Cited by

n.7 (Minn. 2012) (holding that “the three nonprofit organization petitioners constitute ‘individual[s]’ within the meaning of Minn. Stat. § 204B.44 and have standing pursuant to the statute.” (alteration in original)).

1 These cases are: d 490 (Minn. 2024).

v. Ritchie, n.7 (Minn. 2012), we decline to decide this issue.

be entitled to intervention as a matter of right, the proposed intervenor must satisfy four requirements: “(1) a timely application; (2) an interest in the subject of the action; (3) an inability to protect that interest unless the applicant is a party to the action; and (4) the applicant’s interest is not adequately represented by existing parties.”

4 to the action; and (4) the applicant’s interest is not adequately represented by existing parties.”

.” (citation omitted)); n.7 (Minn. 2012) (“Because standing is essential to our exercise of jurisdiction, the issue is one which can be raised by this court on its own motion .

This rule requires: “(1) a timely application; (2) an interest in the subject of the action; (3) an inability to protect that interest unless the applicant is a party to the action; and (4) the applicant’s interest is not adequately represented by existing parties.” d 636, 641 (Minn. 2012) (citation omitted).

d 636, 645 n.7 (Minn. 2012), in which our supreme court interpreted Minnesota Statutes section 204B.44 (2010).

(referring to the “high degree of deference” in our review); Breza, d at 636 (referring to the “high standard set out in our precedent for finding a proposed constitutional amendment to be misleading”).

n.7 (Minn. 2012); d 736, 737 (Minn. App. 1996) (noting that appellate courts “are required to address the issue [of standing] even if the courts below have not passed on it, and even if the parties fail to raise the issue before us” (q uotation omitted)).

Rule 24.01 establishes four requirements for intervention as of right: “(1) a timely application; (2) an interest in the subject of the action; (3) an inability to protect that interest unless the applicant is a party to the action; and (4) the applicant’s interest is not adequately represented by existing parties.” d 636, 641 (Minn. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The supreme court has recognized that this rule requires: “(1) a timely application; (2) an interest in the subject of the action; (3) an inability to protect that interest unless the applicant is a party to the action; and (4) the applicant’s interest is not adequately represented by existing parties.” League of Women Vot ers Minn. v. Ritchie , (citing Minneapolis Star & ).

sis added).3 Our supreme court has interpreted this rule to require four elements to allow intervention: “(1) a timely application; (2) an interest in the subject of the action; (3) an inability to protect that interest unless the applicant is a party to the action; and (4) the applicant’s interest is not adequately represented by existing parties.” League of Women Voters Minn. v. Ritchie

(Page, J., dissenting) (“[W]hen the Legislature uses two different words in the same statute, D-3 the court presumes that the Legislature means two different things.”).

“Generally, we do not decide issues raised by an amicus that are not raised by the litigants themselves.” n.7 (Minn. 2012).

In re Gillette Children’s Specialty Healthcare , ; n.7 (Minn. 2012) (recognizing that standing presents a jurisdictional question).

See League of Women Voters Minn. v. Ritchie , , 640 (Minn. 2012) (acknowledging that under Minn. Stat. § 204B.44, a petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating the error the petitioner seeks to have corrected by the court).

v. Ritchie , -82 (Minn. 2012) (labelling as dicta and “not controlling for the present case” a gratuitous comment unnecessary to the decision).

See *13 League of Women Voters Minn. v. Ritchie , , 646 (Minn. 2012).

League of Women Voters Minn. v. Ritchie , , 645 n.7 (Minn. 2012) ; D.T.R.

We conclude that, given the respect the Judiciary owes to our, coordinate branches, and the detailed, specific tools provided by our constitution to resolve political disputes, it would be unwise for us to intervene here.

n.7 (Minn. 2012) (“Generally, we do not decide issues raised by an amicus that are not raised by the litigants themselves.”).

(stating that a comment concerning a legal proposition not essential to the case is dicta and is not binding).

1 Nunn also argues for the first time on appeal that the multiple-victim exception to Minn. Stat. § 609.035 (2014) violates both the doctrine of separation of powers, and the prohibition against double jeopardy

18, 2005); n.7 (Minn. 2012) (stating that appellate courts may raise standing sua sponte because it is a jurisdictional question).

For example, the supreme court concluded in League of Women Voters Minn. v. Ritchie that Minn. Stat. § 204B.44 (2010) “constitute[d] a legislative grant of standing” because it provided that “[a]ny individual may file a petition in the manner provided in this section for the correction of any of the following errors, omissions, or wrongful acts which have occurred or are about to occur.” n.7 (Minn. 2012).

685 n. 29 (Minn.2012) (Anderson, Paul H., J., dissenting).

(“Obiter dictum is a judicial comment made while delivering a judicial opinion, but one that is unnecessary to the decision in the case and therefore not precedential.” (quotation omitted)); see also State v. Rainer, 258 Minn. 168, 177-78 , -96 (1960) (discussing obiter and judicial