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Reasonable suspicion requires “something more than an unarticulated hunch,” and an officer must be able to “point to something that objectively supports the suspicion at issue.”

The district court stated that State v. Davis , 3 controlled the matter.

“[R]easonable suspicion requires something more than an unarticulated hunch.” State v. Davis , (quotation omitted).

First, “[w]e presume that tips from private citizen informants are reliable.”

For example, in State v. Davis, the Minnesota Supreme Court stated, “Based on the balance between the minimal intrusion on appellant’s privacy interest and the government’s interest in effective law enforcement, the 9 police needed reasonable, articulable suspicion to use [a] narcotics-detection dog in the common hallway outside appellant’s apartment .”

In assessing reasonable suspicion , we consider the totality of the circumstances known to the officer at the time of the seizure, State v. Smith , 51-52 (Minn. 2012), including “s eemingly innocent factors ,” State v. Davis

While not a high threshold, “reasonable suspicion requires something more than an unarticulated hunch,” and requires that “the officer must be able to point to something that objectively supports the suspicion at issue.” (quotation omitted).

erson.’”) (quoting United States v. Cortez , 449 U.S. 411, 418, 101 S. Ct. 690, 695 (1981)); State v. Diede , (noting that the court is to determine reasonable, articulable suspicion based on the totality of the circumstances at the time of the seizure, the rational inferences from those facts, from the perspective of a reasonable police office) ; State v. Davis , (noting that the reasonable suspicion standard is not high) (quotation omitted) .

was reliable, other than her identificatio n.” But we “presume that tips from private citizen informants are reliable.”

Reasonable suspicion requires “something more than an unarticulated hunch, [and] that the officer must be able to point to something that objectively supports the suspicion at issue.” -83 (Minn. 2007).

Reasonable suspicion requires “something more than an unarticulated hunch”; “the officer must be able to point to something that objectively supports the suspicion at issue.” (quotation omitted); see also Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22, 88 S. Ct. at 1880.

that a dog sniff at an apartment door is a search under article 1, section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution, and that the sniff is constitutional only if it is supported by reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.

” State 5 v. Davis, (quotation omitted); see also Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22, 88 S. Ct. at 1880.

(quoting State v. Davis , , 175 (Minn. 2007) ).

82-83 (Minn. 2007); McGrath, d at 540.

Reasonable suspicion requires “something more than an unarticulated hunch”; “the officer must be able to point to something that objectively supports the suspicion at issue.” (quotation omitted); see also Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22, 88 S. Ct. at 1880.

(quotation omitted); (requiring investigatory stop to be based on more than “mere whim, caprice, or idle curiosity” (quotation omitted)).

State v. Miller , review denied (Minn. July 15, 2003), and a cl ear-error standard to a district court’s factual findings, considering the “tota lity of the circumstances pertaining to the issue, including possible inno cent explanations for the a lleged suspicious activity,” (d 173, 182 (Minn. 2007)).

(citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1880 (1968)).

The reasonable - suspicion standard is not high, but the suspicion must be “something more than an unarticulated hunch,” State v. Davis , (quotation omitted), and more than an “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion,”

Id.; (“[R]easonable suspicion requires something more than an unarticulated hunch[; an] officer must be able to point to something that obj ectively supports the suspicion at issue.” (quotatio n omitted)).

The suspicion must be based on “ ‘specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.’” State v. Davis , (quoting Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1880 (1968)).

211-12 (applying reasonable suspicion instead of full probable cause to “balance[ ] a person’s expectation of privacy against the government’s interest” in detecting drugs); Larsen, d at 150 (acknowledging that a departure from individualized suspicion may be warranted if the need “outweighed the interests of ordinary citizens”); Ascher, d at 186 (same); (“The Minnesota Constitution protects citizens against unreasonable government intrusions upon areas where there is a legitimate expectation of

Although tips from private citizens are presumed reliable, 82 (Minn. 2007), King understates the quality of the call by referring to the information provided as a mere anonymous tip.

(citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1880 7 (1968)).

Tips from private citizens are presumed reliable and these tips are particularly reliabl e “when informants give information about their identity so that the police can locate them if necessary.” d 173, 178, 183 (Minn. 2007) ( 890 (Minn. 1988)).

See, -82 (Minn. 2007) (holding, in the absence of Supreme Court precedent, that a dog sniff in a hallway outside an apartment constitutes a search requiring a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity); (holding that a dog sniff of an area outside a storage

(concluding that shared stairway of duplex was common area and not curtilage); (concluding that defendant did not have an expectation of privacy in the common hallway of apartment building); -38 (Minn. 1987) (concluding that defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in backyard of duplex).

(“[Reasonable suspicion requires’ something more than an unarticulated hunch, [and] that the officer must be able to point to something that objectively supports the suspicion at issue.’” ()).

4 Reasonable suspicion requires “something more than an unarticulated hunch”; “the officer must be able to point to something that objectively supports the suspicion at issue.” (quotation omitted); see also Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22, 88 S. Ct. at 1880.