Cited by

-8 (Minn. 2013) (citing Lubbers for proposition that superseding cause is question of fact and affirming conviction of criminal vehicular homicide); -72 & n.5 (Minn. 2009) (citing Lubbers in discussing elements of duty and proximate cause and reversing conviction of second-degre

In Smith, we held that “the defendant’s operation of a motor vehicle must be the ‘proximate cause’ of the victim’s death ‘without the intervention of an efficient independent force in which [the] defendant did not participate or which he could not reasonably have foreseen.’ ” ().

(“In order to prove proximate cause, the [s]tate must show that the defendant’s acts were a substantial factor in causing the death.”).

30, 1993); (explaining that “Minnesota law requires the state to prove that the act of operating a motor vehicle was the proximate cause of the victim’s death” for a person to be convicted under the criminal-vehicular-homicide statute), aff’d, (same), rev. denied (Minn. Feb.

state must show that: (1) the allegedly negligent party committed an act that, in the exercise of ordinary care, the negligent party should have anticipated would likely injure others, even if the party could not anticipate the precise injury that resulted, and (2) the act was a “substantial factor in causing the death,” see also Lubbers, d at 401.

See, (criminal vehicular homicide); (first -degree murder); State v. McCormick , d 498, 507 -08 (Minn. App. 2013) (second -degree manslaughter), review denied (Minn. Oct.

That is because, “[e]ven if [the] three elements [of plain error] are met, this court has discretion whether to address the error to ensure the fairness and integrity of the judicial proceedings,” –31 (Minn. App. 2012), aff’d, , and the supposed error in Schill’s trial strategy not to object to evidence in order to develop defense testimony and argument does not implicate the fairness and integrity of the proceedings.

at 506– 07 (discussing superseding cause in the context of a tort claim); d 724, 729 (Minn. App. 2012) (discussing superseding cause in the context of a criminal case), aff’d

9 The Minnesota Supreme Court has recognized that a defendant “causes” death, for proximate-cause purposes, if “the defendant’s acts were a substantial factor in causing the death.” -6 (Minn. 2013) (concluding that the defendant’s acts, while not the immediate cause of death, were a substantial causal factor leading to the death); (“To prove that a defendant is guilty of causing the death of another, the State must prove the defendant’s acts

25, 1990); (noting that existence of a superseding cause may be a jury question if the evidence is such that reasonable minds could differ).