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In this situation, given the lack of clarity and a federal circuit split, we see no reason to depart from our usual practice of applying supreme court precedent and leaving to the supreme court “‘the prerogative of overruling its own decisions.’” (quoting Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989)).

(holding that a Supreme Court decision casting doubt on a previous opinion’s reasoning is different from overruling the prior opinion’s holding).

And yet, as Paatalo correctly acknowledges, “only the [United States] Supreme Court may overrule one of its own decisions.”

“The legislature has the exclusiv e authority to define crimes and offenses and the range of the sentences or punishments for their violation.” Minn. Stat. § 609.095(a) (2020); aff’d, (“Minnesota courts do not have inherent authority to impose terms or conditions of sentences for criminal acts and must act within the limits of their statutory authority when imposing sentences.” (quotation omitted)).

First, “only the Supreme Court may overrule one of its own decisions.” (holding that a Supreme Court decision casting doubt on a previous opinion’s reasoning is different from overruling the prior opinion’s holding).

The court of appeals affirmed Sutter’s conviction, exempted all co-conspirator statements from a Confrontation Clause analysis.

Nevertheless, Hunt asks this court to recognize a broad right to travel means he does not need a driver’s license to drive when he is not “engaged in commerce.” And yet, Hunt acknowledges that “o nly the [United States] Supreme Court may overrule one of its own decisions,” and as an error -correcting court, this court is not autho rized to change or extend the law.

“We review de novo whether the Confrontation Clause was violated.” aff’d

State v. Brist , , 54 (Minn. 2012) ; see Bourjaily , 483 U.S. at 175 , 107 S.Ct.

d 51, 54 (Minn. 2012) (“Supreme Court precedent on matters of federal law, including the interpretation and application of the United States Constitution, is binding on this court.”).

(stating that the Minnesota Supreme Court is bound by United States Supreme Court “precedent on matters of federal law”); (stating that this court is bound by Minnesota Supreme Court precedent).

The Minnesota Supreme Court recognized in State v. Brist that courts are required “to conduct a separate Confrontation Clause analysis for out-of-court ‘testimonial’ statements, even when the statements at issue otherwise satisfy a firmly- rooted hearsay exception.” 4 Applying the Davis factors to this case, J.C.-L.’s statements to Detective Parranto in the ambulance were nontestimonial, and therefore admissible at trial.

Further, despite narrowing the scope of the exception in terms of searches other than of the defendant’s body, the U.S. Supreme Court has not overruled Robinson, and "only the Supreme Court may overrule one of its own decisions.” (citing Thurston Motor Lines, Inc. v. Jordan K. Rand, Ltd., 460 U.S. 533, *773 535 , 103 S.Ct.

We have previously acknowledged that the United States Supreme Court is the “final arbiter of the meaning and application of the United States Constitution.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

1782, 1790 , 149 L.Ed.2d 820 (2001) (“[I]t is this Court’s prerogative alone to overrule one of its precedents.” (quotation omitted)); (“We have therefore recognized that, when we consider matters arising under the United States Constitution, we.are bound to apply Supreme Court decisions that are on point and are good law.”), cert.

(“Supreme Court precedent on matters of federal law, including the interpretation and application of the United States Constitution, is binding on this court.”).