Cited by

-66 (Minn. App. 2009) (concluding prosecutor’s comments explaining victim’s age, inexperience, and shame were not an attempt to inflame jury passions, but an explanation of evidence on “why [the victim] did not immediately report the sexual assault”), aff’d, (“Prosecutors are permitted to make reasonable inferences from evidence on the record, to analyze or explain the evidence, and to make legitimate arguments to the jury based on the evidence.”), rev. denied (Minn. Sept.

1(2) (presence); d 243, 247 (Minn. 2010) (presence); Worthy, d at 275 (counsel).

Our harmless-error doctrine reflects the fact that “[m]ost constitutional errors can be harmless.” –60 (Minn. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8 (1999)).

Factual findings are not clearly erroneous “if there is reasonable evidence to support them.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

7 Moore , d at 433-34; aff’d on other grounds, -57 (Minn. 1976) (discussing the critical role of the presumption of innocence and the burden of proof).

Second, we “indulge every reasonable presumption against the loss of constitutional rights.” see also Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) (“It has been pointed out that courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights and that we do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights.” (quotation omitted)).

” Finnegan v. State , d 856, 864 (Minn. App. 2009), aff’d

Our harmless error doctrine reflects the fact that “most constitutional errors can be harmless.” –60 (Minn. 2010) (quoting Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8 (1999)).

at 710; see also State v. Finnegan , -48 (Minn. 2010).

See, e.g., Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 263, 266, 109 S. Ct. 2419, 2421 (1989) (jury instruction containing erroneous conclusive presumption); Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 691, 106 S. Ct. 2142, 2147 (1986) (erroneous exclusion of the defendant’s testimony about the circumstances of his confession); n.6 (Minn. 2010) (continuing the trial in the defendant’s absence).

“It is improper f or a prosecutor to misstate the presumption of innocence in a criminal case.” aff’d on other grounds

art of trial could not be construed as an effective waiver unless there was something specific on the record indicating that he knew the trial could continue if he left ”); (“A voluntary absence a fter clear and unequivocal notice of the commencement of trial is a knowing waiver of constitutional rights.” (quotation omitted) ), aff’d, ; see also Minn. R. Crim.

[B]ecause [o]ur judicial system could not function if defendants were allowed to pick and ch oose when to show up for trial .” State v. Finnegan , d 243, 247 –48 (Minn. 2010) (quot ation omitted ).

Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8 (1999); see, e.g., Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 263, 266 (1989) (per curiam) (jury instruction containing erroneous conclusive presumption); Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 691 (1986) (exclusion of the defendant’s testimony regarding the circumstances of his confession); n.6 (Minn. 2010) (continuing the trial in the defendant’s absence).

n.3 (Minn. 2010) (explaining that failure to raise an issue in the petition for review “waives the issue on appeal”)

1(2); (holding defendant’s waiver of right to be present at trial may be express or implied from conduct).

2142 , 90 L.Ed.2d 636 (1986) (exclusion of the defendant’s testimony regarding the circumstances of his confession); , 251 n. 6 (Minn.2010) (continuing the trial in the defendant’s absence).

See, (holding that defense counsel’s failure to submit written closing argument, as defense counsel and the State had agreed to do, was not structural error); , 251 n. 6 (Minn.2010) (holding that error in continuing trial in the defendant’s absence was not structural error); (holding that correcting jury instructions while the district court was reading the instructions to the jury was not structural error); State v. Dahlin, 75

render immediate reasonable assistance to the injured person.” Although Tucker’s failure to render aid to Garley could constitute an impermissible ground for departure based on an uncharged criminal offense, we need not decide that question because Tucker failed to raise it either before the district court or on appeal, , 248 n. 3 (Minn.2010).

Under this standard of review, factual findings will not be reversed unless they are clearly erroneous, and a matter will not be disturbed “unless the ...