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“An error in excluding evidence is harmless only if the reviewing court is satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that if the evidence had been admitted and the damaging potential of the evidence fully realized, a reasonable jury would have reached the same verdict.” (quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Feb.

“An error in 14 excluding evidence is harmless only if the reviewing court is satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that if the evidence had been admitted and the damaging potential of the evidence fully realized, a reasonable jury would have reached the same verdict.” (quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Feb.

We have observed that “the admission of evidence of a witness’s prior sexual conduct is highly prejudicial.” rev. denied (Minn. Feb.

A district court improperly coerces a verdict when its instructions, taken as a whole, communicate to the jury “that it must reach a verdict, or that deadlock is not an option.” rev. denied (Minn. Feb.

The absence of such an 16 imperative makes the supplemental instruction in this case different from supplemental instructions in other cases that a jury “must reach a verdict,” d 334, 337-40 (Minn. App. 2012), rev. denied (Minn. Feb.

Excluding evidence “is harmless only if the reviewing court is satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that if the evidence had been admitted and the damaging potential of the evidence fully realized, a reasonable jury would have reached the same verdict.” (quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Feb.

“An error in excluding evidence is harmless only if [we are] satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that if the evidence had been admitted and the damaging potential of the evidence had been fully realized, a reasonable jury would have reached the same verdict.” (quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Feb.

And “[a]n error in excluding [defense] evidence is harmless only if the reviewing court is satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that if the evidence had been admitted and the damaging potential of the evidence fully realized, a reasonable jury would have reached the same verdict.” (quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Feb.

“An error in excluding evidence is harmless only if the reviewing court is ‘satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that if the evidence had been admitted and the damaging potential of the evidence fully realized, a [reasonable] jury would have reached the same verdict.’” ().

Evidence of a victim’s previous sexual conduct is “highly prejudicial,” rev. denied (Minn. Feb.

State v. Olsen , rev. denied (Minn. Feb.

“An error in excluding [defense] evidence is harmless only if the reviewing court is ‘satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that if the evidence had been admitted and the damaging potential of the evidence fully realized, a [reasonable] jury would have reached the same verdict.’” (), rev. denied (Minn. Feb.

“An error in excluding evidence is harmless only if” we are “satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that if the evidence had been admitted and the damaging potential of the evidence had been fully realized, a [reasonable] jury would have reached the same verdict.” (alteration in original) (quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Feb.

“An error in excluding [defense] evidence is harmless only if the reviewing court is satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that if the evidence had been admitted and the damaging potential of the evidence fully realized, a reasonable jury would have reached the same verdict.” (quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Feb.

“[T]elling a jury that it must reach a verdict may cause jurors holding a minority viewpoint to surrender their honest beliefs in order to reach a unanimous verdict” and “is particularly coercive when delivered to a jury that is at an impasse.” rev. denied (Minn. Feb.

(alteration in original) (), rev. denied (Minn. Feb.

“An error in excluding [defense] evidence is harmless only if the reviewing court is ‘satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that if the evidence had been admitted and the damaging potential of the evidence fully realized, a [reasonable] jury would have re ached the same verdict.’” (quoting State v. Post , ).

d 334, 340 (Minn. App. 2012), rev. denied (Minn. Feb.

412(1); rev. denied (Minn. Feb.

(holding exclusion of evidence warrants reversal only if admission of evidence would have led to a different verdict beyond a reasonable doubt), review denied (Minn. Feb.

(admitting evidence of a victi m’s prior sexual conduct is “highly prejudicial”).

review denied (Minn. Feb.

In so doing, we apply a harmless-error test in wh ich “we determine first whethe r the district court erred, and if so, whether that error was harmless.” review denied (Minn. Feb.

review denied (Minn. Feb.

-41 (Minn. App. 2012) (holding that evidence that a victim went to a medical center for an STD test was not admissible under rule 412), review denied (Minn. Feb.

In State v. Olsen, this court reasoned that such a charge is erroneous for two 5 reasons: it misstates the law, which clearly allows a hung jury, and it coerces a jury because such an instruction “may cause jurors holding a minority viewpoint to surrender their honest beliefs in order to reach a unanimous verdict.” review denied (Minn. Feb.

“The right to present a defense is not unlimited; the admission of evidence of a witness’s prior sexual conduct is highly prejudicial and will not survive a rule 403 balancing test unless a special exception applies.” review denied (Minn. Feb.

The Martin “decision established two clear rules – that it is error to charge the jury that the case must be decided, and that it is error to give an instruction that specifically encourages the minority to reconsider its position without encouraging the same of the majority.” (citing Martin, 297 Minn. at 368–69, 370, 372–73, d at 770, 772–73), review denied (Minn. Feb.

“The right to present a defense is not unlimited; the admission of evidence of a witness’s prior sexual conduct is highly prejudicial and will not survive a rule 403 balancing test unless a special exception applies.” (quotations and citations omitted), review 6 denied (Minn. 27 Feb.

y otherwise would likely infer that the defendant was the source of the knowledge.” (“In certain cases the due process clause, the right to confront accusers, or the right to present evidence will require admission of evidence otherwise excluded by the rape shield law.”); (“[E]vidence [of a victim’s prior sexual conduct] is .