Cited by

5 plain language of the statute.” accord Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997).

n.9 (Minn. 2011) (declining to “abandon the plain language of” the relevant statute “for an interpretation that inserts a temporal limitation”); d 918, 924 (Minn. App. 2024) (concluding that, “[i]f the legislature intended to limit a public employer’s obligation ‘to continue

The MGDPA seeks “to reconcile the rights of data subjects to protect personal information from indiscriminate disclosure with the right of the public to know what the government is doing.” KSTP-TV v. Ramsey C ounty, (quotation omitted).

(“When relying on the plain statutory text, we read words and phrases to avoid absurd results and unjust consequences.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

4725 v. City of Brainerd, (“[W]e cannot add language to a statute; rather, we must apply the plain language of the statute as written.” (quotation omitted)); n.9 (Minn. 2011) (declining to “abandon the plain language of” the relevant statute “for an interpretation that inserts a temporal limitation”).

A court will “read and construe a statute as a whole and must interpret each section in light of the surrounding sections to avoid conflicting interpretations” and will read words and phrases “to avoid absurd results and unjust consequences.”

n.9 (Minn. 2011) (declining to “abandon the plain language” and accept an interpretation that “inserts” a limitation not otherwise present).

4, 8 (emphasis added); (asserting that “all government data falls into one of two main categories based on the type of information included in the data: (1) data on individuals, or government data in which any individual .

The MGDPA “regulates the collecti on, creation, storage, maintenance, dissemination, and access to government data in government entities.” KSTP-TV v. Ramsey County , (quoting Minn. Stat. § 13.01, subd.

n.9 (Minn. 2011) (declining to “abandon the plain language” of a statute in favor of an interpretation that “inserts” a limitation not otherwise present); Genin v. 1996 Mercury Marquis , (“The rules of construction forbid adding words or meaning to a statute that were intent

14–15; see KSTP - (explaining that “ ‘not public data’ is all other government data”).

See KSTP-TV v. Ramsey County , , 789 (Minn. 2011) (explaining levels of access to classifications of data on individuals).

The [MGDPA] also attempts to balance these competing rights within a context of effective government operation.” KSTP-TV v. Ramsey County , (quotation omitted).

The [M GDPA] also attempts to balance these competing rights within a context of effective government operation.” (quotation omitted).

793 (Minn. 2011) (noting that appellate courts are limited to interpreting the plain language of the statute and that policy arguments are properly directed to the legislature); (ruling that reviewing court may not rely on policy arguments to

(citation omitted); see also ILHC of Eagan, (“The touchstone for statutory interpretation is the plain meaning of the statute’s language.”).

In examining the language of a statute, “we construe words and phrases according to their common usage.” (citing Minn. Stat. § 645.08 (2010)).

“[Appellate courts] begin statutory interpretation with the plain language of the statute,” but a “previous interpretation of a statute guides [appellate courts] in determining its meaning,” – 05 (Minn. 2011).

The Act also attempts to balance these competing rights within a context of effective government operation.” (quotation omitted).

The Act also attempts to balance these competing rights within a context of effective government operation.” (quotation omitted).