Cited by

See Sanchez, d at 560-61 (assuming without deciding that the equitable-tolling doctrine can apply to a postconviction petition); -31 (Minn. 2011) (same).

(reasoning that affidavits stating that trial witnesses were on drugs at the time of the crime were merely impeaching because they solely addressed the credibility of the witnesses and did not provide evidence regarding the innocence of the defendant); see also infra section II.B.5 (concluding that

See Holland, 560 U.S. at 649 (citation omitted); d 20, 30 (Minn. 2011).

4(b)(2); –27 (Minn. 2011).

n.5 (Minn. 2011) (stating that the postconviction court assesses whether the claim satisfies the statutory criteria before assessing the merits under the Rainer test); n.7 (Minn. 2018) (stating that an untimely petition must first sat isfy a subdivision 4(b) exception for

See also Roby v. State , n.6 (Minn. 2011) (holding that the district court’s misapplication of the Rainer test was harmless error because a claim that fails under its lower burden of proof would certainly fail under the more stringent statutory test).

Roby v. State , n.5 (Minn. 2011) (citing Rainer v. State , d 692, 695 (Minn. 1997)).

2(1)(c)b. “The clear and convincing evidence sta ndard is met when the truth of th e fact to be proven is highly probable.” Roby v. State , (quotation omitted).

4(a) (2016) ; see also Roby v. State , , 24 (Minn. 2011).

–30 (Minn. 2011) (concluding that interests-of-justice claims that arose more than two years before defendant filed his petition for postconviction relief were time barred).

6 n.5 (Minn. 2011) (citing Rainer, d at 695).

“Clear and convincing” evidence m eans that the truth of the facts asserted is “highly probable.” ().

Roby v. State , n.5 (Minn. 2011).

Clear and convincing evidence is demonstrated when the truth of the facts sought to be admitted is “highly probable.” (quotation omitted).

(“[T]he federal habeas corpus statute’s time limit is tolled when a petitioner pursues his rights reasonably diligently but some extraordinary circumstance prevents him from filing his habeas corpus petition on time.”).

See Wayne, d at 920; (holding that “general prison policies” that made it more difficult for the petitioner to file his claim in a timely fashion did not constitute the sort of “extraordinary circumstance[s]” necessary to invoke equitable tolling).

2(1)(c)b. “The clear and convincing evidence standard is met when the truth of the fact to be proven is highly probable.” (quotations omitted).

26 n. 5 (Minn.2011) (citing Rainer, d at 695 ).

), when the petitioner establishes that: “(1) the evidence was not known to the petitioner or counsel at the time of trial; (2) the failure to learn of the evidence before trial was not due to a lack of diligence; (3) the evidence is material, not merely impeaching, cumulative, or doubtful; and (4) the evidence would probably produce either an acquittal or a more favorable result.” , 26 n. 5 (Minn.2011).

9 *520 where we upheld the denial of an eviden-tiary hearing because the hearsay declar-ant was dead.

See Rickert, d at 242 (explaining that the earliest an interests-of-justice claim based on the transcript delivery could arise was when the transcript was ordered, and the latest the claim could have arisen was when the court reporter delivered the transcript); , 24 n. 2 (Minn.2011).