Cited by

(stating that this court will review an unobjected-to error under the “plain error test”); (applying plain-error to review Confrontation Clause issue when the objection at trial was on hearsay grounds and declining to consider the effect of a hearsay objection on the appropriate standard of review); -64 (Minn. 2008) (applying plain-error standard of review to forfeited Confrontation Clause issue).

(d 849, 861 (Minn. 2008)).

We will not reverse a conviction “based on mere conjecture.”

at 484 (d 849, 861 (Minn. 2008)).

See, d 849, 863 (Minn. 2008) (observing that we apply the plain-error analysis to a constitutional challenge or evidentiary question that has been otherwise forfeited by a failure to object).

“The phrase ‘circumstances proved’ does not mean ‘every circumstance as to which there may be some testimony in the case’; rather, it 5 refers only to those ‘circumstances as the jury finds proved by the evidence.’” -58 (Minn. 2008) (quoting State v. Johnson, 217 N.W.

at 785; (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

But we will not reverse a conviction “based on mere conjecture.”

We “construe conflicting evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict.”

We will not reverse a conviction supported by circumstantial evidence based on “mere conjecture”; rather, the appellant must “point to evidence in the record that is consistent with a rational theory other than guilt.”

Put another way, we “construe conflicting evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and assume that the jury believed the State’s witnesses and disbelieved the defense witnesses.”

(quotations omitted); (holding that a reviewing court must “assume that the jury believed the State’s witnesses and disbelieved the defense witnesses”).

(“[W]e will not reverse a conviction, even one grounded only in circumstantial evidence, based on mere conjecture or the possibility of innocence when the evidence shows such possibility is unreasonable.”).

An alternative hypothesis to guilt may not be based on “mere conjecture.”

(stating that the circumstances proved, as a whole, need not exclude all inferences other than guilt because “[t]he State’s obligation is to exclude all reasonable inferences other than guilt”).

In addition, “inconsistencies in the state’s case or possibilities of innocence” do not require reversal of a conviction if the evidence ultimately “makes such theories seem unreasonable.”

When applying the circumstantial-evidence standard of review, “alternative hypotheses to guilt may not be based on ‘mere conjecture.’” ().

“The Sixth Amendment guarantees the accused the right to confront the witnesses against him.”

Appellate courts “construe conflicting evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict.”

We also “construe conflicting evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and assume that the jury believed the State’s witnesses and disbelieved the defense witnesses.”

Appellate courts also “construe conflicting evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict.”

8 861 (Minn. 2008); (noting that “possibilities of innocence do not require reversal of a jury verdict so long as the evidence taken as a whole makes such theories seem unreasonable” (quotation omitted)).

A defendant must “point to evidence in the record that is consistent with a rational theory other than guilt.”

We also “construe conflicting evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict.” State v. Tscheu

See State v. Tscheu , (noting that to successfully challenge a jury’s verdict, an appellant must “point to evidence in the record that is consistent with a rational theory other than guilt”).

d 849, 858 (Minn. 2008) (“[W]e will not overturn a conviction based on circumstantial evidence on the basis of mere conjecture.” (quotations omitted)).