Cited by

d 816, 820-21 (Minn. 2015) (declining to provide two different definitions for “take” and “taking” when “the difference is not definitional, but syntactical”); (stating that the “verb ‘convicted’ and its related noun ‘conviction’ should be given similar meaning

(noting that “a legislature’s use of a verb tense is significant in construing statutes” and “different tenses exist to express differences in the time or duration of an action” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

The preambiguity canons of interpretation include the ordinary -meaning canon, see Riggs, d at 682, the whole-statute canon, see Riggs, d at 683, the canon against surplusage, see State 10 v. Thompson, and the presumption of consistent usage, -23 (Minn. 2015).

(“There is a natural presumption that identical words used in different parts of the same act are intended to have the same meaning.” (quotation omitted)); (applying the presumption of consistent usage in a plain meaning analysis of a statutory term).

where we stated that “[w]e do not turn to the common law definition of a word if the statute provides its own definition.” But that statement does not stand for the proposition that, if the Legislature has provided a definition, the phrase cannot be consistent with the common law.

16 an action.” see also Housing & Redevelopment Auth.

See, e.g., STRIB IV, - 9 24 (Minn. 2015)

See, e.g., STRIB IV, -24 (Minn. 2015); American Family Ins.

–21 (Minn. 2015) (declining to provide two different definitions for “take” and “taking” when “the difference is not definitional, but syntactical”); Wilbur v. State Farm Mut.

(“When a word is defined in a statute, we are guided by the definition provided by the Legislature.” (quotation omitted)); 2 Notably, DeBaere was decided in 1984, when the statutory definition of “consent” in the sex-crimes context was somewhat different.

“[D]ifferent tenses of words in a statute can lead to different meanings; a legislature’s ‘use of a verb tense is significant in construing statutes.’” (citing United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 333 (1992)).

In an analogous situation, the supreme court stated, “We see no reason to change our interpretation of [a key word in a statute] when the Legislature has also declined to do so.” d 816, 822 (Minn. 2015).

” (quoting Roos v. City of Mankato, 271 N.W.

–24 (Minn. 2015) (holding that the statutory definition of “taking” from the fish and game laws applied to the word “take” in a specific statute about deer hunting).

Additionally, we have determined that “there is a presumption of consistent usage throughout a statute.” 822 (Minn. 2015).

See, e.g. , STRIB IV, LLC v. County of Hennepin , , 825 (Minn. 2016) ; State v. Schmid , , 822-24 (Minn. 2015) ; Nelson v. Schlener , , 293 (Minn. 2015) ; American Family Ins.

0 (Minn. 2015); see Citizens Advocating Responsible Dev.

See State v. Schmid , , 820 (Minn. 2015) (noting that a statute is unambiguous when only one reasonable interpretation exists).

5 In ascertaining whether statutory words and phrases are ambiguous, we “construe words and phrases according to rules of grammar and according to their common and approved usage.” (quotations omitted).

d 816, 820 (Minn. 2015) (“We do not turn to the common law definition of a word if the statute provides its own definition.”).

In conducting this review, we recognize that Minnesota statutes are presumed constitutional, 3 We observe that none of the parties here had the benefit of the Minnesota Supreme Court’s when briefing whether relator’s actions could fall under the definition of “taking” in Minn. Stat. § 97A.401, subd.

d 816, 820-21, 824 (Minn. 2015) (using the American Heritage Dictionary to define terms).