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“It is misconduct for a prosecutor to intentionally misstate evidence or to appeal to the passions of the jury.”

We have repeatedly said that to support a conviction, the circumstantial evidence “must point unerringly to the accused’s guilt.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

King asserts that the prosecutor’s 16 argument improperly vouched for the veracity of D.H.’s and K.H.’s testimony by “impliedly guaranteeing” they were truthful, that a prosecutor must not “vouch for the veracity of any particular evidence.” King, d 219, 236 (Minn. 2005), further argues that the prosecutor belittled his chosen defense, deviating from the rule that the prosecutor must not “denigrate a particular type

For example, evidence may be used to challenge witness credibility, 6 or establish a witness’s bias or prejudice, Minn. R. Evid.

Evidence relating to a witness’s bias, “which may be induced by self-interest or by fear of testifying for any reason, is almost always relevant because it is probative of witness credibility.” (emphasis added).

vouch for the veracity of any particular evidence.”

(noting that “a defendant’s concern with escape rather than with rendering aid to the victim” is relevant to analyzing the nature of the killing).

Accordingly, a prosecutor may not “vouch for the veracity of any particular evidence.”

State v. McArthur , ; see also Moore, d at 90 (explaining that the victim was cut in her body’s vital areas, including her neck).

( holding that evidence was sufficient to support first-degree murder conviction even though murder weapon was never recovered); Stein, d at 719 (rejecting similar argument because none of the missing evidence established “a coherent alternative hypothesis” that rebutted the evidence demonstrating guilt); -50 (Minn. 2007) (holding that evidence was sufficient to support first -degree murder conviction even though no evidence of motive 13 was introduced).

See State v. McArthur , , 49 (Minn. 2007) (treating a claim that there was no evidence of motive as a form of a "sufficiency" claim).

State v. McArthur , , 50 (Minn. 2007).

Regarding the nature of the killing, we have looked at "the number of wounds inflicted, infliction of wounds to vital areas, [and] infliction of gunshot wounds from close range," State v. McArthur , , 50 (Minn. 2007), as well as the period of time between the infliction of wounds and firing additional shots after the victim was incapacitated, State v. Buchanan , , 547-48 (Minn. 1988) (shooting a victim once, pausing, walking around the victim, and firing two more shots supported an inference of

“Evidence of witnesses’ fears of testif ying and of purported threats against witnesses both tend to be relevant to genera l witness credibility or to explain a witness’s reluctance to testify or inconsis tencies in a witness’s story.” State v. McArthur

[A] prosecutor should not refer to facts not in evidence.” State v. McArthur

[A] prosecutor should not refer to facts not in evidence or vouch for the veracity of any particular evidence.” (citation omit ted).

When an appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence presented at trial, we review the evidence “to determine whether, given the facts in the record and the legitimate inferences that can be drawn from those facts, a jury could reasonably conclude that the defendant was guilty of the offense charged.” -07 (Minn. 2014) ().

“Relevant evidence is generally admissible.” see also Minn. R. Evid.

Minn. 2010) (), and review the evidence “to determine whether, given the facts in the record and the legitimate inferences that can be drawn from those facts, a [fact-finder] could reasonably conclude that the defendant was guilty of the offense charged.” -07 (Minn. 2014) ().

-52 (Minn. 2007) (discussing probative value of evidence of threats or fears).

(declining to address an issue that requires facts not in the record); (“[A]n ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim should typically be raised by a postconviction petition for relief.”), aff’d sub nom.

(stating that “it would be unreasonable to require the state to ignore the credibility issues on direct examination and then repeatedly rebut attacks on witness credibility during redirect”).

“Evidence of witnesses’ fears of testifying and of purported threats against witnesses both tend to be relevant to general witness credibility or to explain a witness’s reluctance to testify or inconsistencies in a witness’s story.”