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The state must prove that the defendant “was aware that his behavior was prohibited by the order.” aff’d on other grounds

(“[I]t is the function of the fact-finder, not this court, to make credibility determinations.”).

State v. Watkins , , 28 (Minn. 2013).

State v. Watkins , , 28 (Minn. 2013).

-661 (Minn. 2007), see also Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 16, 119 S. Ct. 1827, 1837 (1999) (concluding that the omission of the element of “materiality” from jury consideration is s

“An error affects a defendant’s substantial rights if the error was prejudicial and affected the outcome of the case.”

“[T]he failure to instruct the jury on an elem ent of the charged offense is subject to review as a trial error.”

the Minnesota Supreme Court considered the meaning of the term “knowingly violates” in the context of the domestic- abuse-no-contact-order (DANCO) statute.

the supreme court interpreted a 1Because the district court pronounced a sentence on count 3 but dismissed counts 1 and 2, we consider Weldon’s arguments only with respect to count 3.

See, e.g., Huber, d at 527 (“[A] new trial will only be granted when it is necessary to ensure the fairness, integr ity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”); -31 (Minn. 2013) (“[W]e must consider the fourth prong of the plain-error test: whether a new trial is required to ensure the fairness, integrity, and public reputation of judicial proceedings.”).

(“An error in instructing the jury is prejudicial if there is a reasonable likelihood th at giving the instruction in question had a significant effect on the jury’s verdict.”) (quotation omitted)).

-30 (Minn. 2013) (discussing the phrase “knowingly violates this subdivisi on” as it relates to violation of the DANCO statute); -61 (Minn. App. 2012) (discussing the phrase “knowingly violates ” as it relates to violation of an HRO).

See Baird, d at 113 (holding that unobjec ted-to jury instructions are reviewed for plain error, requiring a showing that there was plain error affecting the defendant’s substantial rights); –28 (Minn. 2013) (discussing standard for reviewing unobjected- to jury instructions which omitted an element of the charged offense).

Instead, “[m]ost errors are trial errors, which are reviewed under a prejudicial- impact analysis to determine whether they require reversal and a new trial.” -26 (Minn. 2013).

- 61 (Minn. App. 2012), Mikulak argues that, to prove a knowing violation of the statute, the state had to show not only that he knew that he was required to register, but that he also knew that his action, or inaction, violated the statute.

If the state fails to carry its burden, we must consider the fourth prong of the plain- error test: “whether a new trial is required to ensure the fairness, integrity, and public 13 reputation of judicial proceedings.”

(defining “knowingly,” or “to know,” as “to perceive directly; grasp in mind with clarity and certainty” in analysis of the Domestic Abuse No Contact Order Statute, as stated in Minn. Stat. § 629.75, subd.

d 21, 29-30 (Minn. 2013) (explaining that a reasonable belief may negate the existence of a mental state essential to a charged crime).

An error in instructing the jury is prejudicial if there is a reasonable likelihood that giving the instruction in question had a significant effect on the jury’s verdict.” (citation and quotation omitted).

However, “mistake of law can be a defense when the elements of the offense require an intent to violate a statute because in such a case the mistake of law negat[es] the existence of a mental state essential to the crime charged.” (alteration in original) (quotation omitted).

-29 (Minn. 2013) (stating that in determining whether the omission of an element of a charged offense was prejudicial, an appellate court “may consider, among other factors, whether: (1) the defendant contested the omitted element and submitted evidence to support a contrary finding, (2) the State submitted overwhe

In State v. Watkins, the supreme court held “that the omission of an element of a crime in a jury instruction does not automatically require a new trial.”

But this portion of the instructions omitted the requirement that Huber's aiding of Delbert be "intentional."3 See Milton, d at 808 (concluding jury instructions on accomplice liability were plainly erroneous because they omitted the "intentionally aiding" element); -28 (Minn. 2013) (holding that an unobjected-to jury instruction that omitted the "knowing" element of the offense constituted plain error).

“Most errors are trial errors, which are reviewed under a prejudicial-impact analysis to determine whether they require reversal and a new trial.” –26 (Minn. 2013).

If the state fails to carry its burden, this court must consider the fourth prong of the plain-error test: “whether a new trial is required to ensure the fairness, integrity, and public reputation of judicial proceedings.” -31 (Minn. 2013).