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Evidence of fear should not be admitted “to create an inference that a defendant is a bad person who is likely to commit a violent crime.”

“Due process requires that defendants be afforded meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.”

“Bias, which may be induced by self-interest or by fear of testifying for any reason, is almost always relevant because it is probative of witness credibility.”

Finally, appellant argues that the prosecutor argued facts not in evidence when he stated during closing argument that “the children have told you the defendant threatened them, threatened to kill their mother, threatened to hurt their family.” “[A] prosecutor should not refer to facts not in evidence.”

When the sufficiency of evidence is challenged, we review the evidence “to determine whether, given the *307 facts in the record and the legitimate inferences that can be drawn from those facts, a jury could reasonably conclude that the defendant was guilty of the offense charged.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

passage of time between infliction of wounds, and a defendant’s concern with escape rather than with rendering aid to the victim.”

(noting that “a defendant’s concern with escape rather than with rendering aid to the victim” is relevant to the nature of the killing and is probative of premeditation).

“Evidence of witnesses’ fears of testifying and of purported threats against witnesses both tend to be relevant to general witness credibility or to explain a witness’s reluctance to testify or inconsistencies in a witness’s story.”

We have noted that courts “should be concerned that the evidence of fear is not used to create an inference that a defendant is a bad person who is likely to commit a violent crime.”

applies in the case of Rule 609 impeachment evidence”); (“[0]rdinarily it is not plain error for the trial court to fail to sua sponte give a[] [cautionary] instruction.” (quotation omitted)).

(explaining that evidence of premeditation includes “a defendant’s concern with escape rather than with rendering aid to the victim”); Moua, d at 42 (finding that “[t]he fact that appellant was more concerned with escape than with helping the victim, and that appellant appeared to have a plan

passage of time between infliction of wounds, and a defendant’s concern with escape rather than with rendering aid to the victim.” (citation omitted).

In other words, the evidence “must point unerringly to the accused’s guilt.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

(stating that premeditation may be evidenced by “a defendant’s concern with escape rather than with rendering aid to the victim”).

See, (stating the standard for sufficiency of the evidence challenges to circumstantial evidence eases.)

To prove premeditation, the facts must establish “ ‘that some appreciable period of time passed after the defendant formed the intent to kill, during which the statutorily required consideration, planning, preparation, or determination took place.’ ” ().

“But, when a conviction is based solely on circumstantial evidence, that evidence must be ‘consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and inconsistent with any other rational hypothesis except that of guilt.’ ” ().

See, -52 (Minn.2007) (holding that it is permissible for prosecutors to elicit information about fear or threats in order to explain a witness’s reluctance to testify).

See, -52 (Minn.2007) (holding that it is permissible for prosecutors to elicit information about fear or threats in order to explain a witness’s reluctance to testify).

-50 (Minn.2007); -07 (Minn.2006) (concluding that “the nature of the killing [evidence was] significant” where the defendant (1) fired multiple shots; (2) shot the victim in the head at close range; and (3) fled the scene following the shooting).