Cited by

Opinions in Minnesota that cite State v. Davis, 732 N.W.2d 173.

185 citing documents.

  • Stanley Paul Wenell-Jack, petitioner, Appellant, Minn. Ct. App. 2019
  • State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2019
  • State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2019
    The district court stated that State v. Davis , 3 controlled the matter.
  • State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2019
  • State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2019
    “[R]easonable suspicion requires something more than an unarticulated hunch.” State v. Davis , (quotation omitted).
  • State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2019
    First, “[w]e presume that tips from private citizen informants are reliable.”
  • State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2019
    For example, in State v. Davis, the Minnesota Supreme Court stated, “Based on the balance between the minimal intrusion on appellant’s privacy interest and the government’s interest in effective law enforcement, the 9 police needed reasonable, articulable suspicion to use [a] narcotics-detection dog in the common hallway outside appellant’s apartment .”
  • State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2018
    In assessing reasonable suspicion , we consider the totality of the circumstances known to the officer at the time of the seizure, State v. Smith , 51-52 (Minn. 2012), including “s eemingly innocent factors ,” State v. Davis
  • State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2018
    While not a high threshold, “reasonable suspicion requires something more than an unarticulated hunch,” and requires that “the officer must be able to point to something that objectively supports the suspicion at issue.” (quotation omitted).
  • State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2018
    erson.’”) (quoting United States v. Cortez , 449 U.S. 411, 418, 101 S. Ct. 690, 695 (1981)); State v. Diede , (noting that the court is to determine reasonable, articulable suspicion based on the totality of the circumstances at the time of the seizure, the rational inferences from those facts, from the perspective of a reasonable police office) ; State v. Davis , (noting that the reasonable suspicion standard is not high) (quotation omitted) .
  • State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2018
    was reliable, other than her identificatio n.” But we “presume that tips from private citizen informants are reliable.”
  • State of Minnesota, Appellant, Minn. Ct. App. 2018
  • , A18-0348 Minn. Ct. App. 2018
    Reasonable suspicion requires “something more than an unarticulated hunch, [and] that the officer must be able to point to something that objectively supports the suspicion at issue.” -83 (Minn. 2007).
  • State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2018
    Reasonable suspicion requires “something more than an unarticulated hunch”; “the officer must be able to point to something that objectively supports the suspicion at issue.” (quotation omitted); see also Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22, 88 S. Ct. at 1880.
  • State of Minnesota, Appellant, Minn. Ct. App. 2018
    that a dog sniff at an apartment door is a search under article 1, section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution, and that the sniff is constitutional only if it is supported by reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.
  • State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2018
    ” State 5 v. Davis, (quotation omitted); see also Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22, 88 S. Ct. at 1880.
  • State v. Edstrom 916 N.W.2d 512 Minn. 2018
  • State v. Edstrom 916 N.W.2d 512 Minn. 2018
    (quoting State v. Davis , , 175 (Minn. 2007) ).
  • State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2018
  • State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2018
  • State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2018
    82-83 (Minn. 2007); McGrath, d at 540.
  • State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2018
    Reasonable suspicion requires “something more than an unarticulated hunch”; “the officer must be able to point to something that objectively supports the suspicion at issue.” (quotation omitted); see also Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22, 88 S. Ct. at 1880.
  • State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2018
    (quotation omitted); (requiring investigatory stop to be based on more than “mere whim, caprice, or idle curiosity” (quotation omitted)).
  • Michael Scott Torfin, petitioner, Appellant, Minn. Ct. App. 2017
    State v. Miller , review denied (Minn. July 15, 2003), and a cl ear-error standard to a district court’s factual findings, considering the “tota lity of the circumstances pertaining to the issue, including possible inno cent explanations for the a lleged suspicious activity,” (d 173, 182 (Minn. 2007)).
  • State v. Edstrom 901 N.W.2d 455 Minn. Ct. App. 2017
  • State v. Edstrom 901 N.W.2d 455 Minn. Ct. App. 2017
  • Laurie Ann McIntyre, petitioner, Appellant, Minn. Ct. App. 2017
    (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1880 (1968)).
  • State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2017
    The reasonable - suspicion standard is not high, but the suspicion must be “something more than an unarticulated hunch,” State v. Davis , (quotation omitted), and more than an “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion,”
  • State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2017
    Id.; (“[R]easonable suspicion requires something more than an unarticulated hunch[; an] officer must be able to point to something that obj ectively supports the suspicion at issue.” (quotatio n omitted)).
  • State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2017
    The suspicion must be based on “ ‘specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.’” State v. Davis , (quoting Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1880 (1968)).
  • City of Golden Valley v. Wiebesick 899 N.W.2d 152 Minn. 2017
  • City of Golden Valley v. Wiebesick 899 N.W.2d 152 Minn. 2017
    211-12 (applying reasonable suspicion instead of full probable cause to “balance[ ] a person’s expectation of privacy against the government’s interest” in detecting drugs); Larsen, d at 150 (acknowledging that a departure from individualized suspicion may be warranted if the need “outweighed the interests of ordinary citizens”); Ascher, d at 186 (same); (“The Minnesota Constitution protects citizens against unreasonable government intrusions upon areas where there is a legitimate expectation of
  • State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2017
    Although tips from private citizens are presumed reliable, 82 (Minn. 2007), King understates the quality of the call by referring to the information provided as a mere anonymous tip.
  • State of Minnesota, Appellant, Minn. Ct. App. 2017
    (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1880 7 (1968)).
  • State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2017
  • State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2017
    Tips from private citizens are presumed reliable and these tips are particularly reliabl e “when informants give information about their identity so that the police can locate them if necessary.” d 173, 178, 183 (Minn. 2007) ( 890 (Minn. 1988)).
  • State of Minnesota v. Leona Rose deLottinville 890 N.W.2d 116 Minn. 2017
  • State of Minnesota v. Leona Rose deLottinville 890 N.W.2d 116 Minn. 2017
    See, -82 (Minn. 2007) (holding, in the absence of Supreme Court precedent, that a dog sniff in a hallway outside an apartment constitutes a search requiring a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity); (holding that a dog sniff of an area outside a storage
  • State of Minnesota v. Cassandra Lee Lundgren Minn. Ct. App. 2016
  • State of Minnesota v. Cassandra Lee Lundgren Minn. Ct. App. 2016
    (concluding that shared stairway of duplex was common area and not curtilage); (concluding that defendant did not have an expectation of privacy in the common hallway of apartment building); -38 (Minn. 1987) (concluding that defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in backyard of duplex).
  • State of Minnesota v. Jose Martin Lugo, Jr. 887 N.W.2d 476 Minn. 2016
  • State of Minnesota v. Jose Martin Lugo, Jr. 887 N.W.2d 476 Minn. 2016
    (“[Reasonable suspicion requires’ something more than an unarticulated hunch, [and] that the officer must be able to point to something that objectively supports the suspicion at issue.’” ()).
  • State of Minnesota v. Kyle Mark Watson Minn. Ct. App. 2016
  • State of Minnesota v. Kyle Mark Watson Minn. Ct. App. 2016
  • State of Minnesota v. Jimmy Clyde Griffin Minn. Ct. App. 2016
  • State of Minnesota v. Jimmy Clyde Griffin Minn. Ct. App. 2016
  • State of Minnesota v. Henry James Johnson Minn. Ct. App. 2016
  • State of Minnesota v. Henry James Johnson Minn. Ct. App. 2016
    4 Reasonable suspicion requires “something more than an unarticulated hunch”; “the officer must be able to point to something that objectively supports the suspicion at issue.” (quotation omitted); see also Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22, 88 S. Ct. at 1880.
  • Michael John Frank v. Commissioner of Public Safety Minn. Ct. App. 2016
  • Michael John Frank v. Commissioner of Public Safety Minn. Ct. App. 2016
    The reasonable-suspicion standard is not high, but the suspicion must be “something more than an unarticulated hunch,” 5 (quotation omitted), and more than an “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion,” (quotation omitted).