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We therefore treat “[a] brief lapse in judgment or a single, isolated incident of misconduct [as] less serious than multiple instances of misconduct occurring over a substantial period of time.” –41 (Minn. 2010) (explaining that acts of client neglect, incompetent representation, improper advice, and conduct prejudicial to justice, considered alone, may not warrant severe punishment but the cumulative weight of the violations does).

The goal of discipline is “not to punish the attorney, but rather to protect the public, to protect the judicial system, and to deter future misconduct by the disciplined attorney as well as by other attorneys.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

But we have also stated that, where evidence of reputation or “excellent results” comes only from testimony, the “referee is in the best position to assess the relative weight to give to witnesses’ testimony.” n.1 (Minn. 2006).

Ultimately, the goal of discipline is “not to punish the attorney, but rather to protect the public, to protect the judicial system, and to deter future misconduct by the disciplined attorney as well as by other attorneys.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The goal of discipline is “not to punish the attorney, but rather to protect the public, to protect the judicial system, and to deter future misconduct by the disciplined attorney as well as by other attorneys.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

(stating that an attorney’s neglect caused “the needless expenditure of judicial resources and the resources of opposing counsel, which harmed the legal profession”).

The goal of discipline is “not to punish the attorney, but rather to protect the public, to protect the judicial system, and to deter future misconduct by the disciplined attorney as well as by other attorneys.” In re Albrecht , (citation 3 Laver makes one object ion that is unrelated to the referee’s findings and conclusions: that the referee erred in denying several of Laver’s pretrial motions.

We impose discipline “not to punish the attorney, but rather to protect the public, to protect the judicial system, and to deter future misconduct by the disciplined attorney as well as by other attorneys.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

We impose discipline “not to punish the attorney, but rather to protect the public, to protect the judicial system, and to deter future misconduct by the disciplined attorney as well as by other attorneys.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Ultimately, the goal of discipline is “not to punish the attorney, but rather to protect the public, to protect the judicial system, and to deter future misconduct by the disciplined attorney as well as by other attorneys.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Finally, we examine “similar cases to impose consistent discipline.” .

.” 8 they leave us “with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

See In re Albrecht , (noting that a serious conditi on did not qualify as a severe disorder, so was not a mitigating factor).

We also weigh aggravating and mitigating circumstances and examine “similar cases in an effort to impose consistent discipline.”

See In re Albrecht , , 535 (Minn. 2010).

In re Albrecht , , 535 (Minn. 2010) (citation omitted).

In re Albrecht , , 540 (Minn. 2010).

“We consider four factors when determining the appropriate' discipline: 1) the nature of the misconduct, 2) the cumulative weight of the violations of the rules of professional conduct, 3) the harm to the-public, and 4) the harm to the legal profession.” () (internal quotation marks omitted).

We do, however, give “ ‘great deference to a referee’s findings and will not reverse those findings unless they are clearly erroneous.’” ().

“A referee’s findings are clearly erroneous when they leave us ‘with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.’ ” Glasser, d at 646 ().

We give “significant weight” to the referee’s recommendation for discipline, but “we are the ‘sole arbiter of the discipline to be imposed.’ ” ().

-39 (Minn. 2010) (“We have repeatedly stated that mere compliance with the rules of professional misconduct is not a mitigating factor in attorney discipline cases.”).

See Ulanowski, d at 801 (concluding that attorney harmed the legal profession because his frivolous claims cost opposing parties approximately $46,000 in legal fees); (concluding that attorney’s neglect harmed the legal profession by causing needless expenditure of the resources of opposing counsel).