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An appellate court “assume[s] that the jury believed the State’s witnesses and disbelieved the defense witnesses,” and will not disturb a guilty verdict if the jury, acting with due regard for the presumption of innocence and the requiremen t of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, could reasonably conclude that the defendant was prove d guilty of the offense charged, -77 (M

And we “assume as we must that the jury believed the State’s witnesses and disbelieved conflicting evidence,” and recognize that “the jury is in the best position to evaluate the evidence.” 861 (Minn. 2008).

“Only a minimal amount of physical pain or injury is necessary in order to satisfy the definition of bodily harm.” State v. Tscheu , (quotation omitted).

The supreme court has stated that plain error affects substantial rights “if [the error] had the effect of depriving the defenda nt of a fair trial.” State v. Tscheu , (quotation omitted).

“[E]ven though verdicts based on circumstantial evidence may warrant stricter scrutiny, [appellate courts] still construe conflicting evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and assume that the jury believed the State ’s witnesses and disbelieved the def ense witnesses.”

State v. Tscheu , , 858 (Minn. 2008).

” n.7 (Minn. 2008) (quotation omitted).

“[W]here a defendant chooses to introduce evidence after his motion for judgment of acquittal has be en denied, we consider the whole record and not just the evidence produced by the State.” State v. Tscheu , n.7 (Minn. 2008) (citations an d quotations omitted).

“[E]ven though verdicts based on circumstantial evidence may warrant stricter scrutiny, [appellate courts] still construe co nflicting evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and assume that the jury believed the State’s witnesses and disbelieved the defense witnesses.”

The Minnesota Supreme Court has stated that the third prong of 15 the plain-error test is satisfied “if [the error] had the effect of depriving the defendant of a fair trial.” (quotation omitted).

However, (plurality opinion)

A defendant “is entitled to have the district court make a determination of the Rule 609(a) issue outside the presence of the jury before the accused decides whether to testify.” (quotation omitted).

(stating that plain- error analysis applies to alleged confrontation error not objected to in district court).

(Matthews II, unrelated to Matthews).

An alternative rational hypothesis must be supported by more than “mere conjecture” and must “point to evidence in the record that is consistent with a rational theory other than guilt.”

“[C]ircumstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction when all the circumstances proved are consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis except that of [the accused’s] guilt.” (quotation omitted).

But “we still construe conflicting evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and assume that the jury believed the State’s witnesses and disbelieved the defense witnesses.”

“[C]ircumstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction when all the circumstances proved are consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis except that of [the 6 accused’s] guilt.” (quotation omitted).

This essentially implicates the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, which “guarantees the accused the right to confront the witnesses against him.”

(quoting Griller, d at 741).

We must assume that “the jury believed the State’s witnesses and disbelieved 4 the defense witnesses.”

We assume that “the jury believed the State’s witnesses and disbelieved the defense witnesses.”

We must assume that “the jury believed the State’s witnesses and disbelieved the defense witnesses.”

(stating that a court reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence assumes that the jury disbelieved the defense witnesses); (stating that “the jury, within their discretion, was entitled to completely discount appellant’s explanation”), review deni

While the law does not prefer direct evidence to circumstantial evidence, see 10 Minnesota Practice, CRIMJIG 3.05 (2006), a conviction based on circumstantial evidence requires that the circumstances proved be consistent with an appellant’s guilt and inconsistent with any other rational or reasonable hypothesis, (emphasizing that the state’s evidence need not exclude all inferences other than guilt but must exclude “all reasonable inferences other than guilt”).