Cited by

-54 (Minn. 2013) (noting that “[t]he word ‘purpose’ is synonymous with ‘intention’ and is defined as the ‘result’ or an effect that is intended or desired” (quotation omitted)).

2 The supreme court has held that the word “purpose” is “synonymous with intention.” -54 (Minn. 2013).

d 849, 853 (Minn. 2013) (explaining that, for a general-intent crime, “[i]t is not necessary that [the actor] intend the resulting harm or know that his conduct is criminal”).

So long as the offender has voluntarily done the act, the crime has been committed.” (quoting 9 Henry W. McCarr & Jack S. Nordby, Minnesota Practice— Criminal Law & Procedure § 44.3 (4th ed. 2012)).

I. Voluntary Intoxication Defense When a defendant is charged with a crime requiring proof that they intended to cause a particular result, “the fact of [voluntary] intoxication may be taken into consideration in determining such intent.” (quoting Minn. Stat. § 609.075 (2012)).

6 (2022); (“[F]leeing by other means as defined in Minn. Stat. § 609.487, subd.

(interpreting the voluntary intoxication statute and holding that, based on its plain and ordinary meaning, the phrase “particular intent” unambiguously referred to specific-intent crimes, not general-intent crimes)

See Minn. Stat. § 609.075 (2020)

5 was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”

at 105 (noting that “‘purpose’ in the context of this statute means ‘aim, objective, or intention.’” (); (holding that phrase “for the purpose of” created specific-intent crime because “‘purpose’ is synonymous with ‘intention’ and is defined as the ‘result or an effect that is intended or desired.’” (quoting American Heritage Dictionary 1471 (3d ed. 1996)).

(stating that offense of fleeing peace officer in motor vehicle “requires a specific intent to attempt to elude the 12 officer”); -54 (Minn. 2013) (stating that offense of fleeing peace officer by means other than motor vehicle “is a specific-intent crime”).

ecent decision, State v. Dorn, assault- harm requires “only an intent to do the prohibited physical act of committing a battery.” (emphasis added) (quotation omitted); compare Fleck, d at 309 (explaining that domestic assault bodily harm is a general-intent crime because it prohibits the intentional infliction of bodily harm), -54 (Minn. 2013) (explaining that the crime of fleeing 7 To note, State v. Lampkin from this court held that the intent element of the statute governing domestic assault r

d 849, 853 (Minn. 2013) .

And we attempt as much as possible to interpret the statute “in a manner that renders no part of it meaningless.”

So long as the offender has voluntarily done the act, the crime has been committed.” (quotation omitted).

9 Henry W. McCarr & Jack Nordby, Minnesota Practice—Criminal Law and Procedure § 44:3 (4th ed.) (“Language in a statute that a prohibited act be done ‘for the purpose of’ a particular result creates a specific intent crime.”); State v. Wilson , –54 (Minn. 2013) (statutory language that a prohibited act be done “for the purpose of” a particular result creates a specific intent crime).

or insignificant.” T.G.G., d at 318-319 (quotation omitted); (“[W]e interpret the statute in a manner that renders no part of it meaningless.

This means that the offense “requires an intent to cause a particular result.” State v. Wilson , (quotations omitted); see also Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd.

See State v. Wilson , , 853 (Minn. 2013) ("[W]e interpret the statute in a manner that renders no part of it meaningless.").

State v. Wilson , , 853 (Minn. 2013) (quoting 9 Henry W. McCarr & Jack S. Nordby, Minnesota Practice-Criminal Law & Procedure § 44.3 (4th ed. 2012)).

-54 (Minn. 2013) (determining that the word “purpose” denoted a specific -intent requirement).

If a district court errs by failing to instruct the jury on voluntary intoxication, we w ill reverse unless the evidence establishing that the defendant “formed the re quisite intent is so overwhelming that the instructional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” d 849, 857 (Minn. 2013).

ion on voluntary intoxication: “(1) the defendant must be charged with a specific - intent crime; (2) there must be evidence sufficient to support a jury finding, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant was intoxicated; and (3) the defendant must offer intoxication as an explanation for his actions.” State v. Torres , d 609, 616 (Minn. 2001) ; -57 (Minn. 2013).

We interpret a statute “in a manner that renders no part of it meaningless.” d 849, 853 (Minn. 2013).

Specific-intent crime “[Appellate courts] apply common law principles when determining whether a statute is a general-intent or a specific-intent crime.” 853 (Minn. 2013).

“A party must satisfy the burden of production before that party is entitled to a voluntary intoxication jury instruction.” d 849, 854 (Minn. 2013).

Because a general-intent crime prohibits a person from voluntarily engaging in prohibited conduct, “it is enough that the offender intend to do the act proscribed.” (quotation omitted).

An appellate court reviews statutory-interpretation questions de novo, as legal questions

6 An appellate court reviews questions of statutory interpretation de novo, as legal questions