Cited by
Opinions in Minnesota that cite State v. Austin, 788 N.W.2d 788.
- State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2026
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State of Minnesota, Respondent,
Minn. Ct. App. 2026
Although the statute does not define “sexual or aggressive intent” we have stated that sexual intent exists if a person acts “based on sexual desire or in pursuit of sexual gratification.” rev. denied (Minn. Dec.
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State of Minnesota, Respondent,
Minn. Ct. App. 2025
(“In common usage, an act is committed with sexual intent when the actor perceives himself to be acting based on sexual desire or in pursuit of sexual gratification.”).
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State of Minnesota, Respondent,
Minn. Ct. App. 2025
Applying the common and approved usage of the term “sexual intent,” we have determined that “an act is committed with sexual intent when the actor perceives himself to be acting based on sexual desire or in pursuit of sexual gratification.” rev. denied (Minn. Dec.
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State of Minnesota, Respondent,
Minn. Ct. App. 2024
5 The purpose of requiring the state to prove sexual intent is “to avoid criminalizing contact that is accidental or that serves an innocuous, non-sexual purpose.” rev. denied (Minn. Dec.
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State of Minnesota, Respondent,
Minn. Ct. App. 2024
Absent any allegation of aggressive intent, the state must show “sexual intent.” Because “sexual intent” is not defined by statute, we construe it “according to [its] common and approved usage.” , rev. denied (Minn. Dec.
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State of Minnesota, Respondent,
Minn. Ct. App. 2023
“Sexual intent,” as interpreted by caselaw, means that “the actor perceives himself to be acting based on sexual desire or in pursuit of sexual gratification” and “must be established to avoid criminalizing contact that is accidental or that serves an innocuous, non-sexual purpose.” rev. denied (Minn. Dec.
- In the Matter of: Heidi Sue Heller, obo minor children, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2023
- State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2023
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State of Minnesota, Respondent,
Minn. Ct. App. 2023
In this context, “an act is committed with sexual intent when the actor perceives himself to be acting based on sexual desire or in pursuit of sexual gratification.” rev. denied (Minn. Dec.
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State of Minnesota, Respondent,
Minn. Ct. App. 2022
9 (defining “know” as requiring the actor to believe the specified fact exists) (2018); - 93 (Minn. 2010) (interpreting a statute prohibiting nonconsensual “sexual contact” to “define a ‘specific intent’ crime”); (holding that “knowing or having reason to know” in statute demonstrated legislative intent to define fifth-degree criminal sexua
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State of Minnesota, Respondent,
Minn. Ct. App. 2022
-93 (Minn. App. 2010) (stating that second-degree criminal sexual conduct is a specific-intent crime requiring evidence that “the defendant intend the specific result of touching intimate body parts”) , rev. denied (Minn. Dec.
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State of Minnesota, Respondent,
Minn. Ct. App. 2022
An act “is committed with sexual intent when the actor perceives himself to be acting based on sexual desire or in pursuit of sexual gratification.” rev. denied (Minn. Dec.
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In re the Matter of: Kimberly Rose Wangsness and on Behalf of Minor Children, petitioner, Respondent,
Minn. Ct. App. 2022
Third, Penkert argues Minn. Stat. § 609.3451 requires “sexual or aggressive intent” rev. denied (Minn. Dec.
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State of Minnesota, Respondent,
Minn. Ct. App. 2020
(“ [a] subjective sexual intent typically must be inferred from the nature of the conduct itself”), review denied (Minn. Dec.
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State of Minnesota, Respondent,
Minn. Ct. App. 2020
review denied (Minn. Dec.
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State of Minnesota, Respondent,
Minn. Ct. App. 2019
“[A]n act is committed with sexual intent when the actor perceives himself to be acting based on sexual desire or in pursuit of sexual gra tification.” review denied (Minn. Dec.
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State of Minnesota, Respondent,
Minn. Ct. App. 2019
As Beckstrand notes, under Minnesota law , “[s]exual intent must be established to avoid criminalizing contact that is accidental or that serves an innocuous, non-sexual purpose.” review denied (Minn. Dec.
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State of Minnesota, Respondent,
Minn. Ct. App. 2018
This court has construed second-degree criminal sexual conduct to be a “specific- intent crime,” requiring the state to prove the defendant “intend[ed] the specific result of touching intimate body parts”; the statute does not criminalize “merely reckless or negligent” conduct, - 93 (Minn. App. 2010), review denied (Minn. Dec.
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Mackenzie Hanson, petitioner, Respondent,
Minn. Ct. App. 2017
But , in the context of sexual assa ult, “a showing of sexual intent does not require direct evidence of the defendant’s desires or gratification because a subjective sexual intent typically must be inferred from the nature of the conduct itself.” review denied (Minn. Dec.
- State of Minnesota v. Jeremia Joseph Loper Minn. Ct. App. 2016
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Explained
State of Minnesota v. Jeremia Joseph Loper
Minn. Ct. App. 2016
We discussed “sexual intent” review denied (Minn. Dec.
- State of Minnesota v. Wendell Anthony Greene Minn. Ct. App. 2015
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State of Minnesota v. Wendell Anthony Greene
Minn. Ct. App. 2015
review denied (Minn. Dec.
- State of Minnesota v. Timothy Francis Holt Minn. Ct. App. 2015
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State of Minnesota v. Timothy Francis Holt
Minn. Ct. App. 2015
-93 (Minn. App. 2010), review denied (Minn. Dec.
- State of Minnesota v. Charles Kihanya Minn. Ct. App. 2015
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State of Minnesota v. Charles Kihanya
Minn. Ct. App. 2015
We have defined sexual intent as occurring “when the actor perceives himself to be acting based on sexual desire or in pursuit of sexual gratification.” review denied (Minn. Dec.
- John Fasan Atambo, Relator v. Commissioner of Health Minn. Ct. App. 2015
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John Fasan Atambo, Relator v. Commissioner of Health
Minn. Ct. App. 2015
(stating that sexual intent is an act “based on sexual desire or in pursuit of sexual gratification” and “typically must be inferred from the nature of the conduct itself”), review denied (Minn. Dec.
- State of Minnesota v. Jay Dean Uldrych Minn. Ct. App. 2015
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State of Minnesota v. Jay Dean Uldrych
Minn. Ct. App. 2015
“[A]n act is committed with sexual intent when the actor perceives himself to be acting based on sexual desire or in pursuit of sexual gratification.” review denied (Minn. Dec.
- State of Minnesota v. Spidel Wayne Browder Minn. Ct. App. 2015
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State of Minnesota v. Spidel Wayne Browder
Minn. Ct. App. 2015
“When a defendant denies that conduct occurred, the intoxication defense is unavailable because he has not placed intent at issue.” n.5 (Minn. App. 2010), review denied (Minn. Dec.
- Daniel Justin Olson v. State of Minnesota Minn. Ct. App. 2015
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Daniel Justin Olson v. State of Minnesota
Minn. Ct. App. 2015
5, 11(a)(i) (2010) (defining “intimate parts” and “sexual contact”); (requiring state to show that defendant acted with sexual or aggressive intent and that defendant’s act involved intentional touching of intimate parts), review denied (Minn. Dec.
- State of Minnesota v. Shelby Ivan Charles Minn. Ct. App. 2014
- State of Minnesota v. Shelby Ivan Charles Minn. Ct. App. 2014
- State of Minnesota v. Hugh Alexander Larson Minn. Ct. App. 2014
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State of Minnesota v. Hugh Alexander Larson
Minn. Ct. App. 2014
“[B]ecause intent is a state of mind, it is generally proved by inferences drawn from a person’s words or actions in light of all the surrounding circumstances.” (“[A] showing of sexual intent does not require direct evidence of 4 the defendant’s desires or gratification because a subjective sexual intent typically must be inferred from the nature of the conduct itself.”), review denied (Minn. Dec.
- State v. Wenthe 845 N.W.2d 222 Minn. Ct. App. 2014
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State v. Wenthe
845 N.W.2d 222
Minn. Ct. App. 2014
For example, criminal sexual conduct involving sexual contact is a specific-intent crime because sexual contact requires proof of “sexual or aggressive intent.” (quoting Minn.Stat.