for making a false report.”).

The reasonable- articulable-suspicion standard is not high, but the suspicion must be “something more than an unarticulated hunch,” (quotation omitted), and more than an “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion,” Timberlake, d at 393 (quotation omitted).

Reasonable suspicion requires “something more than an unarticulated hunch”; “the officer must be able to point to something that objectively supports the suspicion at issue.” d 173, 182 (Minn. 2007) (quotation omitted); see also Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22, 88 S. Ct. at 1880.

The Terry standard requires “‘specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the intrusion.’” (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S. Ct. at 1880).

Whether a reasonable, articulable suspicion exists is assessed in light of the totality of the circumstances, and “seemingly innocent factors may weigh into the analysis.”

The reasonable-suspicion standard is 8 not high, but the suspicion must be “something more than an unarticulated hunch,” (quotation omitted), and more than an “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion,” (quotation omitted).

d 173, 182 (Minn. 2007).

But “‘[w]e presume that tips from private citizen informants are reliable,’” especially “‘when informants give information about their identity so that the police can locate them if necessary.’” Timberlake, d at 394 (-83 (Minn. 2007)).

Contrary to Rurup’s assertion that the state has the burden of proof, the “proponent of a motion to suppress has the burden of establishing that his own Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the challenged search or seizure.” Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 130, 99 S. Ct. 421, 424 n.1 (1978); d 173, 178 (Minn. 2007) (explaining that the defendant had the burden of showing that a dog sniff occurring in a common hallway violated his Fourth Amendment rights); (explaining that a defendant must f

The reasonable-suspicion standard is not high, but the suspicion must be “something more than an unarticulated hunch,” (quotation omitted), and more than an “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion,” Timberlake, d at 393 (quotation omitted).

See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 130, 99 S. Ct. 421, 424 n.1 (1978) (“The proponent of a motion to suppress has the burden of establishing that his own Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the challenged search or seizure.”); (explaining that the defendant had the burden of showing that a dog sniff which occurred 4 in a common hallway violated his Fourth Amendment rights); (explaining that a defendant must first establish

The reasonable-suspicion standard is not high, but the suspicion must be “something more than an unarticulated hunch.” (quotation omitted).

The reasonable-suspicion standard is not high, but the suspicion must be “something more than an unarticulated hunch,” (quotation omitted), and more than an “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion,” Timberlake, d at 393 (quotation omitted).

(concluding that an officer must have reasonable articulable suspicion that a suspect is engaged in illegal activity to justify a warrantless dog sniff in a common hallway).

The reasonable-suspicion standard is not high, but the suspicion must be “something more than an unarticulated hunch,” (quotation omitted), and more than an “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion,” Timberlake, d at 393 (quotation omitted).

“Reasonable suspicion must be based on specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.” (quotation omitted).

“The Minnesota Constitution protects citizens against unreasonable government intrusions upon areas where there is a legitimate expectation of privacy.”