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However, a rational hypothesis must “point to evidence in the record that is consistent” with the theory and be supported by more than “mere conjecture.” (quotation omitted).

We must assume that “the jury believed the State’s witnesses and disbelieved the defense witnesses.”

Questions regarding “which witnesses or conflicting evidence to believe are for the jury even in cases built entirely on circumstantial evidence.”

“There may well be testimony on behalf of the defendant as to inconsistent facts and circumstances, not conclusively proved, and 5 which the jury may have a right to and do reject as not proved.” (quotation omitted).

“Failure to object to the admission of evidence generally constitutes waiver of the right to appeal on that basis.”

We must assume that “the jury believed the State’s witnesses and disbelieved the defense witnesses.”

“There may well be testimony on behalf of the defendant as to inconsistent facts and circumstances, not conclusively proved, and which the jury may have a right to and do reject as not proved.” (quotation omitted).

at 337-40 (Meyer, J., concurring); (Meyer, J., concurring).

807 (requiring that out-of-court statements have circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness to be admissible); 1 Taylor does not argue that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

“There may well be testimony on behalf of the defendant as to inconsistent facts and 9 circumstances, not conclusively proved, and which the jury may have a right to and do reject as not proved.” (quotation omitted).

A proffered rational alternative hypothesis must be supported by more than “mere conjecture” and must “point to evidence in the record that is consistent with a rational theory other than guilt.” d 849, 858 (Minn. 2008).

We must assume that “the jury believed the State’s witnesses and disbelieved the defense witnesses.”

(emphasizing that the state’s evidence need not exclude all inferences other than guilt but must exclude all reasonable inferences other than guilt).

While the district court correctly recognized that several Minnesota appellate opinions have commented about the efficacy of incorporating the Al-Naseer and Silvernail analysis into jury instructions, (Meyer, J., concurring and writing for three justices); (Meyer, J. concurring); McCormick, d at 505 n.2, appellant did not argue to the district court, and does not argue on appeal, that the jury instructions were erroneous or insufficient.

Nevertheless, “[appellate courts] may consider an error not objected to at trial if there was (1) error, (2) the error was plain, and (3) the error affected the defendant’s substantial rights.”

“[I]nconsistencies in the state’s case or possibilities of innocence do not require reversal of a jury verdict so long as the evidence taken as a whole makes such theories seem unreasonable.”

2 Plain error exists when: (1) there is an error; (2) the error is plain; and (3) the error affects a party’s substantial rights.

See, (“[F]or plain error to exist, the trial error must have been so clear under applicable law at the time of the conviction....”) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

We must assume that “the [fact-finder] believed the State’s witnesses and disbelieved the defense witnesses.”