Cited by

To do so, we consider “ ‘whether the testimony of the accomplice was corroborated by significant evidence, whether the accomplice testified in exchange for leniency, whether the prosecution emphasized the accomplice’s testimony in closing argument, and whether the court gave the jury general witness credibility instructions.’” Horst, d at 38 ().

–99 (Minn. 2005) (stating that “mere presence at the scene, inaction, knowledge and passive acquiescence” does not make the witness an accomplice (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

14 2016) (considering “ ‘whether the tes timony of the accomplice was corroborated by significant evidence, whether th e accomplice testified in exch ange for leniency, whether the prosecution emphasized the accomplice’s testimony in closing argument, and whether the court gave the jury general witness credibility instructions’ ” ()).

Smith cites the dissent in State v. Jackson , , 901 (Minn. 2008) (Page, J., dissenting), to support this position, but has no other authority to suggest that a different standard applies when accomplice testimony is offered as part of a plea agreement.

State v. Jackson ( Jackson I ), , 898 (Minn. 2008).

In contrast, the supreme cou rt concluded that two witnesses who were present before, during, and after a shooting were not accomplices because there was no evidence that they planned to shoot the victim or knew that the appellant intended to kill him.

” State v. Horst , (quoting State v. Jackson , d 894, 899 (Minn. 2008) (declining to decide whether w itness was accomplice because failure to give an accomplice-corroboration instruction was harmless)).

This rule recognizes that accomplice testimony is inherently suspect, because an accomplice “may testify against another in the hope of or upon a prom ise of immunity or clemency or to satisfy other self-serving or malicious motives,” State v. Shoop

In imposing accomplice liability, Minnesota law distinguishes “between playing a knowing role in the crime and having [a] mere presence at th e scene, inaction, knowledge and passive acquiescence.” (alteration in original) (quotation omitted).

The statute recognizes that accomplice testimony is inherently suspect, d 894, 898 (Minn. 2008), because of concern that an accomplice will offer self-serving, dishonest testimony

Accomplice testimony is inherently suspect, due to concern that an accomplice will offer self-serving, dishonest testimony

ilure to give an accomplice- corroboration instruction, we have examined “whether the testimony of the accomplice was corroborated by significant evidence, whether the accomplice testified in exchange for leniency, whether the prosecution emphasized the accomplice’s testimony in closing argument, and whether the court gave the jury general witness credibility instructions.” (internal quotation marks omitted).

Accomplice testimony is inherently suspect, because of concern that an accomplice will offer self-serving, dishonest testimony

State v. Reed, 737 1 Although defense counsel appears to concede that Bellanger was present and that White, Jones, and Wind committed the offenses, this does not amount to a concession of guilt because accomplice liability cannot be imposed based on “mere presence.” see also Mahkuk, d at 682 (requiring knowledge of crime and intention to further crime for accomplice liability).

in which we held that two witnesses were not accomplices primarily because there was “no evidence that [the witnesses] knew [that the defendant] intended to kill [the victim].” And to the extent that the question of Hernandez’s accomplice status is close, the district court should have instructed the