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Although a prosecutor may not express her personal opinion on the credibility of a witness, she may analyze the evidence and argue that “particular witnesses were or were not credible,” –1 9 (Minn. 2006).

d 910, 918 (Minn. 2006) (13 years); (about 16 years).

It is not misconduct, however, “for the state to analyze the evidence and argue that particular witnesses were or were not credible.” -19 (Minn. 2006).

“But it is not misconduct for the state to analyze the evidence and argue that particular witnesses were or were not credible.” -19 (Minn. 2006).

During closing arguments, a prosecuting attorney may “analyze the evidence and argue that particular witnesses were or were not credible.” State v. Wright , -19 (Minn. 2006).

VI; 7 n.1 (Minn. 2006) (“Statements in a complaint are hearsay, implicating confrontation concerns.”); (holding that admitting a prior criminal complaint plainly violates a defendant’s confrontation rights) , review denied (Minn. Mar.

State v. Wright , (citation omitted) .

A. Relevance and Materiality “Spreigl evidence may be relevant and material to show the identity of the perpetrator if identity is at issue and if there is a sufficient time, place, or modus operandi nexus between the charged offense and the Spreigl offense.” d 910, 917 (Minn. 2006) (quotation omitted).

State v. Wright , d 910, 918-19 (Minn. 2006).

It is not improper f or a prosecutor “to analyze the evidence and argue that particular witnesses were or were not credible.” -19 (Minn. 2006).

But it is not improper for a prosecutor “to analyze the evidence and argue that particular 14 witnesses were or were not credible.” State v. Wright , -19 (Minn. 2006).

For example, quoting Ness in State v. Wright, the supreme court concluded that Spreigl evidence is admissible to prove identity only if there is a “repeating or ongoing pattern of very similar conduct.” (holding that the weapon used and injuries inflicted in the previous and charged offenses were “markedly similar”).

But “if the prior crime is simply of the same generic type as the charged offense, it ordinarily should be excluded,” – “Spreigl evidence may be introduced to establish, by showing a common scheme or plan– –that a sexual act occurred.” (citation omitted).

12 “The Sixth Amendment right to counsel is the right to effective assistance of counsel.” State v. Wright

“Spreigl evidence may be relevant and material to show the identity of the perpetrator if identity is at issue and if there is a sufficient time, place, or modus operandi nexus between the charged offense and the Spreigl offense.” (quotation omitted).

“However, if the prior crime is simply of the same generic type as the charged offense, it ordinarily should be excluded.” -18 (Minn. 2006) (quotation omitted).

ause the statements were a “direct endorsement of [A.K.T.’s] credibility.” “The assessment of a witness’s credibility ‘is exclusively the province of the jury,’” (d 584, 589 (Minn. 2007)), and “[i]t is improper for the state to express a personal opinion on [a witness’s] credibility.”

“Spreigl evidence must not be more prejudicial than probative.”

“Spreigl evidence may be relevant and material to show the identity of the perpetrator if identity is at issue and if there is a sufficient ‘time, place, or modus operandi nexus’ between the charged offense and the Spreigl offense.” ().

“[T]he more distant the Spreigl act is in terms of time, the greater the similarities as to place and modus operandi must be to retain relevance.” (quotation omitted).

“Spreigl evidence may be relevant and material to show the identity of the perpetrator if identity is at issue and if there is a sufficient time, place, or modus operandi nexus between the charged offense and the Spreigl offense.” (quotation omitted).

You should believe [A.B.].” “[I]t is not misconduct for the state to analyze the evidence and argue that particular witnesses were or were not credible.” – 19 (Minn. 2006); (holding that a prosecutor’s statements that a particular witness was “very sincere” and “very frank in his testimony” were arguments regarding the witness’s credibility and not improper vouching), review denied (Minn. Mar.

VI; Minn. Const. art. 1, § 6

A prosecutor may not express a personal opinion regarding witness credibility, but it is not improper for a prosecutor “to analyze the evidence and argue that particular witnesses were or were not credible.” -19 (Minn.2006).

(citing McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 , 771 n. 14, 90 S.Ct.

But for purposes of remand, in which the supreme court permitted use of Spriegl evidence “if identity is at issue and if there is a sufficient time, place, or modus oper-andi nexus between the charged offense and the Spriegl offense.” Respecting the requirement of sufficient similarity, the court held that “if the prior crime i

917 n. 1 (Minn.2006) (“Statements in a complaint are hearsay, implicating confrontation concerns.”).